Introduction:
In X Complainant of Complaint Case No. 65/2026 v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [2026 LiveLaw (AB) 467], the Allahabad High Court delivered a significant ruling on the scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Justice Subhash Vidyarthi held that the High Court is not powerless merely because no application invoking its inherent jurisdiction has been filed. Even while exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court may, on its own motion, invoke its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings if their continuation would amount to an abuse of the process of law or defeat the ends of justice.
The case arose from an appeal filed by a complainant challenging an order of the Special Judge, who had treated her application under Section 173(4) BNSS as a complaint instead of directing registration of an FIR. The complainant, a Scheduled Caste woman employed as an instructor in an Upper Primary School, alleged that she and her husband had been cheated in a property transaction. According to her, although part of the sale consideration was recovered after the property was resold, some amount remained unpaid. She further alleged that one of the opposite parties sexually exploited her on the pretext of helping her recover the outstanding amount while her husband was away for work.
After the police failed to register an FIR, she approached the Special Judge under Section 173(4) BNSS seeking a direction for investigation. The Special Judge declined to order registration of an FIR and instead treated the application as a private complaint. Dissatisfied with this course, the complainant approached the High Court in appeal.
While examining the appeal, however, the High Court found that the allegations themselves failed to disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. It concluded that the complaint appeared to be an attempt to use criminal proceedings for recovery of disputed money and ultimately exercised its inherent jurisdiction suo motu to quash the complaint proceedings altogether.
Arguments of the Parties:
The complainant argued that the Special Judge had erred in refusing to direct registration of an FIR despite allegations disclosing cognizable offences. She submitted that her husband had purchased a plot from the opposite parties, but it later transpired that the seller lacked title over the property. Although a portion of the consideration had been refunded after the plot was sold again, a balance amount remained unpaid.
According to the complainant, the second opposite party exploited her vulnerable circumstances by assuring her that he would help recover the outstanding amount. She alleged that, relying on these assurances, she was sexually exploited over a period of time. She maintained that the allegations disclosed serious offences warranting immediate police investigation and that the Special Judge ought to have exercised powers under Section 173(4) BNSS by directing registration of an FIR instead of converting the application into a complaint case.
The State defended the order passed by the Special Judge and submitted that the court had exercised its discretion in accordance with law by treating the application as a complaint. It was contended that not every allegation automatically requires registration of an FIR and that the Magistrate possesses discretion to proceed by way of a complaint where circumstances so justify.
The opposite parties also disputed the allegations and asserted that the dispute essentially arose from a financial transaction concerning the sale of immovable property. They pointed out that part of the consideration had already been refunded after settlement of an earlier criminal case and that no material existed to establish cheating, forgery, or any other criminal offence. According to them, the criminal justice system was being invoked merely to exert pressure for recovery of an undisclosed amount allegedly remaining unpaid.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Subhash Vidyarthi first examined the nature of the allegations contained in the application. The Court noted that the dispute fundamentally related to a monetary transaction involving the complainant’s husband. Significantly, neither the husband had disclosed the alleged unpaid balance nor had he initiated any civil or criminal proceedings for its recovery.
The Court further observed that the complainant herself admitted that a substantial part of the sale consideration had already been refunded pursuant to an earlier settlement. Despite this, no documentary material was produced to indicate that the opposite parties had forged any document or dishonestly induced the complainant’s husband into purchasing the property through deception.
Turning to the allegation of sexual exploitation, the Court found the version presented by the complainant to be wholly improbable. It observed that the complainant was a thirty-five-year-old married woman employed as an instructor in an Upper Primary School. Her allegation that she repeatedly permitted herself to be sexually exploited solely because of assurances regarding recovery of her husband’s alleged outstanding dues did not inspire confidence. Even assuming the allegations to be true, the Court held that they failed to disclose the ingredients of any cognizable offence against the opposite parties.
The High Court observed that criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a means of recovering disputed monetary claims. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021), the Court reiterated that criminal law should not be misused as a coercive mechanism for enforcing private financial disputes.
Having reached the conclusion that the complaint itself constituted an abuse of the criminal process, the Court considered an important legal issue—whether it could invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS even though no application seeking quashing had been filed and the accused had not yet approached the High Court.
The Court observed that Section 528 BNSS merely recognises the High Court’s inherent powers and does not create them. Those powers exist independently to secure the ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court, and give effect to orders passed under the criminal procedure law.
Justice Vidyarthi relied upon several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court explaining the scope of inherent jurisdiction. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977), the Supreme Court recognised the High Court’s power to terminate criminal proceedings where continuation would amount to injustice. The Court also referred to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), which laid down the well-known categories in which criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed, particularly where allegations do not disclose any offence or where proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides.
The Court further relied upon Som Mittal v. State of Karnataka (2008), reiterating that inherent jurisdiction is intended to prevent abuse of judicial process and to secure the ends of justice.
Most significantly, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Popular Muthiah v. State (2006). In that judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction even while exercising appellate or revisional powers and that the filing of a separate petition under Section 482 CrPC is not a condition precedent for exercising such jurisdiction.
Applying these principles, Justice Vidyarthi held that the High Court was fully empowered to invoke Section 528 BNSS suo motu while deciding the complainant’s own appeal. The Court observed that whenever continuation of criminal proceedings would itself amount to an abuse of the process of law, the High Court not only possesses the power but also owes a duty to intervene, irrespective of whether any party has specifically invoked its inherent jurisdiction.
The Court emphasised that procedural technicalities cannot prevent the High Court from discharging its constitutional responsibility to ensure that criminal law is not misused. If the material before the Court clearly establishes that criminal proceedings are frivolous, malicious, or legally unsustainable, the Court is duty-bound to exercise its inherent powers in order to protect the administration of justice.
On the facts of the present case, the Court concluded that the allegations were inherently improbable and appeared to have been made for the purpose of exerting pressure upon the opposite parties to recover an unspecified monetary claim. Continuation of the complaint proceedings would therefore amount to abuse of the judicial process and unnecessarily subject the opposite parties to criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, while exercising its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, the High Court set aside the order of the Special Judge treating the application under Section 173(4) BNSS as a complaint and quashed the entire complaint proceedings.
The judgment is significant because it reiterates that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is not confined to proceedings initiated through a formal petition under Section 528 BNSS. Rather, whenever the Court finds, even during appellate proceedings, that continuation of criminal prosecution would defeat the ends of justice or constitute abuse of the process of law, it can exercise its inherent powers suo motu to prevent miscarriage of justice. The decision also reinforces the settled principle that criminal law cannot be employed as a tool for recovery of disputed civil dues or as an instrument of harassment.