Introduction:
In a significant constitutional ruling reinforcing the inclusive reach of judicial protection under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the Madras High Court, presided over by Justice Hemant Chandangoudar, held that a non-citizen is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when State action is alleged to be arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, and violative of the right to equality and life, even though such a person cannot claim fundamental rights reserved exclusively for citizens under Articles 15, 16, and 19, the Court was dealing with a writ petition filed by G. Thirukalyanamalar, a registered Sri Lankan Tamil refugee residing in Tamil Nadu, who challenged the action of the State Bank of India, a public sector bank and hence an instrumentality of the State, in terminating her services solely on the ground that she was not an Indian citizen, the petitioner had been appointed in 2008 as Officer – Marketing and Recovery (Rural) and had been in continuous service for several years with no adverse remarks, later when the Bank initiated recruitment for the post of Probationary Officer (Rural Business) from among existing Officers (Marketing and Recovery – Rural), she applied, was selected, and her name was included in the final selection list, however, during scrutiny of documents, the Bank noted that she was a Sri Lankan national and passed an order terminating her services, treating her nationality as a disqualification, this order was assailed as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and discriminatory, especially in light of the special rehabilitation policies of the Government of Tamil Nadu and the Government of India for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, the petitioner also contended that she had entered India as early as 1990, had completed her education in Tamil Nadu, possessed qualifications recognized by Indian authorities, and that the recruitment application did not even require disclosure of citizenship, making the allegation of suppression unsustainable, the Court was thus called upon to decide not only whether the termination was legally valid but also whether a non-citizen could maintain a writ petition alleging violation of constitutional guarantees of equality and personal liberty, the judgment thus carries far-reaching implications for refugee rights, constitutional access to justice, and the obligations of State instrumentalities toward long-settled non-citizens who have been granted rehabilitation and social integration benefits by government policy.
Arguments:
On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that termination of service solely on the ground of nationality amounted to hostile discrimination prohibited under Article 14 of the Constitution, and that such action also impacted her right to livelihood, which forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21, it was submitted that the petitioner had been residing in India for decades as a registered Sri Lankan Tamil refugee, had entered the country in 1990, had pursued her schooling and higher education in Tamil Nadu, and had obtained degrees recognized by Indian authorities, and therefore she was not a transient foreign national but part of a protected refugee community that the State itself had undertaken to rehabilitate through structured schemes providing shelter, education, and employment opportunities, it was further argued that the petitioner’s grandparents were born in India and had migrated to Sri Lanka, and therefore the petitioner had substantial links with India, strengthening the equity in her favour, the petitioner also contended that she was appointed by the Bank in 2008 after due process and had served uninterruptedly without any allegation of misconduct, inefficiency, or ineligibility, and therefore, termination after several years solely on the ground of nationality was arbitrary, unreasonable, and shockingly disproportionate, it was further emphasized that the application form for the Probationary Officer post did not require disclosure of citizenship status, and hence the allegation that the petitioner had suppressed material facts was factually incorrect, the petitioner also relied upon government notifications exempting Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from certain requirements under the Immigration and Foreigners Act, particularly noting that persons who had taken shelter in India up to 9 January 2015 were exempted from producing passport or travel documents, thereby recognizing their unique legal status, the petitioner thus asserted that the Bank, being a State instrumentality, was bound to act fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with constitutional principles, and could not arbitrarily deprive her of employment after having itself employed her for years, on the other hand, the Bank contended that recruitment notifications clearly contemplated appointment of Indian citizens and that public employment under Article 16 was meant for citizens, the Bank argued that the petitioner was a Sri Lankan national and had applied for the promotional post despite knowing that citizenship was a basic eligibility requirement, and therefore her very continuation in service was irregular, it was further argued that a non-citizen had no locus standi to invoke writ jurisdiction for enforcement of fundamental rights, as such rights were guaranteed only to citizens, and therefore the petition itself was not maintainable, the Bank also alleged that the petitioner had not disclosed her nationality at the time of applying for the Probationary Officer post, and that once the discrepancy came to light, the Bank was duty bound to correct the illegality by terminating her service, the respondent thus justified the termination as a lawful administrative action to ensure compliance with recruitment rules and constitutional requirements regarding public employment, and urged the Court not to dilute statutory eligibility norms merely on compassionate or equitable considerations, asserting that public institutions must strictly follow recruitment conditions to maintain administrative integrity.
Judgment:
After carefully examining the constitutional scheme, statutory provisions, rehabilitation policies, and the factual matrix of the case, the Madras High Court decisively rejected the Bank’s preliminary objection regarding maintainability and held that while non-citizens cannot seek enforcement of fundamental rights reserved exclusively for citizens under Articles 15, 16, and 19, they are fully entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction when State action is alleged to violate Articles 14 and 21, which are available to “persons” and not restricted to citizens, the Court categorically observed that where State action is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, and affects equality before law or the right to life and personal liberty, a non-citizen cannot be denied access to constitutional remedies, the Court further noted that the State Government of Tamil Nadu had formulated comprehensive rehabilitation schemes for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, providing benefits such as shelter, education, and opportunities for employment, thereby acknowledging their long-term integration into society, the Court also took judicial notice of government notifications exempting Sri Lankan Tamil refugees who had entered India up to 9 January 2015 from passport and travel document requirements under Section 3 of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, thereby recognizing their distinct legal position, applying these principles to the present case, the Court observed that the petitioner had entered India in 1990, had completed her entire education in Tamil Nadu, and had obtained qualifications recognized by Indian authorities, and that she had been appointed by the Bank itself in 2008 and allowed to serve continuously for several years, the Court found it significant that the recruitment application for the Probationary Officer post did not require disclosure of citizenship status, and therefore the allegation of suppression of nationality was unsustainable, the Court further held that even if the Bank had the right to restrict recruitment to citizens, such restriction could not be applied retrospectively to terminate an employee who had already been appointed and continued in service without objection for years, the Court held that sudden termination solely on the ground of nationality, without any misconduct or ineligibility in educational or professional qualifications, amounted to hostile discrimination and violated Article 14, the Court also observed that livelihood forms an essential component of the right to life under Article 21, and arbitrary deprivation of employment by a State instrumentality directly impacts that constitutional guarantee, accordingly, the Court declared the termination order as arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional, and unsustainable in law, and set aside the impugned order, thereby restoring the petitioner’s service, while clarifying that the State cannot deny constitutional protection to non-citizens when State action itself violates basic principles of equality and fairness, the judgment thus firmly establishes that refugee status or foreign nationality does not strip a person of constitutional safeguards against arbitrary State action, especially when the State itself has facilitated long-term rehabilitation and social integration.