Introduction:
The Karnataka High Court has held that continuity of service by itself does not confer a right upon a government or institutional employee to have service rendered in one cadre counted for promotional or financial benefits available in another cadre. The Division Bench comprising Justice S.G. Pandit and Justice K. Manmadha Rao made this clarification while dismissing a writ petition filed by Dr. Mohammed Shakeel Ansari, an Associate Professor at the National Institute of Unani Medicine (NIUM), Bengaluru. The petitioner had challenged the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Bengaluru Bench, which had rejected his claim for counting his earlier service as Clinical Registrar for the purpose of extending benefits under the Dynamic Assured Career Progression (DACP) Scheme.
The dispute arose from the petitioner’s career progression at NIUM. Dr. Ansari initially joined the National Institute of Unani Medicine as a Clinical Registrar on October 22, 2004. He continued in that position until 2012. Subsequently, he applied through the proper channel for the post of Lecturer (Jarahiyat) pursuant to a recruitment notification. After participating in the selection process, he was selected and appointed as Lecturer on March 24, 2012, and commenced his duties shortly thereafter. According to the petitioner, his transition from Clinical Registrar to Lecturer was a lateral entry without any interruption in service.
The petitioner subsequently sought recognition of his earlier service for the purpose of financial advancement under the DACP Scheme. His principal contention was that because there had been no break between his earlier employment and his appointment as Lecturer, the period spent as Clinical Registrar ought to be treated as qualifying service for determining his eligibility under the DACP Scheme. He further contended that the duties performed in the two posts were sufficiently analogous and that several employees junior to him had received higher Grade Pay under the scheme.
The dispute also concerned an Office Memorandum dated June 6, 2017, which altered the period of regular service required for promotion under the DACP Scheme and gave effect to the revised arrangement from April 1, 2015. The petitioner questioned the manner in which his eligibility had been assessed and alleged that denial of the benefit resulted in unequal treatment.
The Central Administrative Tribunal, however, rejected his claim. The Tribunal found that the post of Clinical Registrar and the post of Lecturer belonged to different cadres and involved different duties and responsibilities. It therefore held that service rendered in the former cadre could not automatically be added to the regular service rendered in the latter cadre for the purpose of financial upgradation under DACP.
Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision dated February 1, 2023, Dr. Ansari approached the Karnataka High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The central legal issue before the High Court was whether an employee’s uninterrupted service, coupled with appointment to another post through lateral entry, creates an enforceable right to have service in the previous cadre counted for financial progression under a scheme whose eligibility conditions are based on regular service in the relevant cadre.
The case therefore required the Court to distinguish between the concept of continuity of service and the separate question of whether a particular period of service is legally reckonable for a specific promotional or financial benefit. The Court also had to examine the petitioner’s reliance on the constitutional principle of equal pay for equal work and determine whether employees belonging to different cadres could legitimately be compared for the purpose of claiming parity in DACP benefits.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Dr. Mohammed Shakeel Ansari, contended that the Tribunal had adopted an overly technical approach in refusing to recognise his earlier service. His principal submission was that he had joined NIUM as Clinical Registrar in 2004 and had subsequently entered the post of Lecturer through a regular selection process without any break in service. According to him, the uninterrupted nature of his service demonstrated continuity and should have enabled the authorities to consider the entire period for the purpose of determining his eligibility for DACP benefits.
The petitioner placed particular emphasis on the fact that his appointment as Lecturer was by way of what he described as lateral entry. He argued that his movement from the post of Clinical Registrar to the post of Lecturer was not a fresh entry into government or institutional service but a progression within the same establishment. Consequently, he argued that the earlier period ought not to have been ignored merely because the designation and cadre of the post changed.
Another important submission was that the posts of Clinical Registrar and Lecturer were analogous in nature. The petitioner sought to establish that both positions were connected with the academic and teaching functions of the institution and therefore the distinction drawn by the Tribunal between the two cadres was artificial. On this basis, he argued that his earlier service possessed sufficient relevance to be taken into account for financial advancement.
Dr. Ansari also invoked the constitutional guarantee of equality. He contended that several officers junior to him had received higher Grade Pay under the DACP Scheme while he had been denied comparable advancement. According to him, such differential treatment was discriminatory and offended the principle of equal pay for equal work. He sought to demonstrate that the practical nature of the work performed by the employees concerned justified treating them as belonging to the same broad class for financial benefits.
