Introduction:
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has reiterated that a petition seeking cancellation of bail and a petition seeking setting aside of a bail order operate within distinct legal parameters. While cancellation of bail ordinarily requires the existence of supervening circumstances, misuse of the concession of bail, interference with the administration of justice or violation of bail conditions, setting aside the original bail order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the order itself was perverse, illegal or founded on wholly irrelevant considerations.
Justice Sumeet Goel made the observation while dismissing a petition filed by complainant Manan Chugh in connection with a travel-fraud case. The petitioner had challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, which had granted regular bail to respondent No. 2, a woman accused in an FIR registered under Sections 318(4), 3(5) and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).
The dispute arose from an alleged travel transaction involving ₹8,90,000. According to the complainant, the accused woman, along with her father and other co-accused, was operating a travel business. The complainant alleged that the amount was paid for arranging air tickets and hotel accommodation. However, as the date of travel approached, he allegedly discovered that the tickets and hotel reservations provided to him were forged, cancelled or otherwise invalid. He was consequently required to make alternative travel arrangements at substantially higher costs.
The complainant approached the High Court after the Additional Sessions Judge granted regular bail to the accused. His principal contention was that the trial court had not properly appreciated the investigative material and had incorrectly viewed the dispute through the lens of a possible breach of agreement rather than an alleged cheating scheme existing from the very beginning of the transaction.
The challenge also relied upon material concerning other FIRs allegedly involving the accused and her alleged pattern of similar conduct. The complainant further raised concerns regarding the accused’s ability to leave India. It was submitted that she had previously been intercepted at the Indira Gandhi International Airport while allegedly attempting to travel to Dubai. According to the petitioner, the alleged foreign connections and this earlier incident created a genuine apprehension that she might evade the criminal proceedings or interfere with witnesses.
The State supported the complainant’s challenge and relied upon the alleged pattern of similar offences to contend that the accused’s conduct warranted greater scrutiny.
The accused, however, opposed the petition on the ground that it was essentially an attempt to obtain a review of the order granting bail. Her counsel argued that the petitioner had not identified any event occurring after the grant of bail that could justify cancellation. There was, according to the defence, no allegation supported by material showing that the accused had misused the liberty granted to her, attempted to influence witnesses, tampered with evidence, evaded the process of law or violated any condition of bail.
The High Court ultimately found that the petition was, in substance, a challenge to the correctness of the original bail order rather than a case of subsequent misuse of bail. It found the trial court’s order to be a reasoned and speaking order and held that the grounds now relied upon had substantially been available when bail was originally considered.
At the same time, the High Court took note of the flight-risk concern and directed the accused to surrender her passport before the concerned trial court within seven days. Thus, while the Court declined to disturb the regular bail, it imposed an additional safeguard concerning the accused’s ability to travel outside India.
Arguments of the Parties:
Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner-complainant contended that the Additional Sessions Judge had failed to properly appreciate the material collected during investigation. According to the petitioner, the allegations were not merely indicative of a contractual disagreement or failure to perform a promise. Rather, the material allegedly disclosed a deliberate scheme to deceive the complainant from the inception of the transaction.
The petitioner challenged the reasoning adopted by the trial court in drawing what was described as a “thin line” between criminal cheating and a breach of contractual obligations. It was argued that the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the alleged provision of forged, cancelled or invalid travel documents, were sufficient to raise a serious question about the accused’s conduct at the very inception of the transaction.
The complainant further relied upon multiple FIRs and other material which, according to him, demonstrated that the accused was allegedly involved in similar transactions. It was submitted that this material had been brought to the notice of the trial court but had not been given adequate consideration while granting regular bail.
Another significant argument concerned the accused’s alleged flight risk. The petitioner submitted that the accused had previously been intercepted at the IGI Airport when she was allegedly attempting to travel to Dubai. The petitioner argued that this circumstance, coupled with alleged foreign links, created a reasonable apprehension that she might evade the proceedings or attempt to influence witnesses from outside the jurisdiction.
The petitioner therefore sought setting aside of the regular bail order rather than merely modification of its conditions. His argument was that the bail order was fundamentally flawed because relevant material had allegedly not been properly evaluated by the trial court.
The State supported the petitioner’s case. It was submitted that the alleged involvement of the accused in similar offences was relevant to assessing the circumstances in which bail had been granted. The State relied upon the alleged pattern of similar offences as an indication of what it described as criminal propensity.
On the other side, counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 argued that the petition was legally misconceived. According to the defence, the complainant was effectively asking the High Court to sit in appeal over the discretionary order passed by the Sessions Court and reconsider the same material that had already been considered while deciding the bail application.
The defence relied upon the distinction between cancellation of bail and setting aside of a bail order. It was argued that once bail has been granted, cancellation ordinarily requires something more than dissatisfaction with the reasoning adopted by the court. There must be material demonstrating misuse of the liberty granted, interference with the judicial process, violation of bail conditions or some other supervening circumstance.
Counsel further relied upon Sections 483(3) and 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to contend that the High Court’s jurisdiction could not be invoked merely to secure a second consideration of the merits of bail. According to the defence, there had been no subsequent event showing that the accused had misused the concession granted to her.
It was emphasised that no allegation supported by cogent material had been brought on record showing that the accused had attempted to influence witnesses, tamper with evidence, abscond, evade the process of law or violate any condition imposed by the trial court after her release.
