Introduction:
The Calcutta High Court, in Sarbani Sardar (Naskar) & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (M.A.T. 163 of 2026), reaffirmed the settled principle of service jurisprudence that inclusion of a candidate in a select panel or merit list does not automatically confer a legal or vested right to appointment. A Division Bench comprising Justice Shampa Sarkar and Justice Smita Das De dismissed an appeal filed by candidates seeking appointment as Anganwadi Helpers under the Joynagar-II Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Project, holding that empanelment merely signifies eligibility for consideration and does not guarantee engagement.
The dispute arose from a recruitment process initiated for the post of Anganwadi Helper under the Joynagar-II ICDS Project in Maydah Gram Panchayat. The appellants participated in the selection process and successfully cleared the interview. Thereafter, the Child Development Project Officer published a panel containing the names of thirteen successful candidates. Despite being included in the panel, the appellants were not offered appointments. Claiming that the authorities had failed to complete the recruitment process, they approached the writ court seeking a declaration that the panel remained valid and that they could not be treated as disqualified candidates. The writ petition, however, was dismissed.
Aggrieved by that decision, the appellants preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The principal issue before the Court was whether candidates whose names appear in a select panel acquire an enforceable right to appointment merely because they have been empanelled, especially when the panel has expired and no suitable vacancies are available.
The judgment is significant as it reiterates the distinction between selection and appointment, while emphasizing that recruitment authorities retain discretion in filling notified vacancies, subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellants argued that once they had successfully participated in the recruitment process and were included in the panel of selected candidates, the authorities were under a legal obligation to complete the appointment process. According to them, empanelment reflected their successful selection, and there was no justification for denying them engagement as Anganwadi Helpers. They contended that the authorities acted arbitrarily by failing to issue appointment orders despite publishing the panel.
The appellants further submitted that they could not be treated as disqualified candidates merely because appointments had not been made within the expected period. It was argued that the writ court overlooked the legitimate expectation created by the publication of the panel and failed to appreciate that the recruitment process ought to have been carried to its logical conclusion. On this basis, they sought reversal of the writ court’s decision and a direction for their appointment.
The State opposed the appeal by explaining that the recruitment process itself had not culminated in valid appointments due to administrative developments. It was submitted that the Chairman of the Project Level Selection and Monitoring Committee had resigned, following which no further meeting of the committee could be convened to approve the panel. Consequently, the panel lost its validity upon the expiry of its prescribed period.
The State also questioned the authenticity of the panel relied upon by the appellants. It contended that the copy annexed to the writ petition was not an approved document, lacked the signatures of the members of the Selection Committee and had never received approval from the competent authorities, including the Director of Women and Child Development and Social Welfare or the District Magistrate responsible for the ICDS Project. Therefore, according to the State, the panel had no legal sanctity.
Additionally, the State pointed out that the available vacancies did not correspond with the category under which the appellants had been empanelled. While only three vacancies remained available, all of them were reserved category posts. Since the appellants were placed under the general category and had never challenged such categorisation, they were ineligible to be considered against those reserved vacancies.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the writ court, holding that the appellants had no enforceable legal right to seek appointment merely because their names appeared in the select panel.
The Court first examined the validity of the panel itself. It observed that the panel had been prepared on 1 September 2014 and, under the applicable recruitment rules, remained valid only for a period of two years, expiring on 31 August 2016. Since no appointments had been made during the panel’s period of validity and the panel had already lapsed, the appellants could not seek appointments on its basis after its expiry.
The Bench further analysed the actual availability of vacancies. The records revealed that out of thirty sanctioned posts of Anganwadi Helpers, twenty-seven had already been filled. The remaining three vacancies were reserved posts. The appellants, however, had been empanelled under the general category and had never challenged their placement in that category or asserted that they ought to have been considered under any reserved category. As a result, even if the panel had remained operative, they were not eligible for appointment against the existing vacancies.
The Court therefore concluded that the appellants did not satisfy the eligibility requirements for engagement against the available posts. Their claim for appointment could not succeed merely because they had participated in the recruitment process and secured a place in the panel.
The Division Bench also reiterated the well-established legal principle that empanelment is fundamentally different from appointment. Inclusion in a select list only entitles a candidate to be considered for appointment in accordance with law. It does not create a vested or indefeasible right to occupy the post.
To reinforce this principle, the Court relied upon the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, wherein it was held that even when vacancies are advertised and candidates are found suitable, successful candidates do not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment. The recruitment notification merely invites applications, and selection by itself does not compel the State to fill every notified vacancy. The Government retains the discretion not to make appointments, provided its decision is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
The Court also relied upon State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, in which the Supreme Court held that the State is under no legal obligation to appoint every person whose name appears in a select list. The existence of a merit list does not impose a mandatory duty upon the Government to make appointments, nor does it create an enforceable legal right in favour of every empanelled candidate.
Applying these settled principles, the Division Bench held that the appellants’ claim was legally unsustainable. The expiry of the panel, the absence of suitable vacancies, and the lack of any vested right flowing from empanelment collectively defeated their claim for appointment.
The Court also found no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the writ court. It observed that the writ court had correctly appreciated both the factual matrix and the applicable legal principles while dismissing the petition.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the order of the writ court was affirmed. The judgment once again clarifies that participation in a recruitment process and inclusion in a select panel cannot by themselves create a legally enforceable right to appointment. Unless statutory rules specifically provide otherwise, appointment remains subject to the availability of vacancies, fulfillment of eligibility conditions, validity of the panel, and approval by the competent authority. The decision reinforces the consistent judicial approach that recruitment authorities are not bound to appoint every empanelled candidate and that courts will not ordinarily compel appointments in the absence of a clear legal right.