Introduction:
In the landmark case The Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949], the Supreme Court of India delivered a strongly worded judgment addressing a pressing issue that has plagued the criminal justice system for decades—the discontinuation of the practice of conducting trials on a day-to-day basis. The bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan was hearing an application filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which sought cancellation of bail granted to Mir Usman, an accused in a rape case connected to the 2021 West Bengal post-poll violence. While ultimately declining to interfere with the bail order, the Court seized the opportunity to voice its deep concern over the erosion of trial discipline and the growing trend of adjournments that delay justice and compromise the integrity of sensitive cases. The bench reminded that almost three decades ago, it was common practice for trial courts to conduct hearings without interruption until completion, particularly in criminal trials involving grave offences. However, that practice, the Court lamented, has been completely given a “go-by,” resulting in piecemeal trials, witness fatigue, and opportunities for manipulation of evidence. Against this backdrop, the Court not only underscored the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial under Article 21 but also issued guidelines and recommendations for High Courts and district judiciaries to revive the system of day-to-day trial hearings.
Arguments of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI):
On behalf of the prosecution, Archana Pathak Dave, the learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG), advanced strong arguments emphasizing the risks posed by protracted adjournments in sensitive criminal trials. The ASG submitted that allowing an accused to remain on bail while the trial progresses in a staggered fashion could undermine the credibility of the justice system, especially in cases of sexual violence. In the present case, the prosecution highlighted that the victim had already entered the witness box, but her examination was abruptly adjourned, with the next date fixed after four months. Such delays, the ASG argued, created fertile ground for witness intimidation, tampering with evidence, and mental trauma to the victim who must relive the incident each time she appears in court. The prosecution invoked Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code (now Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), which expressly requires that once the examination of witnesses begins, it must continue from day to day until completed. According to the CBI, the trial court’s decision to adjourn witness examination for an extended period was not only contrary to the statutory mandate but also a violation of the victim’s fundamental right to a speedy and effective trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ASG further pressed that the accused, if allowed to exploit these systemic delays, would benefit from the inertia of the judiciary while the victim continued to suffer. Therefore, cancellation of bail was sought as a deterrent against misuse of liberty and to ensure that the accused faced trial without obstruction.
Arguments of the Respondent-Accused:
Representing the accused Mir Usman, learned counsel Anjan Datta countered the CBI’s submissions by emphasizing that bail once granted should not be lightly interfered with unless there are cogent reasons demonstrating misuse of liberty. The defense pointed out that the accused had been on bail for almost a year and had not violated any bail condition, nor had he attempted to tamper with evidence or threaten witnesses. It was argued that the delays in recording the testimony of the victim were not attributable to the accused but were a consequence of circumstances beyond his control, including the victim’s sudden illness and the trial court’s heavy caseload. The defense stressed that systemic shortcomings in the judicial process cannot be held against the accused to justify cancellation of his bail. Cancellation of bail, counsel argued, requires proof of supervening circumstances or misconduct post-grant of bail, neither of which was present in this case. The defense also pointed out that liberty is a fundamental right and once a court has granted bail after considering all material factors, it should not be disturbed merely on speculative grounds of potential witness tampering. Thus, the accused prayed for dismissal of the CBI’s application and continuation of his bail, urging the Court instead to focus on expediting the trial process rather than punishing the accused for delays caused by the judicial system.
Court’s Judgment and Observations:
After considering the arguments of both sides, the Supreme Court refused to cancel the bail of the accused. The Court reasoned that since the accused had been out on bail for almost a year without any allegations of misusing his liberty or attempting to influence witnesses, it would not be proper to set aside the bail order at this stage. However, the Court expressed “grave concern” about the manner in which the trial was being conducted. It took particular note of the trial court’s decision to adjourn the victim’s testimony for nearly four months after she had already stepped into the witness box. The Court warned that such lengthy adjournments could “unwittingly facilitate the accused to tamper with the prosecution witnesses” and cause irreparable harm to the victim’s rights.
In its detailed judgment, the bench strongly emphasized the importance of day-to-day trials, recalling that this was the standard practice until about three decades ago. The Court lamented that this tradition had been abandoned, giving rise to piecemeal hearings that unnecessarily prolonged cases, particularly in criminal matters involving serious social and political implications. The bench observed that while lack of judicial resources and the heavy burden of cases are often cited as reasons for adjournments, the costs of discontinuous trials—including delayed justice, increased burden on witnesses, and opportunities for obstruction—far outweighed any supposed administrative convenience. The Court made clear that speedy trial is not merely a matter of judicial efficiency but a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution, as repeatedly recognized in precedents like Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
The judgment laid down a detailed framework for trial courts and High Courts to follow in order to revive the system of continuous trials. It directed all High Court Chief Justices to constitute Committees tasked with examining how the practice of day-to-day hearings can be effectively implemented within their jurisdictions. Further, the Court suggested that Chief Justices on their administrative side issue circulars to district courts mandating that witness examinations proceed without adjournment until all witnesses in attendance have been examined, except in cases of unavoidable and recorded special reasons. The Court also held that adjournments should not be granted merely to accommodate the convenience of advocates, except in cases of bereavement or similarly grave personal reasons. Importantly, the Court provided guidelines for dealing with non-cooperation by the accused or their counsel, including imposing costs, appointing amicus curiae, or even cancelling bail in cases of deliberate delay.
The bench also addressed the responsibility of public prosecutors, suggesting that summons or processes could be directly handed over to them for efficient service on witnesses. Additionally, presiding officers were encouraged to prepare advance schedules for witness examination, balancing the convenience of counsel with the need for uninterrupted trial progress. With respect to sensitive offences such as rape, the Court reiterated the statutory mandate that trials should ideally conclude within two months of filing the charge sheet.
In the present case, the Court took note of the trial court’s explanation that the adjournment was due to the victim’s sudden illness and the court’s overwhelming backlog of over 4,700 cases, compounded by the Durga Puja closure. While sympathetic to the caseload burden, the Supreme Court nonetheless ordered that the victim’s testimony be preponed to October 24, 2025, instead of the earlier date of December 18, 2025. It further directed the public prosecutor to ensure the victim’s presence on that date and instructed the trial court to complete the examination of important witnesses at the earliest, with a clear mandate to deliver judgment by December 31, 2025.
Concluding its observations, the Supreme Court forwarded a copy of its judgment to all High Court Chief Justices, underscoring that the issue was not confined to a single case but represented a systemic flaw requiring urgent institutional reforms. The bench’s ruling thus not only addressed the immediate concerns of the case but also served as a clarion call to the judiciary to reinstate the discipline of day-to-day trials and honor the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial for all litigants.