Introduction:

The Jharkhand High Court, in its recent judgment, has clarified that the actual use of criminal force is not a requirement to constitute the offence of assault under Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case, titled Devendra Nath Choubey v. The State of Jharkhand (2024), delves into the definition of assault and the conditions under which Section 353 of the IPC, dealing with assault or criminal force against public servants, can be invoked. The bench, led by Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary, addressed the crucial question of whether mere gestures or the creation of apprehension in the mind of the victim regarding the potential use of criminal force could be sufficient to constitute the offence of assault. The case arose from a situation where three individuals, including the petitioner, entered the office of a public servant demanding the immediate issuance of a death certificate. One of the accused allegedly threatened the informant, who was an executive magistrate, with dire consequences. The incident escalated to the point where the informant felt compelled to call the police. The trial court had convicted the accused under Sections 353 and 504/34 of the IPC but acquitted them under Section 448 for house trespass. The appellate court upheld the conviction, leading to a revision petition being filed before the High Court. The key issue was whether the actions of the accused were sufficient to constitute an assault and prevent the public servant from performing his official duties.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Petitioner’s Arguments:

The defence counsel for the petitioner, Devendra Nath Choubey, argued that there was no eyewitness to the alleged incident. The counsel contended that the trial court had relied heavily on the testimony of P.W.-4, which did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the commission of the crime. It was also argued that the accused did not use any criminal force during the incident, and there were no allegations that the informant was physically prevented from performing his official duties. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the presence of criminal force was essential to invoke Section 353 of the IPC. Since there was no physical assault or force used, the conviction under Section 353 was not justified. Furthermore, the counsel contended that no criminal force was exerted upon the informant, and there was no direct prevention of the informant from carrying out his duties.

State’s Arguments:

In response, the counsel for the State emphasized the role of the informant, an executive magistrate, who was carrying out his official duties in his office when the accused entered. The State’s counsel argued that although no physical assault occurred, the actions of the accused, including their abusive language, threatening behaviour, and attempts to pressurize the public servant to perform a specific task, created a situation that obstructed the informant from performing his official duties. The counsel contended that these actions led the informant to feel threatened to such an extent that he had to call the police for assistance. The State’s position was that the offence under Section 353 of the IPC was valid as the accused’s conduct, which included both gestures and verbal threats, created an apprehension in the mind of the informant about the potential use of criminal force, thereby making out the offence of assault as defined under Section 351 of the IPC.

Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:

The Jharkhand High Court, led by Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary, rejected the revision petition filed by the petitioner and upheld the conviction of the accused. The Court meticulously examined the definition of assault under Section 351 of the IPC, which states: “Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault.” The Court emphasized that the key element in an assault is not the actual use of criminal force, but rather the apprehension in the victim’s mind that such force might be used. The Court stated that a mere gesture or preparation by the accused, knowing that it would cause apprehension of criminal force, is sufficient to constitute an assault under Section 351 of the IPC.

In this case, the Court noted that the accused had entered the office of the informant, a public servant, while he was performing his official duties. The accused not only used abusive language but also attempted to pressure the public servant to perform a specific task, even threatening him with dire consequences. The Court found that these actions were sufficient to create an apprehension in the mind of the informant that criminal force could be used. The informant, in response, called the police, which the Court saw as a clear indication of the fear created by the accused’s behaviour.

Justice Choudhary pointed out that the definition of assault under Section 351 IPC does not require the actual use of criminal force. Instead, it is enough that the accused’s actions caused the victim to fear the use of criminal force. This interpretation was critical in this case, where the informant’s actions, including his decision to call the police, demonstrated that he perceived a threat of criminal force from the accused. The Court also made it clear that while mere words alone might not constitute assault, they could, when combined with gestures or other preparatory actions, create the necessary apprehension in the victim’s mind to qualify as assault.

The Court emphasized that Section 353 of the IPC, which deals with the use of criminal force or assault against public servants, is applicable in this case as the accused’s actions led to a disruption of the public servant’s official duties. The informant, being a public servant, was prevented from performing his duties due to the accused’s actions, which included not just verbal threats but also physical gestures that created a sense of imminent danger. The Court found that this constituted an offence under Section 353, as the accused had not only assaulted the informant but also obstructed him in the discharge of his official duties.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the revision petition, finding no merit in the arguments put forth by the petitioner. The conviction and sentence under Sections 353 and 504/34 IPC were upheld, and the Court concluded that the trial court had correctly applied the law.