Introduction:
In Poulomi Pavini Shukla vs Union of India, the Supreme Court of India on Tuesday briefly heard a writ petition challenging certain provisions of Muslim personal law relating to inheritance on the ground that they are discriminatory against women. The petition raises significant constitutional questions about the extent to which personal laws can be subjected to judicial scrutiny under the Constitution, particularly in light of guarantees of equality and non-discrimination.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi, and Justice R. Mahadevan considered the matter and engaged in an extensive discussion with senior advocate Prashant Bhushan, who appeared for the petitioners. During the hearing, the Court examined whether personal law practices—especially those governing inheritance under Muslim personal law—could be tested against constitutional principles of equality under Articles 14 and 15.
The bench referred to the landmark Narasu Appa Mali judgment of the Bombay High Court, which held that personal laws are not “laws” within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution and therefore cannot ordinarily be tested for constitutional validity. At the same time, the Court also discussed developments in constitutional jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Shayara Bano vs Union of India, which struck down the practice of instant triple talaq.
During the hearing, the bench expressed concern that judicial intervention striking down the relevant provisions of Muslim personal law could lead to a legal vacuum, as there is currently no comprehensive statutory framework governing Muslim inheritance outside the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The Court observed that in attempting to bring reform, it must be careful not to inadvertently deprive Muslim women of the legal protection they presently enjoy.
The bench also raised broader constitutional considerations regarding the role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature, particularly in matters involving religious personal laws and the long-standing constitutional aspiration of implementing a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) under Article 44 of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
After hearing preliminary submissions, the Court suggested that the petitioners amend the petition to propose possible remedies and legal frameworks that could apply if the contested provisions were struck down. Accepting this suggestion, the petitioners agreed to amend the petition, and the Court adjourned the matter for further hearing.
Arguments by the Petitioners:
Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the inheritance provisions under Muslim personal law violate the constitutional guarantee of equality because they provide unequal inheritance rights to women as compared to men. According to him, such differential treatment amounts to gender discrimination and is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 15.
Bhushan contended that the Constitution does not permit legal systems—whether statutory or customary—to deny equal rights to women solely on the basis of gender. He argued that the judiciary has a duty to ensure that all laws and practices operating within India conform to constitutional principles, including gender equality.
Addressing the Court’s query regarding whether personal law practices can be subjected to constitutional scrutiny, Bhushan relied on the Supreme Court’s 2017 judgment in Shayara Bano, in which the Court struck down the practice of instant triple talaq as unconstitutional. He argued that this judgment clearly demonstrates that the Court can intervene where personal law practices violate fundamental rights.
Bhushan emphasised that the Shayara Bano ruling established an important precedent: that practices justified under personal law cannot survive if they infringe constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. According to him, after that judgment, it would be inconsistent to allow other discriminatory practices—such as unequal inheritance rights—to continue unchallenged.
He further submitted that the present challenge is not directed purely against uncodified personal law but also against a statutory framework, namely the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. Bhushan argued that since the Act gives legal recognition to certain personal law principles governing inheritance, it falls within the definition of “law” under Article 13 of the Constitution and therefore can be examined for constitutional validity.
According to the petitioners, the Court has the authority to read down or strike down the statute to the extent that it perpetuates discriminatory inheritance rules. Bhushan suggested that the Court could declare that Muslim women are entitled to equal inheritance rights as Muslim men, thereby harmonising personal law with constitutional values.
Addressing concerns raised by the bench about a possible legal vacuum, Bhushan argued that if the discriminatory provisions were struck down, the Indian Succession Act could apply to fill the gap until appropriate legislation is enacted. He maintained that the legal system already contains mechanisms to deal with such situations, and the absence of specific statutory provisions should not prevent the Court from enforcing fundamental rights.
Bhushan also argued that inheritance rights cannot be considered an essential religious practice protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. According to him, inheritance primarily concerns civil rights and property distribution rather than core religious beliefs or rituals. Therefore, he submitted that claims of religious freedom cannot be invoked to shield discriminatory inheritance practices from constitutional scrutiny.
He maintained that the Constitution envisions a society where gender equality is a fundamental value, and the judiciary must ensure that this principle is upheld even in matters relating to personal laws. Bhushan concluded that denying Muslim women equal inheritance rights undermines their economic security and dignity and is therefore incompatible with constitutional morality.
Concerns and Observations of the Court:
During the hearing, the bench raised several significant constitutional and practical concerns regarding the petitioners’ arguments.
Chief Justice Surya Kant repeatedly emphasised the potential consequences of judicial intervention. The Court expressed concern that striking down the relevant provisions of the Shariat Act, 1937 without a clear alternative framework might leave Muslim women without any governing legal regime for inheritance.
The Chief Justice cautioned that well-intentioned reforms could sometimes produce unintended results. He observed that if the Court invalidates the statutory framework governing Muslim inheritance without establishing a replacement mechanism, it might create uncertainty and confusion.
The bench also questioned whether the judiciary should intervene in such a complex area that involves religious traditions, social practices, and legislative policy. Justice Joymalya Bagchi pointed out that the Narasu Appa Mali judgment had historically held that personal laws cannot be subjected to constitutional tests because they do not fall within the scope of Article 13.
Justice Bagchi suggested that if the Court were to depart from this long-standing principle, it would raise broader questions about the judiciary’s role in reforming personal laws across different communities.
The Court also discussed the constitutional directive contained in Article 44, which encourages the State to implement a Uniform Civil Code. Justice Bagchi observed that matters relating to personal law reform may be better addressed through legislative action rather than judicial intervention.
Chief Justice Surya Kant echoed this sentiment, remarking that the long-term solution to such issues may lie in the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code. According to him, legislative reforms have the advantage of being comprehensive and democratically deliberated.
Justice Bagchi also provided an illustrative example regarding bigamous marriages, noting that the principle of “one man, one wife” is not uniformly applied across all communities in India. He questioned whether the judiciary could declare all bigamous marriages unconstitutional merely because the practice differs between communities.
According to the Court, such issues highlight the delicate balance between constitutional equality and religious autonomy, and they demonstrate why legislative intervention may sometimes be more appropriate.
The bench also suggested that judicial intervention might be more appropriate in a case brought directly by Muslim women seeking relief from discriminatory provisions under the Shariat Act. Bhushan responded by pointing out that several petitioners in the present case are indeed Muslim women.
Despite this clarification, the Court maintained that before deciding such a sensitive issue, it would need to examine what legal framework would govern inheritance if the existing provisions were invalidated.
Directions of the Court:
After hearing the submissions and expressing its concerns, the bench suggested that the petitioners amend their writ petition.
The Court asked the petitioners to include detailed proposals explaining what legal remedies or alternative frameworks should apply if the inheritance provisions under the Shariat Act were struck down.
The bench indicated that such suggestions would help the Court evaluate whether judicial intervention would truly advance the cause of gender justice or inadvertently create legal uncertainty.
Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan accepted the Court’s suggestion and agreed to amend the petition accordingly.
In light of this development, the Supreme Court adjourned the matter to allow the petitioners time to revise the petition and provide a clearer roadmap for addressing the legal vacuum issue.
The case will now return to the Court after the amended petition is filed, where the bench will likely examine the constitutional questions in greater depth.