Introduction:

The Allahabad High Court in Shivdhari Versus State of U.P. Through Principal Secretary Department of Revenue Lucknow and Others 2026 LiveLaw AB 90 was called upon to interpret the scope and ambit of Rule 64(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code Rules 2016 and its interplay with Section 66 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code in a dispute concerning cancellation of a residential lease on the ground of non-construction of a house within the stipulated time. The matter arose from a lease granted in favour of a private respondent for a residential plot under Section 64 of the Code which primarily aims to provide housing sites to agricultural labourers and members of various sections of society to ensure social justice and equitable distribution of land. The petitioner, claiming to be an aggrieved person, filed a complaint under Section 66 of the Rules alleging that the private respondent had failed to construct a house within three years from the execution of the lease and therefore the allotment was liable to be cancelled under Sub clause 2(b) of Rule 64. However, this complaint was filed after a staggering delay of thirty two years from the date of allotment. The Collector rejected the complaint as being highly belated and this decision was affirmed by the Additional Commissioner Judicial Ayodhya Division. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court invoking its writ jurisdiction seeking quashing of the orders and cancellation of the lease. The case presented significant questions regarding whether the word may in Rule 64 makes cancellation mandatory or discretionary, whether the Collector retains suo motu powers beyond the three year limitation prescribed for aggrieved persons, and what constitutes reasonable time in matters concerning public land allotments meant for socio economic upliftment.

Arguments:

The petitioner contended that Rule 64(2)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code Rules 2016 clearly stipulates that if the allottee fails to construct a house within three years from the date of execution of the lease, the lease is liable to be cancelled. According to him, the purpose of allotting residential plots under Section 64 is to ensure that beneficiaries actually build houses and reside upon the land, thereby fulfilling the welfare objective of the legislation. It was argued that permitting an allottee to retain possession without construction for decades defeats the very purpose of the scheme and encourages misuse of public resources. The petitioner maintained that the private respondent had not constructed any residential structure within three years of grant of lease and thus the conditions of allotment stood violated. He submitted that the Collector ought to have exercised powers under Rule 64(2)(b) and cancelled the allotment irrespective of delay because the breach was continuing in nature. The petitioner further argued that illegality cannot be sanctified by passage of time and that public land cannot be allowed to remain idle or be misused contrary to statutory intent. He emphasized that Section 66 empowers the Collector to inquire into irregular allotments either on his own motion or on application by any aggrieved person and that the failure to construct within the prescribed time was a clear irregularity warranting cancellation. On the other hand, the private respondent opposed the petition primarily on the ground of gross delay and laches. It was contended that the lease had been granted more than three decades ago and that the petitioner approached the authorities after thirty two years without any explanation for such extraordinary delay. The respondent submitted that Section 66(2) specifically bars entertaining applications filed after expiry of three years from the date of allotment and therefore the complaint was rightly rejected as time barred. It was further argued that Rule 64 uses the expression may be cancelled which indicates discretion and not compulsion and that cancellation is not automatic upon expiry of three years. The private respondent asserted that stability of land titles and certainty in revenue records are essential for social order and permitting stale claims would create chaos and unsettle long standing arrangements. The State authorities supported the rejection of the complaint and contended that the statutory scheme clearly differentiates between an application by an aggrieved person which must be filed within three years and the suo motu powers of the Collector which must also be exercised within reasonable time. They submitted that the petitioner could not bypass limitation by invoking public interest when he claimed to be personally aggrieved.

Judgment:

Justice Alok Mathur, while dismissing the writ petition, undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework governing allotment and cancellation of residential plots under the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code and the Rules framed thereunder. The Court first analysed Rule 64 which provides that if a house is not constructed within three years from the execution of the lease, the lease may be cancelled. The Court held that the use of the word may indicates that the provision is directory and confers discretionary power upon the Collector rather than imposing a mandatory obligation. The Court reasoned that had the legislature intended automatic cancellation it would have used the word shall instead of may. Thus, failure to construct within three years does not ipso facto result in cancellation but empowers the Collector to consider the circumstances and decide appropriately. The Court emphasized that the objective behind allotment of residential sites under Section 64 is to benefit agricultural labourers and persons across castes who require housing and that timely construction is essential to ensure effective implementation of the welfare scheme. To secure compliance, the Collector is empowered to issue notice to the allottee requiring construction within a prescribed period and in case of non compliance, to cancel the allotment. The Court clarified that such power must be exercised after giving proper notice and opportunity of hearing to the allottee in keeping with principles of natural justice. The High Court then turned to Section 66 which provides for inquiry into irregular allotments either suo motu by the Collector or upon application by an aggrieved person. Sub section 2 specifically stipulates that no application shall be entertained after expiry of three years from the date of allotment. The Court held that this limitation squarely applied to the petitioner who described himself as an aggrieved person. Since the allotment was made thirty two years ago and the complaint was filed far beyond the statutory period of three years, the Collector rightly declined to entertain it. The Court rejected the contention that delay should be ignored on the ground of continuing illegality, observing that limitation provisions are enacted to ensure finality and certainty in legal relations. Importantly, the Court drew a distinction between the right of an aggrieved person to move an application within three years and the independent suo motu power of the Collector to cancel allotment within a reasonable time even beyond three years. The Court observed that while an aggrieved person is bound by the three year limitation, the Collector acting on his own motion may exercise powers within a reasonable time frame in appropriate cases to prevent misuse of land allotted for welfare purposes. However, in the present case, the proceedings were initiated not suo motu but on the application of the petitioner and therefore were clearly barred by limitation. The Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Collector and the Revisional Authority and dismissed the writ petition, holding that there was no illegality or perversity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The judgment thus harmonized the discretionary nature of Rule 64 with the limitation prescribed under Section 66 and reinforced the principle that statutory timelines must be respected while also preserving the Collector’s authority to act in public interest within reasonable bounds.