The defence therefore submitted that the petition should be dismissed, particularly because the grounds relied upon by the complainant, including the seriousness of the allegations and the alleged previous cases, were matters which were already available when the Sessions Court granted bail.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Sumeet Goel began the Court’s consideration by identifying the precise nature of the jurisdiction being invoked. The Court stressed that the parameters governing setting aside a bail order are different from those applicable to cancellation of bail.
The High Court relied upon its earlier decision in Dinesh Madan v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-9029-2023, decided on May 17, 2024. In that case, the Court had explained the conceptual distinction between the two remedies. In a cancellation-of-bail proceeding, the focus is ordinarily on supervening circumstances or subsequent misconduct by the accused. In contrast, when the prayer is to set aside the original bail order, the focus is on whether the order itself was unjustified, illegal or founded upon irrelevant considerations.
Applying that distinction, the Court first examined what the complainant was actually seeking. It found that the petitioner’s pleadings and submissions were directed principally towards demonstrating that the trial court had not properly assessed material which was already available when bail was granted.
The petitioner was not relying upon a subsequent act of the accused occurring after her release. Instead, the challenge was that the trial court had allegedly failed to give sufficient weight to the nature of the allegations, the investigative material, the other FIRs and the alleged possibility of the accused fleeing the country.
The High Court therefore treated the petition as one seeking to set aside the original bail order. That classification was important because the petitioner could not succeed merely by establishing that another court might have reached a different conclusion on the same material.
The Court then considered whether the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge could be described as perverse, illegal or based on wholly irrelevant considerations.
On examination, the High Court found the impugned order to be a “well-reasoned speaking order.” The Sessions Court had considered the stage of the criminal proceedings and the fact that the challan had already been presented. It had also taken into account that determining the actual culpability of the accused would ultimately require appreciation of evidence during trial.
The trial court had also considered the likely duration of the proceedings. The High Court noted that the trial was expected to take considerable time and that the prosecution had already presented the challan. These considerations formed part of the basis upon which regular bail had been granted.
The High Court did not find that the Sessions Court had ignored the material so fundamentally as to render its order perverse. Nor did it find that the order had been based upon considerations wholly unrelated to the question of bail.
A crucial factor in the High Court’s decision was the absence of any post-bail misconduct. Justice Goel observed that the petitioner had not placed on record material demonstrating that, after being released on bail, respondent No. 2 had attempted to influence witnesses, tamper with evidence or violate any condition imposed by the Court.
The Court also found no material indicating that the accused had absconded or otherwise evaded the process of law following the grant of bail.
The High Court consequently held that the apprehensions expressed by the petitioner were largely speculative and unsupported by cogent material. The Court drew a distinction between a genuine apprehension supported by subsequent conduct and a concern based upon circumstances that had existed even before bail was granted.
This distinction was particularly significant in relation to the alleged flight risk. The petitioner’s reliance on the accused having allegedly been intercepted at the airport and the existence of foreign links was considered in the context of the challenge to the bail order. However, the Court did not find that these circumstances, in the absence of subsequent misuse of bail or a demonstrably perverse bail order, justified setting aside the entire order.
The Court emphasised that mere dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the court below cannot, by itself, provide sufficient grounds for recalling or setting aside a bail order. Similarly, the seriousness of the alleged offence does not automatically justify interference with an order granting bail once the relevant legal parameters have been considered.
The Court observed that the grounds relating to the nature and gravity of the allegations, as well as the alleged pattern of similar offences, were matters which had been available at the time the accused’s regular bail application was considered. The complainant could not simply re-agitate those matters as though they constituted a new circumstance arising after the grant of bail.
The High Court’s reasoning therefore rested on the principle that the judicial process cannot ordinarily be used to obtain a second evaluation of the same bail considerations merely because the complainant disagrees with the conclusion reached by the lower court.
At the same time, the Court did not completely disregard the concern regarding the accused’s possible travel outside India. Instead of cancelling the bail, it adopted a narrower measure to address that concern. “Considering the factual milieu of the case,” the Court directed respondent No. 2 to surrender her passport before the concerned trial court within seven days.
The passport direction served as a safeguard without disturbing the fundamental decision granting bail. This approach allowed the Court to address the specific concern regarding the accused’s potential movement outside the country while preserving the distinction between a genuine case for cancellation or setting aside of bail and a case where additional conditions may adequately address the concern.
The direction also demonstrates that the Court’s refusal to set aside bail did not amount to a finding that every concern raised by the complainant was irrelevant. Rather, the Court assessed the appropriate legal response to those concerns. Where the material did not satisfy the threshold for setting aside the bail order, a tailored condition could nevertheless be imposed where circumstances justified it.
Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the petition and held that no sufficient ground had been made out to set aside the regular bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram.
Importantly, the Court clarified that its observations were confined to the issue of bail and would not constitute an expression of opinion on the merits of the criminal case. The allegations concerning the alleged travel fraud, forged or invalid documents and the accused’s alleged involvement in other cases therefore remain matters to be determined in accordance with law during the criminal proceedings.
The ruling reinforces an important procedural distinction in bail jurisprudence. A party seeking cancellation cannot ordinarily rely merely upon the seriousness of the allegations or disagreement with the reasoning of the court that granted bail. Where the complaint is directed at the original order itself, the challenge must cross the threshold of demonstrating that the order was legally unsustainable, perverse or based upon irrelevant considerations. Where the complaint concerns conduct after release, the focus shifts to subsequent events such as misuse of liberty, interference with witnesses, tampering with evidence, evasion of proceedings or violation of bail conditions.
In the present case, the High Court found that the petitioner had not crossed that threshold. The regular bail therefore remained intact, subject to the additional direction requiring surrender of the passport within seven days.