⚖️ INTRODUCTION:

In the landmark case Sana Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Madan Kishan Gurow & Ors., adjudicated through Civil Revision Application No. 606 of 2024, the Bombay High Court, speaking through the lucid and authoritative voice of Justice N. J. Jamadar, delivered a significant pronouncement delineating the precise contours of jurisdiction exercised by authorities constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The dispute arose in the context of conflicting claims over Flat No. 1703 in the “Green World” residential project situated in Belapur, Maharashtra, where different purchasers claimed title under separate transactions executed by the promoter, Mount Mary Builders. The petitioner Sana Hospitality asserted its rights pursuant to a 2016 registered sale deed, relying also on a favorable RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing possession, whereas the respondents, including Madan Kishan Gurow and others, asserted that they had independently acquired title through a 2017 agreement, paid complete consideration, availed a housing loan, and secured possession in 2019. The litigation culminated when the respondents approached the Belapur Civil Court seeking declaratory reliefs to validate their title and protect their possession while challenging Sana Hospitality’s earlier conveyance. Sana, in response, invoked Section 79 of RERA to assert that civil courts lacked jurisdiction, contending that only RERA authorities could adjudicate the dispute between allottees. The High Court was thus confronted with a question that strikes at the very architecture of the RERA regime: whether RERA authorities and its appellate forum, possessing execution powers akin to those of civil courts, could also grant declarations, cancel instruments, or adjudicate complex issues relating to title—jurisdiction traditionally reserved exclusively for civil courts. The judgment not only resolved the dispute at hand but also reaffirmed foundational principles of civil jurisdiction under Indian law, holding that tribunals created under special enactments cannot usurp the domain of plenary courts unless such exclusion is explicit and the tribunal possesses commensurate adjudicatory authority.

💼 ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER (SANA HOSPITALITY SERVICES PVT. LTD.):

The petitioner, represented by Advocate M. A. Memon, advanced an extensive and nuanced argument asserting that the civil suit filed by the respondents was expressly barred under Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which proscribes the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of matters required to be adjudicated by RERA authorities. Sana Hospitality contended that the dispute was not one of independent title determination but rather one involving rival claims of allottees to the same flat, a matter intrinsic to the regulatory and adjudicatory domain of RERA. They underscored the fact that Sana already held a registered sale deed and a favorable RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing the handover of possession, thereby asserting that the respondents’ claim, arising subsequently, could only be examined by RERA authorities empowered to enforce their own orders “as a decree of a civil court.” The petitioner further argued that since the Appellate Tribunal under RERA has execution powers akin to a civil court, its jurisdiction necessarily expanded to encompass determinations necessary to effectuate those orders, including incidental inquiries related to title and possession. The petitioner insisted that permitting civil courts to reopen matters already decided under the RERA framework would destabilize the regulatory architecture and undermine legislative intent. It was argued that the plaintiffs were attempting to circumvent RERA proceedings by resorting to civil litigation, thereby inviting parallel adjudication and contradictory outcomes. Moreover, Sana Hospitality submitted that the reliefs sought—though couched in the language of title and declaration—were in substance an attempt to invalidate the petitioner’s RERA-sanctioned rights and possession directive. They contended that once a statutory authority is vested with jurisdiction over a class of disputes, ancillary issues flowing from such disputes must also fall within its remit, failing which the statutory framework would be rendered ineffective. Thus, Sana pleaded that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code as the civil court lacked jurisdiction and the suit was barred by the express provisions of Section 79 of RERA.

🏛️ ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS (MADAN KISHAN GUROW & ORS.):

The respondents, represented by Advocates Vishal Phal and Kunal Damle, mounted a robust rebuttal, emphasizing that their civil suit was neither barred by RERA nor duplicative of any previous adjudication. They asserted that they had no nexus whatsoever with the earlier RERA proceedings initiated by Sana Hospitality and were bona fide purchasers who had acquired rights independently through a 2017 agreement, supported by consideration and possession. According to them, RERA authorities were entirely without jurisdiction to grant declaratory reliefs on title or pronounce upon the validity of instruments executed under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. They emphasized that the reliefs sought—namely, declarations that their agreement was valid, that they were bona fide purchasers without notice, injunctions protecting their possession, and a prayer to declare Sana’s earlier deed null and void—squarely fell within the province of civil courts. The respondents invoked well-settled jurisprudence that the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction can never be presumed; it must be explicit and unequivocal. They relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ramalinga Samigal Madam (1985), which held that even where a statute grants finality to decisions of special tribunals, the extent of exclusion depends on the tribunal’s capacity to grant the same reliefs a civil court can. Since RERA does not, and cannot, cancel registered sale deeds, adjudicate title, or issue injunctions affecting property rights, the respondents argued that the civil suit was not only maintainable but indispensable. They stressed that possession obtained by them was lawful, their title was independent, and the promoter’s duplicity warranted judicial scrutiny that lay wholly outside the statutory jurisdiction of RERA. Thus, they prayed that the plaint be retained for adjudication by the civil court and the revision plea filed by Sana Hospitality be dismissed with exemplary costs.

⚖️ COURT’S JUDGMENT:

Justice N. J. Jamadar, after thoroughly analyzing the statutory scheme, the nature of the reliefs sought, and the applicable precedents, rendered a decisive judgment holding that RERA authorities do not possess jurisdiction to entertain disputes relating to title, nor can they grant declaratory or injunctive reliefs which are the exclusive domain of civil courts. The Court reaffirmed a foundational presumption in Indian jurisprudence—that civil courts possess plenary jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction can be excluded only by express language or necessary implication. The Court held that Section 79 of RERA, though barring civil courts from entertaining matters that RERA is competent to decide, does not confer upon the regulatory or appellate authorities any power to adjudicate disputes concerning the validity of title instruments, cancel registered sale deeds, or restrain parties through injunctions. Observing that the RERA appellate tribunal’s execution powers cannot be misconstrued as a plenary civil jurisdiction, the Court stated emphatically that “while executing an order, the Appellate Tribunal may have the trappings of a civil court, but it cannot be called a Civil Court” empowered to grant reliefs traditionally associated with civil jurisdiction. The Court also referred to the Ramalinga Samigal Madam ruling to hold that the mere grant of decision-making authority to a tribunal cannot imply the ouster of civil courts unless the tribunal can grant equivalent remedies. Since RERA lacks the statutory competence to adjudicate title disputes or invalidate property instruments, the High Court concluded that the civil court was correct in refusing to reject the plaint, and therefore dismissed Sana Hospitality’s revision plea in its entirety. The judgment is a reaffirmation of the demarcation between regulatory adjudication and civil remedies, reinforcing that RERA—though transformative in bringing accountability to the real estate sector—does not supplant civil courts in matters affecting proprietary rights, title declarations, and injunctive protections.