Introduction:

The Allahabad High Court has reiterated an important principle governing the territorial jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India: the mere residence of a petitioner within the territorial limits of a High Court does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction upon that Court to examine a challenge against an order passed by an authority situated outside its territory.

The ruling was delivered by Justice Anish Kumar Gupta in Yadvendra Singh v. Union of India and 3 Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 643. The Court was considering a petition challenging the cancellation of the petitioner’s candidature and withdrawal of his appointment for the post of Tradesman Mate at the 9 Field Ordnance Depot, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.

The petitioner had applied for the post, formerly known as Mazdoor, pursuant to an advertisement issued for recruitment to posts including Fireman, Tradesman Mate and Multi-Tasking Staff. The recruitment exercise was conducted by the concerned authorities at Kangra. The petitioner belonged to the OBC male category and, according to the case placed before the Court, successfully cleared all stages of the selection process.

Despite completing the selection process, the petitioner’s candidature was subsequently cancelled and the appointment letter issued to him was withdrawn on the ground that criminal cases were pending against him. Aggrieved by the decision of the Administrative Officer of the 9 Field Ordnance Depot, the petitioner approached the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the impugned order and consequential relief.

At the outset, however, the respondents raised a preliminary objection concerning territorial jurisdiction. Their contention was that the Allahabad High Court could not entertain the petition because the authority that had passed the impugned order was located at Kangra in Himachal Pradesh. The selection process had also taken place in Himachal Pradesh, and the recruitment advertisement had originated from the same place.

The respondents therefore argued that the petitioner’s residence within the territorial jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court could not independently confer jurisdiction upon that Court. The appropriate remedy, according to the respondents, was to approach the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the authority and the cause of action.

In deciding the objection, Justice Anish Kumar Gupta relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India. The Supreme Court, in that case, had examined the territorial limits of the jurisdiction exercised by High Courts under Article 226 and held that the jurisdiction does not depend upon the residence or location of the person seeking relief. Rather, it depends upon the location of the person or authority against whom the writ is sought.

The principle assumes significance because Article 226 confers wide powers upon High Courts to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose”. However, the exercise of that power is subject to territorial limitations. The constitutional scheme requires a connection between the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction and the authority or cause of action involved in the proceeding.

The present case required the Allahabad High Court to determine whether the petitioner’s residence in Uttar Pradesh was sufficient to overcome the fact that the relevant authorities were situated in Himachal Pradesh and that the material events underlying the dispute had occurred there.

The Court examined the location of the respondent authorities, the origin of the recruitment process, the place where the selection was conducted and the location from which the impugned order was issued. It found that the relevant circumstances were all connected with Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.

Both respondent authorities concerned were situated at Kangra. The advertisement pursuant to which the petitioner had applied was issued from there. The selection process was conducted there, and the impugned decision cancelling his candidature and withdrawing his appointment was also passed in Himachal Pradesh.

In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s residence in Uttar Pradesh could not provide the necessary territorial foundation for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court.

The Court consequently dismissed the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction. Importantly, however, the dismissal was not an adjudication upon the merits of the petitioner’s challenge to the cancellation of his candidature. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the court of appropriate jurisdiction for redressal of his grievance.

The judgment therefore serves as a reminder that the broad nature of Article 226 jurisdiction does not eliminate territorial limitations. A litigant cannot ordinarily choose a High Court merely because he resides within its territory when the challenged action has been undertaken entirely by an authority situated elsewhere.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Yadvendra Singh, approached the Allahabad High Court challenging the decision by which his candidature for the post of Tradesman Mate at the 9 Field Ordnance Depot, Kangra, was cancelled and his appointment letter withdrawn. His case arose after he had participated in the recruitment process and cleared the stages of selection.

The petitioner sought judicial intervention against the order passed by the Administrative Officer of the Depot. The substantive grievance concerned the cancellation of his candidature on account of criminal cases stated to be pending against him. The petitioner sought to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to challenge the legality of that decision.

Although the principal issue before the Court ultimately became one of territorial jurisdiction, the petitioner’s underlying case was that the cancellation of his selection and withdrawal of his appointment deserved judicial scrutiny. Having successfully participated in the recruitment process, the petitioner was aggrieved by the subsequent decision of the authorities.

The petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court, apparently on the basis that the petitioner was residing within Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner sought to have the impugned order examined by that Court and sought consequential relief against the respondent authorities.

The respondents, however, raised a preliminary objection that went to the maintainability of the petition before the Allahabad High Court. They contended that the Court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the authorities against whom the writ was sought were located at Kangra in Himachal Pradesh.

