Introduction:
The Supreme Court of India, while hearing a batch of petitions concerning the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, examined the legality and propriety of using Aadhaar as a document for verification during the enumeration process. The matter was heard by a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi. One of the principal petitions sought a nationwide revision of electoral rolls across all States, while other petitioners challenged the present SIR exercise being undertaken by the Election Commission of India (ECI). A central point of controversy before the Court was whether Aadhaar, which is issued through enrolment centres operated by private agencies, could be treated as a reliable document for verification in the electoral roll revision process. The petitioners questioned the inclusion of Aadhaar among the list of documents prescribed by the ECI for SIR, contending that Aadhaar neither establishes citizenship nor domicile and is issued to any resident of India. The Court, however, noted that Aadhaar has consistently been recognised as a valid proof of identity, though not of citizenship, and that the ECI has the authority to prescribe documents for verification purposes in exercise of its constitutional powers. The Bench also took note of arguments alleging political motivation behind the SIR exercise, which were countered by submissions that deletions from electoral rolls had occurred across party lines and could not be attributed to partisan intent. The hearing is part of a broader judicial examination of electoral integrity, voter verification mechanisms, and the balance between administrative efficiency and constitutional safeguards.
Arguments of the Petitioners (Opposing Use of Aadhaar and the SIR Exercise):
Senior Advocate Vijay Hansaria, appearing for the petitioner seeking nationwide SIR and raising objections to Aadhaar-based verification, strongly argued that Aadhaar should not be permitted as a verification document in the SIR process. His primary submission was that Aadhaar is issued through enrolment centres operated by private agencies, and therefore, cannot be treated as a reliable or relevant document for the purpose of electoral roll verification. He contended that the integrity of the electoral process requires strict scrutiny of documents, and reliance on Aadhaar, which is generated through decentralised and outsourced mechanisms, undermines that scrutiny. According to him, the fact that Aadhaar enrolment is carried out by private operators reduces institutional control and increases the risk of inaccuracies, making it unsuitable for such a sensitive constitutional function as voter verification.
Hansaria further distinguished Aadhaar from documents like birth certificates or municipal records, arguing that Aadhaar does not involve a substantive verification of citizenship or domicile at the time of issuance. He submitted that any person residing in India is eligible to obtain Aadhaar, irrespective of nationality, and therefore Aadhaar cannot be considered as even indirectly connected to electoral eligibility. He emphasised that the Aadhaar Act itself clarifies that Aadhaar does not confer citizenship or domicile and cannot be used as proof thereof. On this basis, he argued that its inclusion in the SIR document list dilutes the constitutional requirement that only citizens of India who meet statutory qualifications can be enrolled as voters.
The petitioners also expressed concern that Aadhaar-based verification could lead to wrongful inclusion or exclusion of names from electoral rolls, thereby affecting the right to vote, which has been recognised as a statutory right with constitutional significance. They suggested that reliance on Aadhaar could result in procedural unfairness, particularly for vulnerable populations who may possess Aadhaar but lack other documents establishing residence or long-term connection to a constituency. From this perspective, Aadhaar was portrayed as an administratively convenient but legally insufficient tool for the rigorous task of electoral verification.
Another significant strand of argument raised by those opposing the SIR exercise was that the revision process itself was politically motivated. It was contended that large-scale deletions or modifications of electoral rolls, especially close to election cycles, could disproportionately impact certain demographic or political groups. The petitioners alleged that such exercises could be used, directly or indirectly, to influence electoral outcomes by altering the voter base in specific constituencies. They argued that the timing and manner of the SIR exercise raised legitimate apprehensions about electoral fairness and neutrality, which are core to the constitutional mandate of the Election Commission.
Although Hansaria later clarified that his objection was not merely about the possibility of forgery, he reiterated that Aadhaar’s design and purpose are fundamentally different from documents traditionally used in electoral verification. He submitted that while Aadhaar may be useful for preventing duplication of entries in electoral rolls, it should not be used as a substantive document for verifying eligibility or identity in the SIR process. According to him, Aadhaar could serve only a limited technical role, such as detecting multiple registrations, but not as a primary verification document for inclusion or retention in electoral rolls.
Arguments Supporting the Use of Aadhaar and Defending the SIR Exercise:
In response to the objections, the Bench, particularly Justice Joymalya Bagchi, made several pointed observations highlighting the realities of modern administrative governance. When it was argued that Aadhaar is issued by private enrolment centres, the Court countered by observing that many essential public services today are delivered through outsourced or public-private partnership models. Justice Bagchi specifically noted that even the process of passport issuance, a core sovereign function, is outsourced to private service providers. The Court questioned why the involvement of private entities in Aadhaar enrolment should, by itself, render the document unreliable.
