Introduction:

In the matter of Manish Bhupendrabhai Panwala v. State of Gujarat & Another, the Gujarat High Court, presided over by Justice J.C. Doshi, quashed a 2009 criminal case registered against a journalist accused of “disturbing a lion while it was feeding” outside the forest limits of the Gir National Park and Wildlife Sanctuary, holding that the alleged act did not meet the statutory definition of “hunting” under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and that the entire prosecution was vitiated by a legal bar on cognizance due to the absence of a valid complaint under Section 55 of the Act. The petitioner, a journalist, had visited Gir National Park in November 2009 with two companions from an NGO engaged in animal and environmental welfare, entering the forest lawfully with valid permits and an official guide. Later that evening, after refueling his vehicle in the city area, he learned from local villagers that a lion was feeding on its prey in an agricultural field outside the sanctuary limits; the group proceeded to the location, which was in a revenue area, not within forest boundaries, where they were intercepted by the local Range Forest Officer. The officer, suspecting a sting operation due to the petitioner’s media credentials, registered a Forest Offence First Report (FOFR) in the early hours of November 6, 2009, alleging that the petitioner and companions disturbed the lion by flashing vehicle lights while it was feeding, thus committing offences under Sections 2(16)(b) (definition of hunting), 2(33) (definition of vehicle), 9 (prohibition of hunting), 39 (wild animals as Government property), and 51 (penalties) of the Act.

Arguments:

The petitioner argued that the location was outside the sanctuary limits, as corroborated by the Gram Panchayat’s rojkam; that there was no allegation or evidence of capturing, killing, injuring, or possessing any wild animal; and that even taking the allegations at face value, merely disturbing a lion did not fall within the ambit of “hunting” as defined in Section 2(16)(b), which covers only acts such as capturing, killing, poisoning, snaring, trapping, or attempts thereof, or causing injury or destruction. He further argued that Section 55 creates a statutory bar on cognizance unless there is a complaint filed by the Director of Wildlife Preservation, Chief Wildlife Warden, or an authorised officer, or by a private person with 60 days’ prior notice; here, the prosecution was initiated solely on the basis of a police-style FOFR and subsequent chargesheet, without any such complaint, rendering cognizance by the Magistrate illegal. The petitioner submitted that continuing the prosecution in such circumstances amounted to abuse of process, and noted that he had already expressed remorse, recognised the impropriety of his conduct, and voluntarily donated ₹1 lakh to the Gujarat State Lion Conservation Society as a gesture of contrition.

The State, through the public prosecutor, maintained that the petitioner’s actions—approaching a feeding lion at night and disturbing it with vehicle lights—were reckless, interfered with wildlife, and warranted prosecution under the Act to deter such conduct, especially during the official lion census period. The State argued that the Range Forest Officer was competent to register the FOFR and investigate, and that the facts indicated interference with a protected species in its natural habitat.

Judgement:

However, the Court, after perusing the rojkam and statutory provisions, held that even accepting the prosecution’s version, the alleged conduct did not satisfy the definition of “hunting” under Section 2(16)(b), nor did it trigger the application of Sections 9, 39, or 51, all of which are premised on acts of hunting or unlawful possession. Merely disturbing a lion by flashing lights, the Court held, while unwise and showing insensitivity towards wildlife, does not constitute an offence under the Act. The Court further found that the proceedings were fatally flawed for non-compliance with Section 55’s mandatory complaint requirement, observing that the Magistrate was legally precluded from taking cognizance without a valid complaint from an authorised officer or proper notice-based private complaint. A Forest Offence Report and chargesheet by the investigating officer do not amount to a “complaint” within the meaning of Section 55, and therefore cognizance was barred in law. Justice Doshi emphasised that subjecting the petitioner to a criminal trial in such circumstances would be a travesty of justice and an abuse of process. Nonetheless, the Court remarked that the petitioner’s conduct was reckless and antagonistic to conservation ethics, particularly disturbing a protected species during feeding at night, and that such behaviour, though not criminal under the Act, deserved public censure. The Court took note of the petitioner’s voluntary donation to the Lion Conservation Society as evidence of a corrective and reformative attitude. Ultimately, the FIR and all consequential proceedings were quashed, with the clarification that the order would not preclude an authorised officer from initiating fresh proceedings under the Act based on the material collected, should such proceedings be instituted in compliance with law. The ruling reaffirms the principle that wildlife protection laws must be applied in strict conformity with their statutory language, that criminal liability cannot be imposed by stretching definitions beyond their terms, and that procedural safeguards like Section 55 are not empty formalities but jurisdictional bars to cognizance, ensuring that prosecutions are initiated responsibly and by authorised persons. It also serves as a cautionary tale for the public and media professionals that while curiosity about wildlife is natural, intrusion into the lives of protected species—especially at vulnerable moments like feeding—is reckless and contrary to conservation principles, even if not criminally punishable.