The petitioner also challenged the effect of the Office Memorandum dated June 6, 2017. According to his case, the revised requirements under the DACP Scheme had adversely affected his eligibility by enhancing the period of regular service required for promotion and by prescribing the applicable regime from April 1, 2015. He sought recognition of his earlier service so that his eligibility could be calculated in a manner more favourable to him.
The respondents, represented by the Union of India and the Director of NIUM, resisted the petition and supported the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Their position was that the DACP Scheme was governed by specific executive instructions and eligibility conditions. Financial upgradation under such a scheme could not be claimed merely on the basis of uninterrupted employment with the institution. What mattered was whether the employee had completed the prescribed period of regular service in the cadre to which the benefit was attached.
The respondents maintained that Clinical Registrar and Lecturer were distinct posts belonging to different cadres and involving materially different functions, responsibilities and service conditions. Therefore, service in one cadre could not automatically be transferred or carried forward for calculating eligibility in another cadre unless the governing rules or scheme expressly permitted such reckoning.
The respondents also disputed the petitioner’s reliance on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. They argued that a claim of pay parity could not be founded merely on the fact that another employee happened to receive a higher financial benefit. Employees had to be similarly situated in all relevant respects, including cadre, duties, responsibilities, service conditions and the applicable promotional framework.
The respondents further submitted that the Tribunal had considered the relevant material and had reached a reasoned conclusion. There was consequently no jurisdictional error or patent illegality warranting interference by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
The respondents’ position was essentially that the petitioner’s uninterrupted employment and subsequent selection as Lecturer could establish continuity of service for certain purposes, but it could not, without an express rule or provision in the DACP Scheme, transform service rendered in a different cadre into qualifying service for financial progression in the Lecturer cadre.
Court’s Judgment:
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench. The Division Bench of Justice S.G. Pandit and Justice K. Manmadha Rao held that the petitioner’s argument rested upon a fundamental conflation of two distinct concepts: continuity of service and entitlement to count past service for a particular promotional or financial benefit.
The Court made it clear that uninterrupted service does not, by itself, determine whether an employee is entitled to have every period of previous service counted under every subsequent service scheme. The relevant question is whether the governing rules or the particular scheme expressly recognise such previous service for the purpose for which the employee seeks to rely upon it.
The Court observed that considerable emphasis had been placed by the petitioner on the fact that he had entered the post of Lecturer by lateral entry and that there had been no break in his service. However, the Bench rejected the proposition that the absence of a break automatically required his service as Clinical Registrar to be counted for DACP purposes.
The Court stated that “continuity of service is distinct from entitlement to count past service rendered in another cadre for promotional or financial benefits.” In other words, an employee may remain continuously employed in an organisation while simultaneously moving from one cadre to another, but the consequences of that continuity depend upon the applicable statutory rules, recruitment regulations, service conditions and the terms of the relevant financial progression scheme.
Applying that principle to the present case, the Court found no provision in the applicable framework that entitled the petitioner to automatically carry forward his service as Clinical Registrar for calculating his eligibility for DACP benefits as a Lecturer. The mere fact that his appointment as Lecturer followed immediately after his earlier service did not alter the distinct character of the two cadres.
The Bench also endorsed the Tribunal’s finding that Clinical Registrar and Lecturer were different cadres involving different duties and responsibilities. The Tribunal had considered the nature of the posts and had concluded that the petitioner’s earlier service could not be treated as qualifying service in the Lecturer cadre for financial upgradation.
The High Court found no perversity in that conclusion. It observed that the Tribunal had correctly applied the governing executive instructions under which the DACP benefit depended upon completion of the prescribed period of regular service in the relevant cadre. Therefore, the petitioner’s eligibility had to be determined by reference to his service as Lecturer rather than by aggregating the earlier period spent as Clinical Registrar.
The Court’s approach reflects an important principle in service jurisprudence: financial progression schemes do not operate independently of their eligibility conditions. An employee cannot claim a benefit simply because a particular interpretation appears equitable or because the employee has served continuously in the same organisation. The entitlement must flow from the applicable rules or administrative instructions.
The Bench also rejected the petitioner’s argument based on equal pay for equal work. The Court emphasised that the constitutional principle cannot be invoked merely because one employee receives a higher salary or financial benefit than another. A person asserting pay parity must first establish that the persons being compared constitute a homogeneous class and are similarly situated in all material particulars.