The Bench further observed that the mere possibility of forgery or misuse cannot be the basis for rejecting a document altogether, since any document, including passports, birth certificates, or municipal records, can potentially be forged. Justice Bagchi emphasised that during Aadhaar enrolment, private operators perform a public duty under statutory supervision, and therefore the process cannot be dismissed as unregulated or arbitrary. The Court underscored that outsourcing does not equate to abdication of governmental responsibility, especially when the overall framework is governed by law and regulatory oversight.
Addressing the argument that Aadhaar does not prove citizenship, the Court reaffirmed its consistent jurisprudence that Aadhaar is an acknowledged proof of identity, not proof of citizenship. The Bench clarified that the Election Commission is not using Aadhaar as evidence of citizenship but as one of the documents that can assist in identity verification. Justice Bagchi reiterated that the Court has never held that Aadhaar can be the basis of determining citizenship, and that the ECI retains the power to conduct further verification if required. Thus, the inclusion of Aadhaar does not, in the Court’s view, dilute the constitutional requirement that only eligible citizens can be enrolled as voters.
The Court also made a significant observation regarding the nature of documents prescribed for the SIR exercise. It noted that the eleven documents listed by the Election Commission need not always have a direct nexus with citizenship. Depending on the objective of the verification exercise, documents may be of various categories, serving different administrative purposes. The Bench observed that the ECI, in exercise of its plenary powers under the Constitution, is entitled to determine what documents are suitable for achieving the objectives of electoral roll accuracy, such as preventing duplication, ensuring correct addresses, and confirming identity. According to the Court, challenging the inclusion of Aadhaar on the ground that it does not establish citizenship may actually run contrary to the ECI’s administrative logic, which uses multiple documents collectively rather than relying on any single document.
On the allegation of political motivation behind the SIR exercise, submissions were made that deletions and corrections in electoral rolls have historically occurred across party lines and in multiple regions, and that no specific political party can claim to be uniquely disadvantaged by such exercises. It was argued that elections have been won by various parties even after large-scale revisions of electoral rolls, indicating that such processes are routine administrative functions rather than targeted political strategies. From this standpoint, it was contended that no mala fide intention can be attributed to the Election Commission merely because the SIR process may lead to deletions or modifications in voter lists.
The overall defence of the SIR exercise rested on the constitutional status of the Election Commission as an independent authority entrusted with the superintendence, direction, and control of elections. Supporters of the exercise argued that maintaining accurate and updated electoral rolls is fundamental to free and fair elections, and that periodic intensive revisions are necessary to remove duplicate entries, account for migration, and reflect demographic changes. Aadhaar, when used alongside other documents, was portrayed as a practical tool that enhances administrative efficiency without undermining legal safeguards.
Court’s Observations and Present Status:
At this stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court has not delivered a final judgment on the merits of the petitions but has made important oral observations that indicate its preliminary assessment of the issues. The Bench questioned the categorical objection to Aadhaar based solely on the involvement of private enrolment agencies, observing that outsourcing is now a common feature of public administration and does not inherently compromise the validity of documents issued under statutory frameworks. The Court clearly stated that Aadhaar is an accepted proof of identity and that its use by the Election Commission for verification purposes does not equate to recognising it as proof of citizenship.
Justice Bagchi’s remarks suggest that the Court views the ECI’s discretion in prescribing verification documents as part of its constitutional mandate, subject of course to judicial review if exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. However, the Bench did not find immediate merit in the argument that Aadhaar’s inclusion is per se illegal or unconstitutional. The Court also appeared unconvinced by claims that the SIR exercise is politically motivated, especially in the absence of concrete evidence showing targeted or discriminatory application.
Importantly, the Court acknowledged that Aadhaar may be particularly useful in preventing duplication of entries in electoral rolls, which is a legitimate and significant objective of electoral administration. While the petitioners sought to restrict Aadhaar’s role strictly to de-duplication, the Court did not endorse such a narrow interpretation at this stage, instead recognising the broader administrative context in which multiple documents are evaluated together.
The Bench also clarified that the prescribed list of documents for SIR does not need to establish citizenship in every case, as the process of voter verification involves multiple layers of scrutiny and administrative checks. The Court indicated that the Election Commission’s approach must be assessed holistically, rather than by isolating individual documents and testing them against standards they were never intended to meet, such as proof of nationality.
The hearing is ongoing, and the Court has also heard other petitioners opposing the SIR exercise. Further arguments are scheduled, and a final determination on the scope, legality, and safeguards of the SIR process is yet to be delivered. However, the oral observations made so far reflect a judicial inclination to respect the administrative discretion of the Election Commission, while remaining open to examining specific instances of arbitrariness or constitutional violation if established.