Introduction:

The Allahabad High Court has held that an appellate court is not required to wait indefinitely for an absconding accused to be traced and produced before proceeding with a criminal appeal. In Phulmati v. State, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 660, the Court examined a criminal appeal that had remained pending for nearly 42 years and was filed by an accused who had been convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment. Justice Vani Ranjan Agrawal proceeded to decide the appeal on merits despite the continued absence of the accused-appellant, holding that the Court was not bound to keep adjourning the matter indefinitely when the appellant had abused the liberty of bail and remained unavailable.

The appeal was instituted in 1982 by Phulmati against the judgment of the Trial Court delivered in the same year. The Trial Court had found her guilty of an offence under Section 307 IPC, relating to attempt to murder, and sentenced her to four years’ rigorous imprisonment. The High Court admitted the appeal on July 6, 1982 and granted the appellant bail. From that point onwards, however, the appellant continued to remain at liberty on bail but subsequently stopped appearing before the Court.

The extraordinary delay in disposal of the appeal was therefore not merely the result of institutional pendency. The record demonstrated that the appellant herself had failed to remain available to the Court. Over the years, the authorities took several steps to secure her presence. Bailable warrants were issued in 2007 and again in 2013. When attempts to locate her at the address available on record failed, proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated in 2013. Proceedings under Section 446 CrPC were thereafter initiated against her sureties in 2014.

Despite these measures, the appellant could not be brought before the Court. Even as late as 2024, the High Court noted that despite serious efforts, the relevant bail bonds could not be traced and notices could not be issued to the sureties. The Court therefore confronted an unusual procedural situation: an accused had filed a criminal appeal against conviction, obtained bail at the admission stage, disappeared thereafter and remained untraceable for decades.

The Court noted that it did not find any reasonable prospect of the accused-appellant being traced and produced before it. It also observed that the appellant appeared to be uninterested in the disposal of her own appeal and had abused the liberty granted to her by failing to appear despite coercive proceedings.

The question before the High Court consequently went beyond the merits of the original conviction. The Court had to determine whether it was legally required to keep the appeal pending until the absconding appellant was eventually located, regardless of how many years might pass. The Bench framed the issue in substance as whether the Court was bound to “wait perennially” for the accused to be searched for and produced before it, while repeatedly adjourning the appeal.

The Court answered that question in the negative. In doing so, it relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013). The Supreme Court in that case had considered the circumstances in which a criminal appeal may be dealt with when the appellant or his counsel remains absent.

The Supreme Court had made it clear that although an appellate court cannot simply dismiss a criminal appeal for non-prosecution without examining the merits, it is equally not compelled to adjourn the matter indefinitely because the appellant is absent. The Court may, as a matter of prudence or indulgence, adjourn a case, but such indulgence cannot be converted into an unlimited obligation to keep the appeal pending.

The Allahabad High Court applied this principle to the extraordinary facts before it. Since the appellant had remained absent for decades despite efforts to secure her presence, the Court concluded that there was no legal necessity to keep the appeal in perpetual suspension. At the same time, respecting the appellant’s right to have her conviction examined in appeal, the Court did not dismiss the matter for default. Instead, it examined the appeal on its merits.

The prosecution case itself dated back to the early 1980s. According to the prosecution, the complainant, Govindi Devi, had mortgaged her jewellery through Phulmati at a jeweller’s shop for a sum of Rs. 500. After the jewellery was redeemed, the two women were returning home together. During the course of their journey, Phulmati allegedly asked Govindi Devi to sit near a well.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant then pushed the complainant into the well with the intention of taking away her money or jewellery and causing her death. The complainant, however, survived the incident. Although she sustained serious injuries in the fall, she managed to hold onto the wall of the well and raised an alarm. Persons present nearby responded to her cries and rescued her.

The prosecution examined several witnesses to establish the occurrence. These included the complainant, eyewitnesses, the jeweller and the investigating officer. Medical evidence was also placed before the Trial Court. The medical examination confirmed significant injuries, including a fracture of the left radius or wrist, which was consistent with the complainant having fallen into the well.

The Trial Court considered the evidence and convicted Phulmati under Section 307 IPC. It imposed a sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment. The accused thereafter challenged the conviction before the High Court.

When the appeal eventually came up for effective consideration decades later, the appellant remained absent. Nevertheless, the High Court proceeded with the assistance of the State counsel, examined the trial record and assessed whether the conviction could legally be sustained.

After undertaking that exercise, the Court found no reason to interfere with the Trial Court’s findings. It considered the independent prosecution witnesses reliable and noted that they had no apparent connection with the complainant and no demonstrated enmity against the accused that could have motivated them to falsely implicate her.

The complainant herself had fully supported the prosecution version. The Court found no material circumstance suggesting that she had fabricated the incident or that the prosecution witnesses had deliberately attempted to implicate an innocent person while allowing the real offender to escape.

