Introduction:

In Jitendra Gorakh Megh vs Gorakh Govind Megh (Interim Application No. 7713 of 2025), reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Bom) 85, the Bombay High Court delivered a significant ruling clarifying the scope and purpose of Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 (MHA). Justice Farhan Dubash held that courts must exercise caution before referring a person to the Mental Health Review Board (MHRB) merely because an adversarial party challenges his or her mental health. The Court observed that Section 105 is intended as a protective mechanism to safeguard the rights of persons with mental illness and cannot be converted into a tool for harassment or litigation strategy. Emphasising the welfare-driven and rights-based character of the MHA, the Court refused to allow the provision to be weaponised in a property dispute between a son and his father, holding that such misuse would undermine the very legislative intent behind the statute.

Factual Background:

The dispute arose in the context of a family property litigation. The son, appearing as a party-in-person, had already instituted proceedings before the High Court seeking partition of ancestral property. During the pendency of those proceedings, he challenged the mental health of his father.

Invoking Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, the son sought a direction to refer his father to the Mental Health Review Board (MHRB) for assessment of his mental condition. Section 105 empowers a court to refer a person to the MHRB when proof of mental illness is adduced before it by an opponent or adversarial party.

To support his application, the son relied upon a medical certificate indicating that his father suffered from diabetes and experienced hypoglycaemic episodes following insulin administration. These episodes allegedly manifested in transient symptoms such as confusion, forgetfulness, delusions, and perspiration.

The father, represented by counsel, opposed the application. The High Court was thus called upon to determine whether the circumstances warranted a reference under Section 105.

Statutory Framework: Mental Healthcare Act, 2017:

Justice Dubash began by examining the structure and purpose of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. Chapter XIII of the Act groups Sections 100 to 104 under the heading “Responsibilities of Other Agencies.” These provisions impose a duty on various agencies to forthwith refer a person suspected to be suffering from mental illness to a mental health establishment for treatment and care.

Section 105 extends a similar responsibility to courts. Where proof of mental illness is adduced before a court, it may refer the person concerned to the MHRB.

However, the Court emphasised that these provisions must be read collectively and in light of the Preamble of the Act. The MHA is a rights-based framework designed to protect, diagnose, treat, and rehabilitate persons with mental illness. It is not a procedural device for adversarial advantage.

Arguments of the Applicant (Son):

The son contended that concerns regarding his father’s mental health were substantiated by medical evidence. The certificate indicated that the father experienced hypoglycaemic episodes that could result in confusion and delusions.

It was argued that in light of such medical concerns, a reference under Section 105 was justified to ascertain the father’s mental capacity. Implicit in the argument was the suggestion that the father’s mental condition might affect his ability to participate in the property litigation or manage his affairs.

The applicant sought to portray the invocation of Section 105 as a necessary protective step.

Arguments of the Respondent (Father):

Counsel for the father opposed the application, arguing that the medical certificate did not establish any enduring or diagnosable mental illness. The symptoms described were temporary and directly linked to fluctuations in blood glucose levels, which resolved upon restoration of normal levels.

It was contended that the son’s application was not motivated by concern for his father’s welfare but was instead a strategic move in the pending partition suit. By casting doubt on his father’s mental capacity, the son sought to secure a litigation advantage.

The respondent emphasised that Section 105 cannot be invoked mechanically or on tenuous grounds.

Court’s Analysis: Protective Purpose of Section 105:

Justice Dubash undertook a purposive interpretation of Section 105. He noted that while a duty is cast upon courts to refer a person to the MHRB when proof of mental illness is adduced, this obligation must be understood in context.

The Court observed:

“What is implicit in a collective reading of these provisions… is that their underlying objective is the protection of the rights of persons with mental illness, not the creation of a mechanism that may be weaponised by a party to gather proof of mental illness against an adversary with a view to securing a tactical advantage in subsisting litigation.”

This observation formed the crux of the judgment. The Court warned against transforming a welfare-driven statute into a litigation tool.

Assessment of the Medical Evidence:

Examining the medical certificate, the Court noted that it described the father as a diabetic patient who experienced hypoglycaemic episodes following insulin administration. These episodes manifested in transient symptoms such as confusion and forgetfulness.

However, the Court observed that these symptoms were temporary and resolved upon restoration of normal blood glucose levels. They did not indicate a chronic or enduring mental illness.

The Court found that the certificate did not establish prima facie proof of mental illness warranting a reference to the MHRB.

Weaponisation of Welfare Legislation:

Justice Dubash expressed strong concern over the potential misuse of Section 105. He cautioned that permitting such applications without rigorous scrutiny would open the floodgates.

If adversarial parties were allowed to routinely invoke Section 105 against their opponents, it would reduce a rights-based statute into an instrument of harassment.

The Court remarked:

“To permit such a course of action would be to arm unscrupulous litigants with the provisions of the MHA… as instruments of harassment rather than protection.”

Such an interpretation would be wholly antithetical to the legislative intent of the Act and could have far-reaching ramifications for the administration of justice.

Shield, Not Sword:

The Court invoked a powerful metaphor, stating that Section 105 is intended to operate as a “shield” for the protection of persons with mental illness and not as a “sword” to be wielded against them.

This distinction underscored the central theme of the judgment: welfare provisions must not be distorted into tactical devices in adversarial litigation.

The Court found it “ex facie apparent” that the son’s application was not motivated by a genuine desire to protect his father’s rights but was a calculated litigation strategy.

Legislative Intent and Constitutional Sensitivity:

Justice Dubash emphasised that the MHA represents a progressive shift in mental health law in India. It embodies constitutional values of dignity, autonomy, and equality.

Allowing Section 105 to be invoked casually would undermine these values and stigmatise individuals based on unsubstantiated allegations.

The Court’s reasoning reflects a broader judicial sensitivity to mental health issues and the need to prevent stigma and misuse.

Final Decision:

Finding the application to be a plain attempt to weaponise Section 105, the Court dismissed the interim application.

It held that the invocation of Section 105 in the present case struck at the root of the legislative intent underlying the MHA. The provision cannot be permitted to be wielded as a sword by an adversarial party for collateral purposes.