The Court specifically referred to factors such as the cadre to which the employees belong, their service conditions, the nature of their duties and the responsibilities attached to their posts. These considerations are important because a difference in financial benefits may legitimately arise from differences in cadre, recruitment, promotion, experience, duties or the operation of a particular statutory or executive scheme.
In the present case, the Tribunal had already recorded a finding that the petitioner was seeking comparison between employees belonging to different cadres. It had also noticed differences in the duties and responsibilities associated with those posts. The High Court found no material demonstrating that these findings were perverse or unsupported by the record.
Consequently, the Bench held that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work could not be invoked to create a right to DACP benefits where the governing scheme itself prescribed different eligibility requirements. The Court noted that if the difference in financial progression resulted from the legitimate operation of the applicable scheme, rather than from hostile discrimination between employees similarly situated, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would not be attracted merely because the petitioner considered the outcome unequal.
The Court stated that financial upgradation under the DACP Scheme was controlled by the applicable executive instructions and eligibility criteria. The scheme therefore had to be applied according to its own terms. Courts could not rewrite those conditions merely to extend a financial benefit to an employee whose previous service did not satisfy the prescribed criteria.
The Court also addressed the scope of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It reiterated that while exercising judicial review over an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the High Court does not ordinarily act as an appellate court reassessing every factual conclusion reached by the Tribunal.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court is exercised where there is a jurisdictional error, patent illegality, violation of natural justice or some other substantial defect warranting judicial intervention. It is not intended to substitute the High Court’s own view for a plausible and reasoned conclusion reached by the specialised tribunal.
In the present matter, the Bench found no such defect. The Tribunal had considered the nature of the two posts, the relevant service conditions and the applicable DACP framework before rejecting the petitioner’s claim. The High Court therefore found no justification to interfere with the Tribunal’s order.
The Court’s reasoning also underscores the distinction between an employee’s legitimate expectation of career progression and an enforceable legal entitlement to a particular financial benefit. An employee may understandably expect previous experience to be recognised when moving to a higher or different post, but such expectation cannot override the terms of the governing service scheme.
The fact that the petitioner had served NIUM since 2004 and had subsequently secured appointment as Lecturer through a proper selection process did not, in itself, create a vested right to have his entire period of institutional service treated as qualifying service for every subsequent financial scheme. The relevant scheme determined what service could be counted, and the Court declined to expand that framework judicially.
The High Court consequently concluded that the petitioner had been correctly granted DACP benefits from the date on which he became eligible within the Lecturer cadre. His previous service as Clinical Registrar could not be added to the qualifying period merely because there had been no break in service.
The Court ultimately dismissed Writ Petition No. 6821 of 2023 (S-CAT), filed by Dr. Mohammed Shakeel Ansari against the Union of India and the Director, National Institute of Unani Medicine. The order dated February 1, 2023, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench, was affirmed.
The judgment provides a significant clarification for service jurisprudence: continuous employment and qualifying service are not necessarily synonymous concepts. Where a financial or promotional scheme prescribes regular service in a particular cadre, an employee cannot claim the benefit of service rendered in another cadre unless the governing rules expressly permit such service to be counted.
The decision also reinforces the limits of the equal-pay doctrine. Financial disparity alone does not establish discrimination. Before Article 14 or Article 16 can be invoked, the employee must demonstrate that the persons compared are similarly situated in all material respects. Where differences in pay or financial advancement arise from legitimate distinctions between cadres and from the operation of an applicable service scheme, constitutional equality principles do not require the authorities to ignore those distinctions.
For employees seeking financial upgradation, the ruling therefore highlights the importance of examining the precise language of the applicable scheme rather than relying solely on uninterrupted service, seniority or the similarity of broad job functions. At the same time, the judgment reinforces the institutional role of administrative tribunals and the restrained nature of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 when the tribunal’s decision is supported by the applicable rules and contains no patent legal error.
In essence, the Karnataka High Court held that the petitioner’s uninterrupted service was not enough to bridge the legal divide between two separate cadres. Since the DACP Scheme did not authorise the counting of his Clinical Registrar service towards his qualifying service as Lecturer, and since he failed to establish unlawful discrimination against similarly situated employees, his claim could not succeed.