The High Court ultimately concluded that the Trial Court had delivered a well-reasoned and detailed judgment after properly scrutinizing the evidence. The conviction under Section 307 IPC and the sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment were consequently upheld.

The Court also directed the Trial Court to make every possible effort to secure the arrest of the appellant so that she could undergo the sentence imposed upon her.

The judgment therefore addresses two important aspects of criminal appellate procedure. First, it clarifies that the right of an accused to have a conviction examined on appeal does not mean that an absconding appellant can indefinitely prevent the appellate court from deciding the matter. Second, it reiterates that an appellate court must examine the merits rather than mechanically dismissing a criminal appeal merely because the appellant is absent.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant, Phulmati, had approached the High Court challenging the Trial Court’s judgment of conviction under Section 307 IPC. Although the appeal had been filed in 1982 and admitted by the High Court, the appellant was not present when the matter was ultimately taken up for consideration. She had been granted bail on July 6, 1982 and had thereafter enjoyed liberty for several decades.

The record before the High Court demonstrated that the appellant had subsequently failed to appear. The Court issued bailable warrants in 2007 and again in 2013. When she could not be found at her recorded address, the authorities initiated proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 CrPC. Section 82 provides for proclamation in cases where a person against whom a warrant has been issued is absconding or concealing himself, while Section 83 enables attachment of property in circumstances contemplated by the provision.

Proceedings were also initiated against the appellant’s sureties under Section 446 CrPC in 2014. Despite these steps, the appellant remained unavailable. The Court further noted that even in 2024, despite substantial efforts, the relevant bail bonds could not be traced and notices could not be served upon the sureties.

In these circumstances, the appellant’s continued absence presented a significant procedural difficulty. A criminal accused has an important right to challenge a conviction, but that right cannot ordinarily be understood as permitting the appellant to keep an appeal pending indefinitely by remaining absent after obtaining bail.

There was no substantive oral argument advanced before the High Court on behalf of the absent appellant at the stage when the appeal was finally considered. However, the very existence of the criminal appeal required the Court to examine the conviction on its merits rather than simply dismissing it because of her absence.

This distinction was important. The Supreme Court’s decision in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka makes clear that a criminal appeal cannot simply be dismissed for non-prosecution without examination of the merits. The accused’s absence does not erase the appellate court’s responsibility to examine whether the conviction is sustainable.

Therefore, although the appellant was unavailable, the High Court treated the appeal as a substantive challenge to the conviction and undertook an examination of the trial record. The question was not whether the appellant deserved to lose the appeal merely because she was absent. Instead, the Court examined whether the evidence justified the conviction independently of her presence.

On the other side, the State opposed interference with the Trial Court’s judgment. The State counsel assisted the High Court in examining the trial record and supported the conviction.

The State’s position was strengthened by the fact that the prosecution evidence had been accepted by the Trial Court after a full examination of the witnesses and documentary and medical material. The complainant had supported the prosecution case, while the independent witnesses were found to have no apparent reason to falsely implicate the appellant.

The prosecution case was that the appellant had taken the complainant to the vicinity of a well after the complainant had redeemed her jewellery from the jeweller. She allegedly pushed the complainant into the well with the intention of robbing her and causing her death. The complainant’s survival was attributed to her ability to hold onto the wall and raise an alarm, after which other persons rescued her.

The State relied upon the testimony of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses to establish the occurrence. The evidence of the jeweller supported the background circumstances concerning the jewellery transaction, while the investigating officer’s evidence addressed the investigation conducted after the incident.

Medical evidence was also relied upon to establish that the complainant had suffered serious injuries. The fracture to her left radius or wrist was consistent with the prosecution account that she had fallen into the well.

The State’s position on the procedural question was also supported by the principle that a court is not required to grant endless adjournments when an accused deliberately remains unavailable. The State could not reasonably be expected to leave a decades-old criminal appeal unresolved indefinitely because the appellant, after securing bail, had failed to appear.

The High Court therefore had to balance two competing considerations. On the one hand was the appellant’s legal right to have her conviction tested in appeal. On the other was the need to ensure that the appellate process was not frustrated indefinitely by an accused who had absconded after being released on bail.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in K.S. Panduranga provided the necessary framework for resolving that tension. The Supreme Court had recognized that an appellate court may, in an appropriate case, adjourn a criminal appeal when the appellant or counsel is absent. Such adjournment is a matter of prudence and judicial discretion. It is not an inflexible legal obligation.

At the same time, the Supreme Court had emphasized that an appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution simpliciter without examining the merits. Thus, the appropriate course was neither to dismiss the appeal mechanically nor to keep it pending forever.

The High Court adopted precisely that middle course. It decided to examine the appeal on merits while the appellant remained absent, thereby protecting the substantive appellate scrutiny to which the conviction was entitled without allowing the appellant’s continued absence to paralyse the judicial process.

