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The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

The Legal Affair

Let's talk Law

When Expression Meets Criminal Law: High Court on Religious Sentiment, Mens Rea, and Constitutional Protection of Personal Belief

When Expression Meets Criminal Law: High Court on Religious Sentiment, Mens Rea, and Constitutional Protection of Personal Belief

Introduction:

The Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Ranjanni Gaur v. State of Punjab and another (2025 LiveLaw (PH) 218), examined the intersection of criminal law, religious sentiment, and constitutional freedoms in a case arising from a rather unusual set of allegations. The petitioner approached the Court seeking quashing of an FIR registered against her under Section 298 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which alleges offence relating to injuring or defiling a place of worship or sacred object with intent to insult the religion of any class.

The allegations stemmed from a complaint that the petitioner had dressed her pet dog as Lord Krishna on the occasion of Janmashtami and subsequently uploaded the images as her WhatsApp status. The complainant alleged that this act hurt the religious sentiments of members of the Hindu community and amounted to an intentional insult to religion. Based on this, an FIR was registered and investigation proceeded, leading to the filing of a final report under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The petitioner, an issueless woman, explained during investigation that she treated her pet dog as her own child and had dressed it in festive attire purely as an expression of affection and celebration of Janmashtami. She maintained that there was no intention, either direct or indirect, to hurt religious sentiments or to insult any deity. It was further argued that the act was a form of personal devotion and symbolic expression protected under the Constitution.

The case thus required the Court to determine whether such conduct could attract criminal liability under Section 298 BNS, and whether the essential ingredients of the offence, particularly mens rea and actus reus, were satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner argued before the High Court that the FIR was fundamentally misconceived in law and fact. It was submitted that Section 298 BNS, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section 295 of the IPC, requires the existence of both a prohibited act and a specific intent to insult or outrage religious sentiments. In the present case, neither condition was fulfilled.

It was contended that the petitioner’s act of dressing her pet dog as Lord Krishna was an innocent and festive expression of affection, devoid of any malicious intent. The petitioner emphasised that she considers her pet as her child, and the act was performed in the spirit of Janmashtami celebrations. Therefore, the essential mental element of the offence, namely deliberate intent to insult religion, was completely absent.

The petitioner further argued that criminal law cannot be invoked merely because a section of society perceives an act as offensive. Subjective hurt, it was contended, cannot substitute the statutory requirement of mens rea. The continuation of criminal proceedings in such circumstances would amount to an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of expression and conscience.

On the other hand, the State opposed the petition, submitting that the act prima facie had the potential to hurt religious sentiments of the Hindu community. It was argued that the petitioner herself admitted to dressing her dog in attire associated with Lord Krishna and posting the images publicly, which could reasonably be interpreted as disrespectful or offensive by members of the community.

The State maintained that at the stage of investigation, it was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and the FIR should not be quashed prematurely. It was further argued that questions regarding intent and justification required detailed examination during trial and could not be decided in a petition for quashing.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Subhas Mehla, after examining the facts, statutory framework, and constitutional principles, held that the essential ingredients of Section 298 BNS were not satisfied in the present case. The Court began by analysing the nature of the offence and emphasised that criminal liability under this provision requires both actus reus and mens rea to be clearly established.

The Court observed that the actus reus under Section 298 pertains to damage, destruction, or defilement of a place of worship or a sacred object. Referring to established precedents such as Queen Empress v. Imam Ali (1887), the Court reiterated that the term “object” must be interpreted in conjunction with “place of worship” and cannot be expansively extended to include any and every item associated with religious symbolism. It held that unless the object is directly connected to a place of worship or religious ritual contextually recognised under law, Section 298 cannot be invoked.

Applying this principle, the Court held that a pet dog dressed in festive attire cannot be construed as a “sacred object” within the meaning of the provision. Therefore, the foundational requirement of actus reus itself was not met.

The Court then turned to the question of mens rea and held that the absence of intent to insult religion was decisive in the case. It noted that the petitioner’s conduct, viewed in its entirety, indicated affection and festive participation rather than hostility or disrespect. The act was, at best, symbolic expression and not an act directed towards defilement or insult.

In a notable observation, the Court remarked that criminal law cannot be invoked on the basis of subjective perceptions of hurt, especially where constitutional protections of expression and belief are implicated. Justice Mehla emphasised that “constitutional tolerance must override hypersensitivity,” cautioning against criminalising innocent acts merely because they are viewed differently by different sections of society.

The Court also engaged in a broader philosophical and theological discussion, observing that religious traditions themselves recognise symbolic inclusivity. Referring to texts such as the Bhagavad Gita and Mahabharata, the Court noted that Hindu philosophy does not support rigid hierarchies between living beings and instead emphasises the presence of divinity in all forms. It highlighted that Lord Krishna’s teachings recognise the equality of all beings, and that symbolic expressions of devotion cannot be automatically construed as sacrilege.

The judgment further observed that dogs hold a significant place in Hindu iconography and mythology, including as the vehicle of Lord Bhairava and companions of Lord Dattatreya. These references were used to underscore the cultural and religious complexity surrounding the notion of purity and sanctity, and to caution against narrow interpretations of religious sentiment.

Importantly, the Court held that the petitioner’s act could also be understood within the framework of Bhakti Yoga, where devotion is expressed through personal and symbolic acts. Dressing a pet as Lord Krishna during Janmashtami, in this context, was seen as an expression of faith and emotional devotion rather than an act of desecration.

On constitutional grounds, the Court held that the petitioner’s actions were protected under Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees freedom of speech and expression, as well as Article 25, which protects freedom of conscience and religion. The Court observed that these rights extend to symbolic and unconventional expressions of devotion, so long as they do not disturb public order or morality, neither of which was found to be affected in this case.

The Court also noted that continuation of criminal proceedings in such circumstances would amount to misuse of criminal law and an unjustified infringement of constitutional liberties. Accordingly, the FIR was quashed in its entirety, and the petitioner was discharged from all proceedings.