Introduction:

In the case titled Yasir Ahmad Bhat v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court had to decide whether an appellant, whose vehicle was seized under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), could bypass the designated statutory mechanism provided under UAPA by directly invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act. The matter arose after a load carrier vehicle was seized on the allegation that it had been used in terror-related activities, following recovery of live ammunition and a grenade from suspects allegedly linked with Lashkar-e-Toiba (TRF). The Special Court (UAPA), Anantnag, dismissed the appellant’s plea for release of the vehicle, noting that proceedings were still pending before the Divisional Commissioner (Designated Authority). The appellants, instead of pursuing remedies under UAPA, filed an appeal before the High Court, claiming that the seizure itself was illegal. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sindhu Sharma and Justice Shahzad Azeem rejected this attempt, holding that UAPA provides a complete code from seizure to adjudication and appeal, and this statutory scheme cannot be circumvented by invoking the NIA Act.

Arguments of the Appellants:

The appellants, represented by Senior Advocate S.T. Hussain with Advocate Nida Nazir, argued that the seizure of the vehicle was unlawful because mandatory procedural safeguards under Section 25 of UAPA had not been followed. They pointed out that the Act requires prior approval of seizure, production before the Designated Authority within 48 hours, and confirmation or revocation within 60 days. According to them, the police did not comply with these timelines and statutory safeguards. They further contended that the vehicle in question was the only source of livelihood for the family and had not been used for terror activities. They argued that continuing to withhold the vehicle was causing undue hardship, particularly when there was no substantive evidence linking it to terror-related incidents. The appellants asserted that the order of the Special Court rejecting the release of the vehicle was appealable under Section 21 of the NIA Act and that the High Court had jurisdiction to examine the validity of seizure. They emphasized that a strict interpretation of UAPA provisions could not override the principle of protecting livelihood, especially when the seizure lacked justification.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The respondents, represented by Senior Additional Advocate General Mohsin-ul-Showkat Qadri with Ms. Nowbahar Khan, countered that the seizure was lawful, justified, and executed strictly in accordance with the UAPA. They argued that the vehicle had indeed been used to transport arms and ammunition for terrorist purposes and that all codal formalities, including prior approval from the Director General of Police under Section 25, had been followed. They highlighted that the Divisional Commissioner, who acts as the Designated Authority under the Act, had already issued notice to the registered owner of the vehicle to present objections against seizure. The respondents maintained that since proceedings were actively pending before the Designated Authority, the appellants had no grounds to prematurely invoke appellate jurisdiction under the NIA Act. They also submitted that the Special Court’s order was interlocutory in nature, and therefore, not appealable under Section 21 of the NIA Act. Entertaining such an appeal, they argued, would undermine the legislative scheme of UAPA and dilute the jurisdiction vested in the Designated Authority and Special Courts.

Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:

Justice Shahzad Azeem, writing for the Bench, emphasized that Section 25 of the UAPA is a self-contained code governing the seizure of property suspected to be involved in unlawful activities. It prescribes safeguards, including prior approval for seizure, production before the Designated Authority within 48 hours, confirmation or revocation within 60 days, and a statutory appellate hierarchy leading from the Designated Authority to the Special Court and then to the High Court. The Court observed that the appellants had “jumped the gun” by bypassing this statutory mechanism and directly invoking Section 21 of the NIA Act.

The Bench categorically held that once a statutory forum is available under UAPA, the High Court cannot permit appellants to circumvent it by invoking appellate jurisdiction under another statute. Such an approach, the Court explained, would defeat the legislative intent behind establishing a complete framework under UAPA for seizure-related disputes. The Court further clarified that the Special Court’s order rejecting the release of the seized vehicle was interlocutory in nature and not appealable under Section 21 of the NIA Act. To entertain such appeals would amount to usurping the jurisdiction of the Designated Authority, which under Section 31 of UAPA is vested with powers akin to a civil court.

The Court also stressed that Section 30 of UAPA vests the Designated Authority with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims and objections relating to seizure. Therefore, the proper course for the appellants was to raise their grievances before the Divisional Commissioner, who had already issued notice, rather than seeking premature intervention of the High Court. The Bench noted that arguments regarding procedural timelines, approval, and livelihood concerns could all be considered by the Designated Authority under the statutory scheme.

The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, vacated interim orders, and reaffirmed that statutory remedies must be exhausted before invoking the High Court’s jurisdiction. The judgment reinforces the principle that specialized statutory mechanisms cannot be bypassed and underscores the completeness of the UAPA framework in handling seizure-related disputes in terrorism-linked cases.