Introduction:
In MR. Anagh v State of Kerala and Ors. (Crl. M.C. 8709/2025, 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 121), the Kerala High Court delivered a significant ruling reinforcing access to justice in the digital era. Justice C.S. Dias set aside an order of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate-II, Thrissur, which had returned a private complaint solely on the ground that the complainant failed to furnish the postal address of the accused.
The petitioner had initiated criminal proceedings alleging that the third respondent committed offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The complaint stemmed from allegedly defamatory and malicious posts circulated on social media platforms including WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram.
The petitioner asserted that defamatory allegations were repeatedly circulated online, causing reputational harm. Despite issuing a legal notice through electronic platforms linked to the accused, there was no response. However, when the private complaint was filed, the Magistrate returned it, citing the absence of the accused’s postal address as a defect.
Aggrieved by this procedural rejection, the petitioner approached the High Court contending that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) nor the BNS mandates the furnishing of a postal address as a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a private complaint.
The High Court’s ruling has become a landmark affirmation of procedural flexibility in cybercrime cases, where anonymity often shields perpetrators and conventional notions of address and identity fail to capture digital realities.
Arguments of the Petitioner:
The petitioner contended that the Magistrate’s insistence on the postal address was legally unsustainable and procedurally regressive. Counsel argued that Section 2(1)(h) of the BNSS defines a “complaint” as any allegation made to a Magistrate with a view to taking action against “some person, whether known or unknown.”
This statutory language, the petitioner argued, is explicit in permitting complaints against unknown persons. If the law recognizes proceedings against unidentified individuals, it would be incongruous to require a precise postal address at the threshold stage. Such a requirement, particularly in cyber offence cases, would undermine the legislative intent and obstruct access to justice.
The petitioner further submitted that in cases involving online misconduct — including cyber defamation, impersonation, and digital harassment — perpetrators frequently use pseudonyms, fake profiles, or partially disclosed identities. Victims may only have access to electronic identifiers such as usernames, profile links, or digital communication records.
Reliance was placed on Sections 63 and 64 of the BNSS, which expressly permit issuance and service of summons through electronic communication. Counsel argued that the procedural framework now recognizes digital modes of service and communication, reflecting technological advancements.
The petitioner also highlighted Sections 67C, 69, 69A, and 69B of the IT Act, which impose statutory obligations on intermediaries to preserve and disclose user data in accordance with lawful directions. These provisions empower investigative agencies to trace and identify accused persons through technical mechanisms.
Further, reference was made to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, and the Kerala Electronic Processes (Issuance, Service and Execution) Rules, 2025, both of which facilitate service through electronic means.
It was argued that if statutory mechanisms exist to trace digital offenders and serve them electronically, returning a complaint for want of a postal address amounts to subordinating substantive justice to procedural rigidity. The petitioner emphasized that such insistence would deny victims meaningful access to criminal law remedies and encourage deliberate anonymity among wrongdoers.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The respondents defended the Magistrate’s order on procedural grounds. It was argued that the requirement of a postal address is essential to ensure proper service of summons and compliance with due process.
They contended that without a verifiable address, the Magistrate would face practical difficulties in issuing process and ensuring the accused’s presence before the court. The absence of such basic identifying information could potentially lead to delays, abuse of process, or uncertainty in criminal proceedings.
The respondents further submitted that procedural safeguards are vital components of criminal jurisprudence and cannot be dispensed with lightly. Ensuring the accused’s right to notice and fair hearing is foundational to justice.
However, the respondents did not dispute that modern statutes recognize electronic service, nor did they demonstrate any express statutory mandate requiring disclosure of a postal address as a precondition for filing a complaint.
Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
Justice C.S. Dias undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework under the BNSS and the IT Act. The Court began by interpreting Section 2(1)(h) of the BNSS, which permits allegations against “some person, whether known or unknown.”
The Court observed that if the statute recognizes the registration of crimes against unknown persons, particularly where cognizable offences are made out, it would be legally inconsistent to insist upon a postal address as a jurisdictional prerequisite for entertaining private complaints involving non-cognizable offences.
The Court emphatically noted:
“If the law recognises registration of crimes against unknown persons when a cognizable offence is made out, it would be incongruous to insist on the disclosure of a postal address as a jurisdictional prerequisite for private complaints alleging non-cognizable offences.”
The judgment examined Sections 63 and 64 of the BNSS, which explicitly permit issuance and service of summons via electronic communication. This legislative shift reflects an acknowledgment of digital realities and modern communication systems.
The Court also considered the provisions of the IT Act that require intermediaries to preserve and disclose user information. These statutory safeguards ensure that investigative authorities are not helpless in identifying digital offenders.
Importantly, the Court observed that in cases involving cyberbullying, online defamation, impersonation, and digital harassment, perpetrators frequently operate under pseudonymous identities. Victims often lack access to residential addresses and may only possess electronic communication details.
In such circumstances, insisting upon a postal address at the threshold stage would deny access to justice, render victims remediless, and encourage strategic anonymity.
The Court strongly criticized the Magistrate’s approach, remarking:
“It would be too rustic to direct the furnishing of the postal address of the accused to entertain a complaint. To return a complaint solely for want of a postal address is to subordinate substantive justice to procedural rigidity.”
Justice Dias further emphasized that courts cannot express helplessness merely because the accused’s address is not readily available. When a cognizable offence is disclosed, police authorities are empowered to register crimes and trace unknown accused persons through investigative mechanisms.
The Court reiterated the foundational principle:
“Ultimately, processual rules are the handmaid of justice.”
Holding that the Magistrate’s order was legally unsustainable, the High Court allowed the criminal miscellaneous petition, set aside the impugned order, and directed the Magistrate to accept the complaint on file.
The Court ordered issuance of process to the accused through the disclosed electronic communication addresses mentioned in the complaint. It further directed that if the accused fails to respond, appropriate steps be taken in accordance with the BNSS and applicable electronic process rules.
In a forward-looking direction, the Court instructed the Registrar (District Judiciary) to place the matter before the competent authority for consideration of suitable amendments to the Criminal Rules of Practice to address cyber offence complaints more effectively.
Significance of the Judgment:
This ruling marks a progressive recognition of the realities of cybercrime and digital anonymity. By aligning procedural law with technological evolution, the High Court ensured that victims of online misconduct are not left without remedies merely because of technical hurdles.
The decision reinforces that criminal procedure must evolve in tandem with societal and technological changes. In an age where identity is often mediated through digital footprints rather than physical addresses, the justice system must adapt accordingly.
The judgment underscores that procedural requirements must facilitate, not frustrate, the administration of justice.