Introduction:

The case of Stevan Bhanubhai Macwan & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, R/Criminal Misc. Application (For Successive Regular Bail – After Chargesheet) No. 512 of 2026, came before the Gujarat High Court and was adjudicated by Justice Nikhil S. Kariel. The matter arose from allegations that the accused had attempted to induce the complainant to convert to another religion, thereby attracting provisions of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act.

The applicants were booked under Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Act, which criminalize forced religious conversion and extend liability to those aiding, abetting, or facilitating such acts. The prosecution case rested on allegations that the accused had induced the complainant to adopt a different religion, although no actual conversion had taken place.

The applicants, who had been in custody since early October 2025, approached the High Court seeking regular bail after the filing of the chargesheet. A crucial legal issue emerged during the proceedings—whether the mandatory requirement of prior sanction under Section 6 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act had been complied with before instituting prosecution.

This issue became central to the adjudication, as Section 6 explicitly mandates that no prosecution under the Act shall be instituted without prior sanction of the District Magistrate or an authorized officer. The High Court’s consideration of this statutory safeguard, along with other relevant factors, ultimately shaped its decision to grant bail.

Arguments by the Petitioners:

The petitioners, through their counsel, advanced multiple arguments in support of their plea for bail, placing particular emphasis on procedural lapses and the nature of allegations.

At the outset, it was contended that the allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, did not disclose the commission of a grave offence warranting continued incarceration. The petitioners highlighted that there had been no actual conversion, and the allegations were limited to inducement. This distinction, according to them, significantly diluted the gravity of the offence.

A central plank of the petitioners’ argument was the non-compliance with Section 6 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act. It was submitted that the provision clearly mandates prior sanction from the District Magistrate before instituting prosecution. In the present case, the chargesheet had been filed on 21.11.2025, whereas the sanction was granted only on 24.11.2025. This, according to the petitioners, amounted to a clear violation of the statutory requirement, rendering the prosecution procedurally flawed.

The petitioners argued that the use of the words “no prosecution shall be instituted except with prior sanction” indicates a mandatory condition precedent. Any action taken in contravention of this requirement would be legally unsustainable.

Additionally, the petitioners submitted that they had been in custody for a considerable period, and with the chargesheet already filed, their further detention would serve no useful purpose. They assured the Court of their willingness to comply with any conditions imposed and emphasized that they were not flight risks.

Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012), wherein it was held that the primary objective of bail is to secure the presence of the accused during trial, and not to punish them prior to conviction.

Arguments by the State:

The State, represented by the prosecution, opposed the grant of bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the allegations and the role attributed to the accused.

It was argued that the offence of inducing religious conversion strikes at the core of societal harmony and must be viewed with seriousness. The prosecution contended that the allegations, as reflected in the FIR and supported by the chargesheet, disclosed active involvement of the accused in attempting to influence the complainant’s religious beliefs.

With regard to the issue of prior sanction, the State submitted that the Investigating Officer had already initiated the process by seeking permission on 20.11.2025, and the sanction was duly granted on 24.11.2025. It was argued that both the sanction and the chargesheet were contemporaneous, and the procedural requirement had substantially been complied with.

The State further contended that technicalities should not be allowed to defeat substantive justice, particularly in cases involving sensitive issues such as religious conversion. It was urged that the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the accused, given the nature of the allegations and the potential impact on public order.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the submissions of both parties and examining the material on record, the Gujarat High Court granted bail to the applicants, while making important observations on the interpretation of Section 6 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act.

The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations, noting that inducement to convert religion is a matter of concern. However, it also observed that no actual conversion had taken place, and the allegations were confined to inducement.

A key factor influencing the Court’s decision was the apparent non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of prior sanction under Section 6. Justice Nikhil S. Kariel observed that the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous—no prosecution shall be instituted without prior sanction. In the present case, the chargesheet had been filed before the sanction was granted, thereby raising a prima facie issue regarding the validity of the prosecution.

The Court drew a distinction between provisions that prohibit the institution of prosecution without sanction and those that bar the court from taking cognizance without sanction. It noted that Section 6 falls in the former category, imposing a restriction on the Investigating Officer rather than the court.

“Prima facie, it would appear that Section 6 imposes a mandate against the Investigating Officer that he would not institute prosecution without prior sanction,” the Court observed.

The Court further clarified that these observations were prima facie in nature, especially since the constitutional validity (vires) of the Act itself is under consideration before the Supreme Court.

In addition to the procedural aspect, the Court also considered other relevant factors, including the period of custody, the filing of the chargesheet, and the maximum punishment prescribed under the Act. It reiterated the principle laid down in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI that bail is not to be withheld as a measure of punishment.

Balancing these considerations, the Court held that the case was fit for the exercise of judicial discretion in favour of the applicants. Accordingly, it granted regular bail, subject to conditions, including the execution of a bond of Rs. 25,000 with one surety of like amount.

Analysis:

This judgment underscores the importance of procedural safeguards in criminal law, particularly when dealing with special statutes that impose additional requirements for prosecution.

The Court’s emphasis on prior sanction reflects a commitment to ensuring that prosecutions under sensitive laws are not initiated arbitrarily. Such safeguards are designed to prevent misuse and to ensure that cases are subjected to administrative scrutiny before proceeding to trial.

At the same time, the judgment demonstrates a balanced approach, as the Court did not delve into the merits of the allegations in detail, recognizing that such issues are to be determined during trial.

The reliance on established principles of bail jurisprudence further reinforces the idea that pre-trial detention should not be used as a punitive tool. By granting bail while leaving the substantive issues open, the Court maintained the delicate balance between individual liberty and societal interests.