Introduction:
In a progressive and rights-oriented ruling, the Madras High Court strongly criticised a Government Order issued by the State’s Human Resource Management Department that sought to restrict maternity leave to just twelve weeks for a third pregnancy. The case, Shayee Nisha v. The Registrar General and Others (2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 190), arose from the denial of maternity leave to a judicial employee based on this newly issued policy. The Court, comprising Justice R Suresh Kumar and Justice N Senthilkumar, examined whether such a restriction could withstand constitutional scrutiny and align with established legal principles governing maternity benefits.
The petitioner, Shayee Nisha, had applied for maternity leave spanning from February 2, 2026, to February 1, 2027. However, her application was rejected by the Principal District Judge, Villupuram, citing a Government Order dated March 13, 2026, which limited maternity leave for third pregnancies to twelve weeks. This decision was further reinforced by an order directing her to resume duties within a short period, thereby compelling her to approach the High Court.
The controversy raised broader questions about the extent to which administrative policies can curtail benefits that have been judicially recognized as part of a woman’s right to dignity and health. It also brought into focus the tension between executive policy-making under Article 162 of the Constitution and judicial precedents that have consistently emphasized the importance of maternity benefits as a component of social welfare.
At its core, the case was not merely about the duration of maternity leave but about whether the State could draw arbitrary distinctions between pregnancies and impose differential treatment on women employees. The High Court’s intervention thus became crucial in reaffirming the principles of equality, dignity, and welfare that underpin labour and service jurisprudence in India.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner’s case was grounded in both legal precedent and constitutional principles. It was argued that the restriction imposed by the Government Order was arbitrary, discriminatory, and contrary to settled law. The petitioner contended that maternity leave is not a discretionary benefit but a statutory and constitutional entitlement aimed at safeguarding the health and well-being of both mother and child. By limiting leave for a third pregnancy, the State had effectively created an artificial classification that lacked any rational basis.
The petitioner further submitted that courts, including the Supreme Court and various High Courts, had consistently recognized that maternity benefits must be granted without discrimination. It was emphasized that the physical and emotional demands of pregnancy do not diminish with the number of children a woman has. Therefore, treating a third pregnancy differently from the first or second was inherently unjust and violative of the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Additionally, the petitioner pointed out that the High Court itself had, in earlier decisions, clarified that maternity leave cannot be curtailed on such grounds. It was argued that the Government Order ignored these binding precedents and sought to reintroduce restrictions that had already been judicially disapproved. The petitioner also highlighted the practical implications of the policy, noting that inadequate maternity leave could adversely affect maternal health, infant care, and overall family welfare.
On the other hand, the State defended its position by relying on its administrative powers under Article 162 of the Constitution, which enables it to frame policies in matters of governance. It was contended that the Government Order was part of a broader administrative framework aimed at regulating service conditions and ensuring efficient functioning of public institutions. The State suggested that limiting maternity leave for subsequent pregnancies was a policy decision taken after considering various factors, including workforce requirements and administrative efficiency.
The respondents also argued that the Government, as an employer, retains the authority to prescribe reasonable conditions for granting leave. It was implied that the restriction was not intended to deny benefits altogether but to balance the interests of employees with those of the institution. However, the State did not provide a compelling justification for why a third pregnancy should be treated differently, nor did it address the petitioner’s argument regarding the uniform nature of maternal health needs.
Court’s Judgment:
The Madras High Court unequivocally rejected the Government’s stance and held that the impugned Government Order could not be sustained in law. The Court observed that the issue of granting maternity leave for a third pregnancy was no longer res integra and had already been settled by judicial pronouncements. By issuing a policy that contradicted these decisions, the State had acted in disregard of binding legal principles.
The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the fundamental understanding that maternity is a biological and social reality that does not vary in its essential nature across pregnancies. Justice R. Suresh Kumar, speaking for the bench, made a significant observation that the suffering experienced by a woman during pregnancy remains the same, irrespective of whether it is her first, second, or third child. This recognition formed the basis for the Court’s conclusion that any differential treatment in granting maternity leave would amount to unjust discrimination.
The bench further held that the Government Order lacked any rational justification. It noted that the State, being a welfare entity, is expected to frame policies that promote the well-being of its citizens, particularly women. Instead, the impugned order imposed an unnecessary restriction that undermined the very objective of maternity benefits. The Court found it contradictory that a government committed to women’s welfare would adopt a policy that curtailed essential support during one of the most critical phases of a woman’s life.
Importantly, the Court emphasized that administrative powers under Article 162 cannot be exercised in a manner that violates constitutional guarantees or contradicts judicial precedents. The Government Order, being inconsistent with established law, was held to be unsustainable. The Court also clarified that such an order cannot bind the judiciary, particularly when dealing with applications for maternity leave filed by women employees.
Another significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s focus on the role of the District Judiciary. It observed that the Principal District Judge had erred in mechanically applying the Government Order without considering its legality. The Court directed that the maternity leave application be reconsidered independently of the impugned policy, thereby restoring the petitioner’s right to fair and lawful treatment.
The Court also referred to its earlier directions wherein it had instructed the Registry to communicate relevant judgments to the Government and departmental heads for strict compliance. Despite this, the issuance of the impugned Government Order indicated a failure to adhere to judicial mandates. The Court implicitly cautioned against such disregard for precedent, underscoring the importance of consistency and respect for the rule of law.
In its final order, the High Court set aside the decision of the Principal District Judge and directed that the petitioner’s application for maternity leave be reconsidered within a week, without reference to the restrictive Government Order. This ensured that the petitioner would receive a fair evaluation based on legal principles rather than administrative constraints.
The judgment stands as a strong reaffirmation of women’s rights in the workplace and highlights the judiciary’s role in protecting these rights against arbitrary state action. By striking down the discriminatory policy, the Court has reinforced the idea that maternity benefits are an essential component of social justice and cannot be curtailed without compelling justification.