Introduction:
The case of Santosh Sardar v. Union of India & Ors. (WPA 25583 of 2022) before the Calcutta High Court raises a significant issue concerning the legality of public employment obtained through fraudulent means and whether long years of service can mitigate such foundational illegality. The judgment, delivered by Justice Amrita Sinha, underscores a fundamental principle of service jurisprudence—that fraud vitiates all, and any appointment secured through deception cannot be legitimised by subsequent conduct or duration of service.
The petitioner, Santosh Sardar, was appointed as a constable in the Border Security Force (BSF) in 1989. At the time of his recruitment, he claimed to have passed the secondary (Madhyamik) examination, which was a minimum eligibility requirement for the post. However, doubts regarding the authenticity of his educational qualification surfaced soon after his appointment. Between 1992 and 2001, multiple verification attempts were made by the authorities, including inquiries with the District Magistrate of North 24 Parganas. These inquiries consistently revealed that no record existed of the petitioner having passed the said examination, nor was his name found in the relevant school records.
Despite these findings, the matter remained pending for several years due to a combination of administrative delays and legal proceedings initiated by the petitioner himself. In 2002, criminal proceedings were initiated against him under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly using forged documents to secure employment. These proceedings, along with the departmental inquiry, were protracted over nearly two decades, largely due to repeated legal challenges mounted by the petitioner before various courts.
Eventually, after the dismissal of his criminal revision petition in 2019, the BSF initiated disciplinary proceedings under the Border Security Force Act. A Petty Security Force Court was convened in 2021, which found the petitioner guilty of providing false information at the time of enrolment and producing forged educational documents. The petitioner himself admitted during the proceedings that he had not passed the secondary examination and had procured a forged certificate due to financial hardship.
Consequently, he was dismissed from service and sentenced to 15 months’ rigorous imprisonment. His appeals before higher authorities within the BSF hierarchy were rejected. Aggrieved, he approached the Calcutta High Court under writ jurisdiction, challenging the dismissal order primarily on the grounds of disproportionate punishment and inordinate delay in initiating action.
The case thus presented the Court with a crucial question—whether an employee who has served for over three decades can be dismissed for fraud committed at the time of entry into service, and whether such dismissal can be interfered with on grounds of proportionality or delay.
Arguments of the Petitioner:
The petitioner advanced multiple arguments in an attempt to challenge the legality and fairness of the disciplinary action taken against him.
Firstly, it was contended that the punishment of dismissal from service was grossly disproportionate, especially considering the fact that the petitioner had served the BSF for more than three decades. It was argued that during this long tenure, he had performed his duties without any major blemish, and therefore, the extreme penalty of dismissal was unjust and harsh. The petitioner urged the Court to take a sympathetic view in light of his long service and the financial hardship that had compelled him to resort to such means at the time of his appointment.
Secondly, the petitioner argued that the delay in initiating and concluding the disciplinary proceedings had caused serious prejudice to him. He submitted that the alleged forgery was detected as early as the 1990s, yet the authorities took nearly two decades to conclude the proceedings. According to him, such inordinate delay violated principles of natural justice and fairness, as it deprived him of the opportunity to effectively defend himself and subjected him to prolonged uncertainty.
The petitioner further contended that the delay was attributable to the authorities and not to him, and therefore, the disciplinary action should be set aside on this ground alone.
Another key argument raised was that the petitioner had already faced criminal proceedings, and the prolonged litigation had taken a toll on his personal and professional life. He submitted that imposing the penalty of dismissal at such a late stage would result in grave injustice, particularly when he was nearing the end of his service.
The petitioner also attempted to invoke the doctrine of proportionality, arguing that even if the charges were proved, a lesser penalty such as reduction in rank or compulsory retirement could have been imposed instead of dismissal.
Lastly, it was argued that the Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, has the power to interfere with disciplinary proceedings where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate or where there is procedural irregularity. The petitioner urged the Court to exercise this power in his favour and grant him relief.
Arguments of the Respondents (Union of India and BSF Authorities):
The respondents strongly opposed the petition and defended the disciplinary action as lawful, justified, and necessary to maintain the integrity of the force.
At the outset, it was argued that the petitioner had secured his appointment through fraud by submitting forged educational certificates and providing false information at the time of enrolment. Such conduct strikes at the very root of public employment and renders the appointment void ab initio. The respondents emphasized that fraud vitiates all transactions, and no equitable considerations can be invoked to legitimise an illegal entry into service.
The respondents further contended that the petitioner had himself admitted during the disciplinary proceedings that he had not passed the secondary examination and had obtained a forged certificate. This admission, coupled with consistent verification reports from the competent authorities, left no room for doubt regarding his guilt.
On the issue of delay, the respondents submitted that the delay in concluding the proceedings was largely attributable to the petitioner’s own actions. They pointed out that the petitioner had filed multiple cases before different courts, including the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the SDJM Barasat, and the Calcutta High Court, which effectively stalled the disciplinary and criminal proceedings for several years. Therefore, he could not now turn around and claim prejudice on account of delay.
The respondents also argued that the minimum educational qualification was an essential eligibility criterion for recruitment in the BSF, and allowing a person who did not meet this requirement to continue in service would undermine discipline and morale within the force. It would also set a dangerous precedent by encouraging others to secure employment through fraudulent means.
Relying on established legal principles and precedents, including decisions of the Supreme Court in Bank of India v. Abhinash D. Mandivikar and Supdt. of Post Office v. R. Valasine Babu, the respondents contended that courts have consistently held that long years of service cannot cure the illegality of an appointment obtained through fraud.
The respondents also emphasized that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with law, and the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself. There was no procedural irregularity or violation of natural justice that would warrant judicial interference.
Judgment of the Calcutta High Court:
The Calcutta High Court, after carefully considering the submissions of both parties, dismissed the writ petition and upheld the dismissal of the petitioner from service.
Justice Amrita Sinha, in a detailed judgment, reiterated the well-settled principle that fraud vitiates all actions. The Court observed that once it is established that an employee secured appointment by producing forged documents, the very foundation of his service becomes illegal. In such cases, the length of service or any subsequent good conduct cannot cure the initial defect.
The Court noted that the petitioner had unequivocally admitted that he had not passed the secondary examination and had used a forged certificate to secure employment. This admission, coupled with consistent verification reports from the authorities, clearly established the charge of fraud.
On the issue of proportionality, the Court held that where the very entry into service is illegal, the question of proportionality of punishment does not arise. The Court observed that retaining such an employee in service would undermine discipline and demoralize other members of the force who had entered service through legitimate means.
The Court also rejected the petitioner’s argument regarding delay. It found that the delay in the proceedings was largely attributable to the petitioner’s own legal actions, which had stalled the process for several years. The Court held that a party cannot take advantage of a situation created by its own conduct.
Further, the Court emphasized that judicial review in service matters is limited and cannot be exercised to grant sympathy in cases involving fraud. The Court observed that it cannot compel an employer to retain an employee who does not possess the essential qualifications for the post.
The Court also relied on precedents of the Supreme Court, which have consistently held that appointments obtained through fraud are void and cannot be regularized, irrespective of the length of service.
Importantly, the Court found no procedural irregularity in the disciplinary proceedings. It noted that the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to present his case and defend himself, and the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations.
In conclusion, the Court held that the dismissal of the petitioner was legally justified and could not be termed disproportionate or arbitrary. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, and the order of dismissal was affirmed.