The respondents pointed out that the relevant recruitment advertisement had been issued from Kangra. The selection process had been conducted there, and the order challenged by the petitioner had also been passed by the Administrative Officer at the same location.

According to the respondents, there was therefore no relevant territorial connection between the impugned administrative action and the territorial jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court. The fact that the petitioner happened to reside within Uttar Pradesh could not, standing alone, create such jurisdiction.

The respondents relied upon the seven-judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India. The judgment in that case had laid down that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 depends upon the person or authority against whom the writ is sought being within the territorial limits of that High Court, rather than upon the residence of the person seeking the writ.

The respondents therefore urged the Allahabad High Court to dismiss the petition at the threshold for want of territorial jurisdiction. They maintained that if the petitioner wished to challenge the order passed by the authorities at Kangra, he should approach the High Court having jurisdiction over those authorities.

The petitioner’s position, on the other hand, required consideration in the context of his grievance against the cancellation of his candidature. His attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court was linked to his residence within Uttar Pradesh. However, the Court was required to determine whether such residence could constitute an independent jurisdictional basis.

The High Court’s consideration ultimately focused not on the merits of the petitioner’s employment grievance but on the constitutional limits of its writ jurisdiction. The Court examined whether the location of the petitioner was sufficient to confer jurisdiction when the authority, recruitment process and impugned decision were all situated outside Uttar Pradesh.

The Court’s analysis therefore proceeded on the principle that territorial jurisdiction must be established through the constitutional and legal framework governing writ proceedings rather than simply through the convenience or residence of the litigant.

The respondents’ objection gained further force from the fact that there was no isolated event within Uttar Pradesh that formed an essential part of the challenged administrative action. The advertisement originated in Himachal Pradesh, the selection was conducted there, the concerned authorities were located there and the final adverse order was also passed there.

Thus, the respondents argued that the entire decision-making process was territorially connected with Himachal Pradesh.

The petitioner was consequently left with the option of approaching the competent court in the State where the relevant authorities were located and where the cause underlying the impugned order had arisen.

The High Court ultimately accepted the respondents’ preliminary objection. It did not enter into the merits of whether the petitioner’s candidature had been correctly cancelled on account of the pending criminal cases. That issue was left open for consideration by the court of appropriate jurisdiction.

The Court’s decision to grant liberty to the petitioner was therefore significant. The dismissal did not extinguish his substantive grievance. It merely determined that the Allahabad High Court was not the proper constitutional forum for adjudicating that grievance.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Anish Kumar Gupta dismissed the writ petition after holding that the Allahabad High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the challenge against the order passed by the authority at Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.

The Court’s reasoning was founded primarily upon the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of Article 226 in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India. The seven-judge Bench in that case had considered the scope of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 and made clear that the jurisdiction of a High Court does not arise merely because the person seeking relief resides within its territory.

The relevant consideration is the location of the person or authority against whom the writ is sought and, in the context of the constitutional framework applicable to writ jurisdiction, the territorial connection of the cause of action.

The principle is rooted in the constitutional structure of High Courts. Article 226 grants each High Court jurisdiction to issue writs, directions and orders within the territorial limits prescribed by the Constitution. The provision cannot be interpreted in a manner that permits a High Court to exercise jurisdiction over an authority having no relevant territorial connection with it merely because an aggrieved individual happens to reside within its territory.

The Court therefore examined the factual circumstances of the present dispute.

It noted that the respondent authorities concerned were located at Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. The recruitment advertisement through which the petitioner applied for the post had been issued from Kangra. The entire selection process had taken place there. Most importantly, the impugned order cancelling the petitioner’s candidature and withdrawing his appointment letter had also been passed in Himachal Pradesh.

These facts demonstrated a direct and substantial territorial connection between the challenged administrative action and Himachal Pradesh.

The Court consequently found no sufficient basis for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court merely because the petitioner resided within Uttar Pradesh.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh was particularly significant because it rejected the proposition that a petitioner’s residence alone determines territorial jurisdiction under Article 226. The location of the aggrieved person is distinct from the location of the authority whose action is being challenged.

This distinction prevents forum shopping and maintains the territorial structure of constitutional judicial review. If residence alone were sufficient, a person could potentially challenge an order passed by a distant authority before any High Court in whose territory the person happened to reside. Such an interpretation would significantly expand the territorial reach of individual High Courts beyond the constitutional framework.

The Allahabad High Court therefore applied the Supreme Court’s binding principle to the facts before it.

