Introduction:
In the case titled Mustafa & Others v. State of Karnataka & Anr. [Criminal Petition No. 101905 of 2025], the Karnataka High Court quashed an FIR filed against three Muslim individuals who were accused of distributing pamphlets promoting Islamic teachings at the Ramatheerth Temple in Jamkhandi. The FIR was registered under Sections 299, 351(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Section 5 of the Karnataka Protection of Right to Freedom of Religion Act, 2022 (KPRFR Act). The petitioners contended that their actions did not amount to any punishable offence as defined by the cited provisions. The case was heard by the High Court where Advocates Iftekhar Shahpuri and Anwarali D Nadaf appeared for the petitioners, while HCGP Abhishek Malipatil represented the State. The Court delivered a reasoned judgment clarifying the scope of offences under the KPRFR Act and emphasized the importance of locus standi and the substantive content of allegations for sustaining a criminal prosecution.
Arguments Presented:
The allegations stemmed from an incident on May 4, 2025, where the complainant stated that the accused were distributing pamphlets that conveyed Islamic teachings and were verbally sharing details of their religious beliefs at a Hindu temple. It was claimed that devotees confronted the accused, after which the latter made derogatory remarks about Hinduism and allegedly offered material incentives, including job offers in Dubai and vehicles, to entice conversions. The FIR registered against them alleged violations under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Karnataka law on religious freedom. The prosecution opposed the quashing of the FIR, asserting that the facts presented in the complaint disclosed an offence under Section 5 of the KPRFR Act, which punishes acts of unlawful conversion through inducement or misrepresentation. They argued that the statements made by the petitioners, coupled with the alleged material inducements, clearly constituted an offence. According to the prosecution, even if an actual conversion had not occurred, the act of attempting to convert with promises of material benefit was sufficient to initiate criminal action.
On the contrary, the petitioners strongly denied these allegations, claiming that their actions were merely confined to peaceful religious preaching without any coercion, inducement, or misrepresentation. They argued that there was no factual foundation supporting the assertion that anyone was compelled or lured into converting to Islam. More importantly, the petitioners submitted that the complainant, being a third party and not a person who had converted or whose family member had converted, had no locus standi to file the complaint under Section 4 of the KPRFR Act. Section 4 restricts the right to lodge a complaint to the person who has been converted or their relatives, including parents, siblings, or close family by blood or adoption. The petitioners further stated that in the absence of any element of compulsion, inducement, force, or conversion, the bare act of distributing religious material could not be criminalized under the cited provisions.
Court’s Judgment:
The Karnataka High Court examined the impugned FIR and the provisions under which the petitioners had been charged. The bench clarified that the KPRFR Act was enacted to prohibit conversion from one religion to another by means of misrepresentation, force, fraud, undue influence, coercion, allurement, or promise of marriage, as per Section 3. For such conversion-related offences to be actionable, Section 4 explicitly lays down who may lodge a complaint — namely, the person who has been converted, or close relatives. Section 5 provides the punishment for any act contravening Section 3. The High Court found that the FIR in the present case had been registered based on a complaint by a third party who did not fall into any of the categories mentioned under Section 4 of the Act. As such, the registration of the FIR itself was procedurally flawed, since the complainant lacked legal standing to initiate such action.
Furthermore, the Court held that even assuming the allegations in the FIR were true, there was no prima facie material to show that the petitioners had actually attempted to convert anyone, or had engaged in coercion, inducement, or fraud. The court reiterated that peaceful preaching or sharing of one’s religious beliefs — absent any effort to forcibly convert — does not fall under the purview of the penal provisions of the KPRFR Act. Additionally, while the FIR mentioned that derogatory remarks were made against Hinduism, there was no independent corroboration or detail establishing that those remarks amounted to a punishable offence. The mere act of distributing pamphlets about Islam at a temple, the Court noted, may be questionable in terms of propriety or sentiment, but does not attract criminal liability unless there is evidence of inducement or compulsion to convert.
The Court ultimately found that the FIR did not disclose any cognizable offence under either the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or the KPRFR Act. It ruled that the continuation of criminal proceedings in such a case would amount to abuse of the legal process and would violate the petitioners’ right to freedom of religion and expression as protected by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that criminal law should not be misused to penalize mere differences in faith or belief when such acts do not infringe upon the rights of others or violate substantive legal provisions. It stated: “The absence of these essential elements renders the allegations insufficient to constitute an offence under the Act. Consequently, the registration of the FIR, culminating in the filing of the charge sheet, is vitiated.” Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the FIR, along with all subsequent proceedings, was quashed.