Introduction:

In XXX v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 3416 of 2025, the Patna High Court delivered a significant judgment emphasising that prosecutions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act cannot be sustained unless the age of the victim is conclusively established through reliable school records or medical evidence in accordance with Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, a mandate that has now been firmly reiterated as a statutory and judicial requirement. The matter came before Justice Alok Kumar Pandey in a criminal appeal filed by the State of Bihar challenging the acquittal granted by the Trial Court to the accused who had been charged with offences under Sections 354 and 354A of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

Arguments:

According to the prosecution’s allegation, the accused had approached the victim at a shop, persuaded her to accompany him to his residence, and upon reaching, allegedly showed her an obscene video; the prosecution further stated that when the victim attempted to escape, she was threatened with dire consequences, including threats to kill her father if she disclosed the incident, leading to the eventual lodging of the FIR after she narrated the incident to her family. The Trial Court, however, acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish one of the most essential ingredients of a POCSO offence—namely, that the victim was a “child” under the Act, meaning below 18 years of age—and consequently, the primary question before the High Court was whether the determination of age had been proved in conformity with statutory requirements.

The State, through its counsel Mr. Ramchandra Singh, argued that the Trial Court had taken an overly technical view of the matter and failed to appreciate that the photocopy of the age-related document, which the Investigating Officer had verified online, was sufficient to conclude that the victim was a minor, and further argued that the circumstances narrated by the prosecution witnesses, the victim’s emotional state, and her prompt disclosure to her parents should have been considered adequate corroborative evidence to establish both the commission of the offence and the victim’s minority. The State also argued that minor inconsistencies in statements are natural in sexual offence cases and should not weaken the prosecution’s case, particularly where the victim’s testimony was consistent in material particulars.

The defence, represented by Mr. Abhinav Alok, Mr. Priyajeet Pandey, and Ms. Megha, countered these submissions by asserting that the prosecution had failed at the very threshold—age determination—and that without legally admissible proof of the victim’s age, the application of the stringent POCSO provisions could not be invoked; the defence stressed that the photocopy of the alleged age certificate produced by the Investigating Officer was inadmissible in evidence, had not been proved through primary or secondary evidence, lacked certification, and was therefore devoid of evidentiary value. The defence further argued that the Investigating Officer had merely claimed to have verified the document online but had not annexed any verification report, had not examined any school authority, had not seized original school registers, and had failed to follow the three-tier statutory age-determination procedure laid down under Section 94(2) of the 2015 Juvenile Justice Act, which requires (i) the date of birth certificate from the school first attended; (ii) the birth certificate issued by municipal or panchayat authorities; and only in the absence of both, (iii) medical determination of age through ossification or other medical tests; however, in the present case, none of these categories of evidence had been produced or proved. The defence also contended that the prosecution’s story was marred by serious inconsistencies, including unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, contradictory statements between the victim and her family members, and absence of independent witnesses despite the alleged incident occurring in a locality where people were present. Moreover, it was argued that the POCSO Act, though intended to provide stringent safeguards for minors, cannot be invoked merely on the basis of assumptions or assertions about age, and that failure to prove age conclusively must necessarily result in benefit of doubt to the accused.

Judgement:

Turning to its analysis, the Patna High Court considered the long line of judicial decisions emphasising that age determination is not a procedural formality but a substantive requirement, particularly in cases under POCSO where the definition of “child” is foundational to the applicability of the Act itself. The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, wherein it was held that the age determination procedure under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, must be strictly followed even when determining the age of a child victim and not merely for juvenile accused. The Court noted that although the 2007 Rules were replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the substance of the rule—regarding mandatory reliance on school records or birth certificates, and only thereafter medical tests—has been preserved and codified in Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act. Justice Pandey observed that Section 94 unequivocally requires the prosecution to produce valid documentary evidence and that photocopies of documents cannot substitute for original records or duly proved secondary evidence; he further observed that medical evidence of age is compulsory when documentary evidence is unavailable, but in the present case, not only was medical evidence not conducted, but there was no explanation from the Investigating Officer regarding this omission. The Court was critical of the investigation, noting that the Investigating Officer had displayed a casual approach by merely accepting a photocopy from the victim’s family and claiming to have conducted online verification without producing any proof of such verification. The Court emphasised that in criminal trials, particularly those under special statutes like POCSO, the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution to prove each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and where essential evidence such as age is missing, the case cannot succeed. Importantly, the Court reiterated the principle that an accused who has been acquitted by a Trial Court enjoys a “double presumption of innocence,” meaning that the appellate court must be especially cautious and should interfere only when the findings of the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal, or grossly unreasonable. In the present case, the High Court held that the Trial Court’s findings were well-reasoned, supported by the record, and founded on a correct understanding of the law; there was no perversity or illegality in the acquittal. The Court also noted several concerns that further weakened the prosecution’s case, including the delay in lodging the FIR, which was not explained in any meaningful way and which therefore cast doubt on the spontaneity and authenticity of the complaint. The Court pointed out that the prosecution witnesses, including the victim and her parents, provided inconsistent accounts regarding the sequence of events, which undermined the credibility of the prosecution’s narrative. It also observed that no neighbour, shopkeeper, or other local resident had been examined—despite the fact that the incident allegedly occurred in an area where independent witnesses were available—and this omission raised further doubts about the reliability of the prosecution’s version. Based on these cumulative factors, the Patna High Court concluded that the prosecution had wholly failed to discharge its burden of establishing that the victim was a minor under POCSO at the time of the incident, and in the absence of such proof, the POCSO provisions could not be invoked. The Court emphasised that while POCSO is a beneficial legislation intended to protect children, it cannot override fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, including the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the Court upheld the acquittal of the accused, reaffirming that age determination is not a flexible or discretionary matter but a mandatory statutory requirement, and that failure to adhere to Section 94(2) of the 2015 Act is fatal to the prosecution’s case.