The Court did not find any other material circumstance that could establish territorial jurisdiction. The recruitment process had not been conducted in Uttar Pradesh. The advertisement had not originated there. The relevant authorities were not situated there, and the impugned order had not been passed there.

The fact that the petitioner was residing in Uttar Pradesh could therefore not independently confer jurisdiction.

The decision also illustrates the distinction between a litigant’s personal connection with a place and the territorial nexus required for constitutional judicial review. A person’s residence may make a particular forum convenient, but convenience cannot substitute for jurisdiction.

This principle is especially important in service and employment disputes involving central or government authorities located in different States. A litigant may reside in one State while applying for a post, undergoing selection and receiving an administrative decision in another. The mere fact that the litigant resides in the first State does not necessarily permit its High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction over the authority situated in the second State.

The High Court accordingly declined to examine the petitioner’s substantive challenge to the cancellation of his candidature.

This was important because the Court’s order should not be understood as affirming the administrative decision against the petitioner. The Court did not determine whether the existence of pending criminal cases legally justified cancellation of the petitioner’s candidature or withdrawal of the appointment letter.

Those questions remained open.

The Court’s conclusion was confined to the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Since the Allahabad High Court lacked jurisdiction, it could not proceed to determine the merits of the petition.

At the same time, the Court ensured that the petitioner was not left without a remedy. It granted liberty to him to approach the court of appropriate jurisdiction for redressal of his grievance.

Such liberty is significant because dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is fundamentally different from dismissal on merits. A jurisdictional dismissal does not decide whether the petitioner’s substantive rights were violated. It simply directs the litigant to pursue the appropriate judicial forum.

The ruling therefore preserves the petitioner’s ability to challenge the impugned order before the competent court while ensuring that the territorial limits of the Allahabad High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction are respected.

The judgment also reinforces the binding nature of Supreme Court precedent. Justice Gupta did not treat territorial jurisdiction as a matter of convenience or discretionary choice. Instead, the Court applied the principle laid down by the seven-judge Bench in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh to the undisputed territorial facts of the case.

The decision reflects the constitutional discipline required in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Article 226 is undoubtedly a broad and powerful remedy, but its breadth does not mean that every High Court can examine every administrative action regardless of where the authority is situated.

The Court’s approach also serves an important institutional purpose. Authorities should ordinarily be answerable to the constitutional court exercising jurisdiction over their territory. This enables the concerned High Court to exercise effective judicial supervision over administrative bodies located within its territorial jurisdiction.

In the present case, the 9 Field Ordnance Depot and the relevant Administrative Officer were situated at Kangra. The recruitment process arose there, and the impugned order was issued there. Accordingly, the territorial nexus was overwhelmingly with Himachal Pradesh.

The Court therefore found that the petitioner’s residence in Uttar Pradesh could not alter the constitutional position.

The judgment is also a reminder to litigants and legal practitioners to examine territorial jurisdiction carefully before instituting writ proceedings. A petition may involve a genuine grievance and still be liable to dismissal if brought before a High Court that lacks territorial jurisdiction.

This is particularly relevant in service matters, where recruitment advertisements, selection processes, appointment orders and subsequent administrative decisions may occur in different places. The mere residence of an employee or candidate should not be treated as an automatic jurisdictional gateway.

The High Court’s reasoning also reflects the importance of distinguishing between the existence of a cause of action and the mere personal residence of a litigant. A court’s territorial jurisdiction must be grounded in the constitutional parameters governing its writ power.

On the facts of the case, the Court found that the essential events were located outside Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Allahabad High Court to entertain the petition.

The final order was therefore straightforward: the writ petition was dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction, while liberty was granted to the petitioner to approach the appropriate court.

The decision in Yadvendra Singh v. Union of India and 3 Others consequently reaffirms a foundational rule of constitutional litigation. A petitioner cannot ordinarily invoke the writ jurisdiction of a High Court merely because he resides within its territorial limits when the authority whose order is challenged is located outside those limits and the material events forming the basis of the dispute occurred elsewhere.

The ruling also underscores that Article 226 jurisdiction must be approached through the constitutional framework rather than the convenience of an individual litigant. The High Court’s power to issue writs is extensive, but it is not territorially unlimited.

Ultimately, the Allahabad High Court did not decide whether the cancellation of the petitioner’s candidature was legally justified. It simply held that such a determination could not be made by that Court in view of the territorial facts. By granting liberty to approach the appropriate forum, the Court preserved the petitioner’s substantive remedy while maintaining the constitutional boundaries of its own jurisdiction.

The judgment thus serves as a practical reminder that before challenging an administrative order under Article 226, a litiant must identify not only the nature of the grievance but also the pr