After examining the evidence, the High Court found that the prosecution case had been properly established and that the Trial Court had correctly appreciated the evidence. There was, therefore, no basis for granting the relief sought through the appeal.

Court’s Judgment:

The Allahabad High Court ultimately dismissed the criminal appeal on merits and affirmed the conviction of Phulmati under Section 307 IPC, along with the sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment. The judgment is significant not merely for its conclusion on the evidence but for the procedural principle that an absconding accused cannot compel an appellate court to wait indefinitely for her return.

Justice Vani Ranjan Agrawal began by examining the unusual procedural history of the case. The appeal had been pending since 1982, making it approximately 42 years old when the Court finally addressed the question of its disposal. The appellant had been granted bail shortly after the appeal was admitted and had remained at liberty ever since.

The Court found that the appellant subsequently failed to appear before it. The judicial record showed repeated efforts to secure her presence. Bailable warrants were issued in 2007 and 2013. Proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 CrPC followed when she could not be located. Proceedings against the sureties under Section 446 CrPC were also initiated.

Yet, despite these measures, the appellant remained unavailable. The Court noted that even in 2024, after what it described as severe efforts, the relevant bail bonds could not be traced and notices could not be issued to the sureties.

Against this background, the High Court found no realistic prospect of the accused-appellant being traced and produced before it. The Court further concluded that her conduct demonstrated a lack of interest in securing disposal of the appeal and amounted to abuse of the liberty of bail.

The central procedural question was therefore whether the Court was bound to continue adjourning the appeal until the appellant was eventually located. The High Court answered this by relying on the Supreme Court’s authoritative decision in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013).

The Supreme Court in that case had laid down important propositions concerning the manner in which criminal appeals should be dealt with when the appellant is absent. The essential principle is that a criminal appeal cannot simply be dismissed for non-prosecution without examination of its merits. The appellate court has a duty to consider the correctness of the conviction.

However, the Supreme Court also clarified that the absence of an appellant does not impose an endless obligation upon the court to adjourn the appeal. The court may adjourn as a matter of prudence or judicial indulgence, but it is not legally compelled to do so indefinitely.

The appellate court may instead examine the record, consider the judgment under challenge and decide whether the conviction and sentence are legally sustainable. This ensures that the accused’s appellate right is respected while preventing the judicial process from being indefinitely stalled.

The Allahabad High Court applied that principle directly to the facts before it. Rather than dismissing the appeal simply because the appellant was absent, the Court expressly decided to examine the case on merits. It did so with the assistance of the State counsel and after perusing the Trial Court record.

This approach is particularly important because dismissal of a criminal appeal for non-prosecution could have serious consequences. A conviction cannot ordinarily be treated as conclusively correct merely because the convicted person is not physically present to prosecute the appeal. The appellate court must still undertake the necessary judicial scrutiny.

At the same time, the law cannot require a court to preserve a criminal appeal indefinitely in circumstances where the appellant has disappeared for decades. Such a rule would permit an accused to effectively control the functioning of the appellate process by simply remaining unavailable.

The High Court therefore adopted the course recognized by the Supreme Court: it examined the merits of the conviction despite the appellant’s absence.

On the merits, the Court found the prosecution evidence reliable. It gave particular significance to the evidence of independent prosecution witnesses. The Court noted that these witnesses had no connection with the complainant and that there was no material showing that they harboured any enmity towards the accused-appellant.

The absence of an apparent motive for false implication was relevant to the Court’s assessment of credibility. Where independent witnesses have no demonstrated relationship with the complainant and no apparent hostility towards the accused, their testimony may provide significant corroboration to the prosecution case.

The complainant, Govindi Devi, had also supported the prosecution version in material particulars. According to her account, she had mortgaged jewellery through Phulmati for Rs. 500 at a jeweller’s shop. After the jewellery was redeemed, the two women proceeded towards home.

The prosecution alleged that Phulmati then asked the complainant to sit near a well and pushed her into it with the intention of robbing her and killing her. The complainant’s survival was attributed to her ability to hold onto the wall of the well and raise an alarm, which attracted the attention of persons nearby.

The medical evidence provided additional support to the prosecution case. The complainant had suffered serious injuries, including a fracture of the left radius or wrist. The nature of the injuries was consistent with the account of a fall into a well and supported the existence of a serious physical assault.

The High Court also considered the overall evidentiary record and found no circumstance indicating a deliberate effort to falsely implicate the appellant while permitting the actual offender to escape. The Court was therefore satisfied that the prosecution evidence had been properly appreciated by the Trial Court.

The Court described the Trial Court’s judgment as a “well-reasoned and detailed judgment” which had properly scrutinized and analyzed the evidence and facts available on record. It found no legal or factual error warranting appellate interference.

Consequently, the conviction under Section 307 IPC was upheld. The sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed by the Trial Court was also maintained.

The decision also dmonstrates that the absence of an accused does not prevent a H