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The Legal Affair

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Police Cannot Register FIR for Petty Offences Against Juveniles Karnataka High Court Reaffirms Protective Framework of Juvenile Justice Law

Police Cannot Register FIR for Petty Offences Against Juveniles Karnataka High Court Reaffirms Protective Framework of Juvenile Justice Law

Introduction:

The Karnataka High Court, in a significant ruling reinforcing the protective philosophy of juvenile justice legislation, quashed the registration of a First Information Report against a person who was admittedly a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident as well as at the time of registration of the crime. The petition was filed by X, who challenged the legality of a 2023 FIR registered by the police invoking multiple provisions of the Indian Penal Code, including Sections 341, 323, 324, 506, 354B and 34, and the consequential filing of a charge sheet. The matter was heard by Justice M Nagaprasanna, who examined whether the police had jurisdiction to register an FIR against a child in conflict with law when the only allegation against him amounted to a petty offence under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. The Court held that registration of an FIR itself was barred under the JJ Act and Rules in cases involving petty offences allegedly committed by juveniles, and accordingly quashed the proceedings while reserving liberty to the prosecution to forward the matter to the Juvenile Police Unit.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:

The counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the entire criminal proceedings were vitiated at the threshold due to lack of jurisdiction. It was submitted that the petitioner was 17 years and 8 months old on the date of the alleged incident as well as on the date of registration of the FIR, his date of birth being 10 April 2005 and the incident having occurred on 17 March 2023. Therefore, the petitioner squarely fell within the definition of a “child” under the Juvenile Justice Act and could not have been proceeded against in the manner adopted by the police.

The petitioner’s counsel drew the attention of the Court to the charge sheet and submitted that the only specific allegation against the petitioner was that he had picked up a stone and hit the complainant on the head, causing injury. Even assuming the allegation to be true, the only offence that could possibly be attributed to the petitioner was under Section 324 of the IPC, which is punishable with imprisonment up to three years.

It was argued that under the JJ Act, offences are categorised into petty, serious and heinous offences. Heinous offences are those punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, whereas petty offences are those punishable with imprisonment up to three years. Since Section 324 IPC carries a maximum punishment of three years, the alleged act clearly fell within the category of a petty offence.

The counsel further relied on Rule 8 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, which expressly mandates that no FIR shall be registered against a child except where a heinous offence is alleged or where the offence is committed jointly with adults. In the present case, although multiple IPC provisions were invoked in the FIR against several accused, the specific allegation against the petitioner did not disclose the commission of any heinous offence. Therefore, the police lacked jurisdiction to register an FIR against the petitioner at all.

It was also contended that subjecting a juvenile to the rigours of a regular criminal investigation, arrest, and charge sheet defeated the very object of the Juvenile Justice Act, which is premised on reformative and rehabilitative justice rather than retributive punishment. The petitioner submitted that once the statute creates a bar, the police cannot circumvent it by invoking multiple sections or by leaving it to the trial to determine culpability.

Arguments on Behalf of the State:

The State opposed the petition and defended the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet. The Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the bar on registration of FIR under the Juvenile Justice Act does not apply to all categories of offences. According to the State, the prohibition was limited and did not extend to cases involving offences that were not heinous.

It was argued that the police were within their jurisdiction to register the FIR, investigate the matter, and file a charge sheet even against a juvenile, and that the merits of the case, including the nature of the offence and the role attributed to the petitioner, were matters to be decided during trial.

The State further submitted that the FIR involved allegations under serious provisions including Section 354B IPC, which relates to assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to disrobe, and therefore the police action could not be said to be wholly without jurisdiction. It was contended that merely because the accused was a juvenile, the investigation could not be halted at the threshold.

As an alternative submission, the Special Public Prosecutor suggested that if the Court were inclined to accept the petitioner’s argument, the FIR could be transferred to the Juvenile Police Unit, which should then be permitted to continue the proceedings in accordance with law. The State maintained that quashing the FIR outright would hamper the course of justice.

Court’s Judgment:

After examining the rival submissions, the statutory scheme of the Juvenile Justice Act, and the factual allegations against the petitioner, the Karnataka High Court decisively ruled in favour of the petitioner. Justice M Nagaprasanna undertook an analysis of the definitions of “heinous offence” and “petty offence” under the JJ Act and observed that the classification depends on the maximum punishment prescribed on the date of commission of the offence.

The Court noted that a heinous offence is one punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, whereas a petty offence is one punishable with imprisonment up to three years. Applying this statutory framework, the Court held that the allegation that the petitioner hit the complainant with a stone could only attract Section 324 IPC, which carries a maximum punishment of three years. Consequently, the offence alleged against the petitioner was clearly a petty offence.

The Court then referred to Rule 8 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, which categorically mandates that no FIR shall be registered against a child except in cases involving heinous offences or where the offence is committed jointly with adults. Justice Nagaprasanna observed that the rule leaves no scope for discretion and creates a clear bar on registration of FIRs in cases involving petty offences committed by juveniles.

Rejecting the State’s argument that the matter could be left to trial, the Court held that the lack of jurisdiction strikes at the root of the proceedings. If the statute bars registration of an FIR itself, the subsequent investigation and filing of a charge sheet cannot be sustained.

The Court also emphasised that the petitioner was admittedly a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident, being 17 years and 8 months old, and therefore could not be tried as an adult for the offences mentioned in the FIR. Subjecting him to ordinary criminal proceedings would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the JJ Act.

While accepting the alternative submission of the State to a limited extent, the Court struck a balanced approach by quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner, but reserving liberty to the prosecution to transmit the papers to the Juvenile Police Unit for continuation of proceedings in accordance with the Juvenile Justice framework. The petition was accordingly allowed.