Introduction:
In a landmark ruling underscoring the foundational principle that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Akash Walia v. State of Haryana and another, quashed an order granting regular bail after finding that the Judicial Magistrate who passed the order shared a distant familial relationship with the accused, thereby giving rise to a real likelihood of bias. The judgment, authored by Justice Sumeet Goel, revisits and powerfully reaffirms the age-old doctrine of nemo judex in causa sua—that no one should be a judge in their own cause—and applies it with contemporary constitutional sensitivity to preserve public confidence in the justice delivery system. The Court held that even remote consanguinity, once known to the Judge or Magistrate, mandates immediate recusal if it is capable of creating a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a prudent observer. The case arose out of an intimidation FIR involving serious allegations of threats and coercion, where the complainant challenged the bail order not on merits alone, but on the far more fundamental ground of compromised judicial neutrality. In setting aside the bail order as “untenable ab initio,” the High Court sent a clear message that institutional integrity outweighs individual adjudicatory outcomes, and that perceived impartiality is as critical as actual fairness in the administration of justice.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner–Complainant:
The petitioner–complainant approached the High Court seeking quashing of the 31 December 2023 order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambala, granting regular bail to the respondent-accused in FIR No. 485 of 2023, registered under Sections 195-A, 506 and later 201 IPC. The gravamen of the petitioner’s challenge was not merely that the bail order was erroneous on merits, but that it stood vitiated at its very root due to the existence of a familial relationship between the Magistrate and the accused.
It was contended that the accused was alleged to have issued threats, directly and through purported gang-linked callers, to coerce the complainant into compromising another pending criminal case. Given the seriousness of the allegations, the grant of bail itself warranted strict scrutiny. However, what rendered the order wholly unsustainable, according to the petitioner, was the fact that the Magistrate who granted bail was related to the accused, a circumstance that had not been disclosed on record at the time of adjudication.
The petitioner asserted that the Magistrate had even taken leave to attend a condolence ceremony in the accused’s family, clearly indicating awareness of the relationship. A formal complaint highlighting this aspect had already been submitted to the Chief Justice, and the matter was under administrative consideration. The petitioner argued that once such consanguinity existed—and was within the knowledge of the Magistrate—the Magistrate was duty-bound to recuse suo motu, irrespective of whether the relationship was close or distant.
Relying on constitutional principles and settled jurisprudence, the petitioner emphasized that the test is not actual bias, but the reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of an informed observer. It was urged that public confidence in the judiciary is irreparably damaged when judicial officers adjudicate matters involving their own relatives, even distantly, and that such adjudications are rendered non est in the eyes of law, regardless of their substantive correctness.
Arguments on Behalf of the State and the Accused:
The State of Haryana, represented by the Additional Advocate General, acknowledged in its compliance affidavit that the Magistrate and the accused were “distant relatives (cousins)”, as reflected in the preliminary inquiry conducted by the District & Sessions Judge, Ambala, the report of which was placed before the High Court in a sealed cover. However, the State sought to downplay the legal impact of this relationship, contending that the connection was remote and did not, by itself, establish actual bias in the grant of bail.
On behalf of the accused, it was vehemently denied that any such familial relationship existed. An affidavit was filed asserting that the allegations of consanguinity were false and motivated, and that the bail order had been passed purely on judicial considerations. The accused argued that bail is a discretionary relief, and unless perversity or illegality on merits is demonstrated, the High Court ought not to interfere.
It was further submitted that the bail order had been in operation for nearly two years, during which time the accused had complied with all conditions, the trial had commenced, and no misuse of liberty had been alleged. Setting aside the bail at such a belated stage, it was argued, would cause grave prejudice and disrupt the course of justice.
The defence also cautioned against creating a precedent where frivolous allegations of distant relationships could be weaponized to seek recusal or invalidate judicial orders, thereby undermining judicial independence and exposing officers to baseless attacks on their integrity.
Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:
Justice Sumeet Goel, after an exhaustive examination of the record, the sealed-cover inquiry, and the governing principles of law, unequivocally rejected the defence’s attempt to trivialize the issue of consanguinity. The Court held that judicial neutrality is judged not by the subjective belief of the Judge in her own impartiality, but by the objective perception of a reasonable, informed observer.
The Court observed that while it is possible for a Judge or Magistrate to be genuinely unaware of a remote familial connection, once such a connection is known or brought to the Judge’s notice, the paramount duty of judicial propriety requires immediate recusal if the relationship is capable of creating an apprehension of bias. The standard applied is not proof of actual prejudice, but the real likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias.
Relying on authoritative precedents such as R v. Sussex Justices, Porter v. Magill, and the recent Supreme Court decision in Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. (2025), the Court reiterated that even a decision that is otherwise “factually accurate and legally impeccable” stands vitiated if tainted by perceived partiality. The doctrine of bias-in-law, the Court held, strikes at the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process itself.
Justice Goel made a powerful observation that the credibility of the justice administration system rests not merely on correct outcomes, but on the assurance that the process is perceptibly fair and untainted by any shadow of prejudice. The “trust and fidelity of the common populace,” the Court noted, is the non-negotiable lifeblood of judicial institutions, and any erosion of that trust is far graver than a procedural irregularity.
Crucially, the Court noted from the sealed-cover material that the Magistrate was aware of the familial connection with the accused at the time of passing the bail order. In such circumstances, failure to recuse rendered the order untenable ab initio. The High Court therefore set aside the bail order pursuant to the doctrine of bias-in-law, holding it to be non est in the eyes of law.
At the same time, balancing institutional integrity with individual liberty, the Court declined to immediately remand the accused to custody. Considering that nearly two years had elapsed since the grant of bail and that the trial had already commenced, the Court permitted the accused to remain on bail till 23 December 2025, directing him to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, Ambala, on or before that date to seek fresh bail, which must be decided on the same day in accordance with law.