Introduction:

The Gujarat High Court, in Vishwas Sudhanshu Bhamburkar v. State of Gujarat and Others, R/Special Criminal Application (Direction) No. 8358 of 2023, was confronted with a case that raised important questions on the limits of litigant conduct, the scope of judicial criticism, and the fine distinction between asserting legal rights and scandalising constitutional courts. The matter was heard by Justice M. R. Mengdey, who was called upon to examine a challenge to an order of the Magistrate declining to direct investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and instead choosing to examine the complainant under Section 200 CrPC. While the petition originally arose out of allegations of serious illegality relating to construction near Surat Airport based on allegedly forged No Objection Certificates, the proceedings before the High Court took a dramatic turn when the petitioner, appearing as party-in-person, made sweeping remarks suggesting that constitutional courts other than the Supreme Court “flagrantly disregard the law” and that Supreme Court judgments such as Lalita Kumari remain unimplemented. The High Court not only dismissed the petition on merits, holding it to be frivolous and an abuse of process, but also issued a contempt notice against the petitioner, observing that his conduct was intended to lower the dignity of the judiciary and scandalise the institution as a whole.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:

The petitioner contended that his grievance stemmed from the consistent failure of the police authorities to register a First Information Report despite clear disclosure of cognizable offences in his complaint dated 14 January 2020 addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Surat City. According to him, certain builders had obtained No Objection Certificates from the Airports Authority of India by submitting forged documents relating to site elevation and WGS-84 coordinates, and thereafter carried out construction at locations different from those for which permissions were granted, in violation of aviation safety norms. He asserted that offences under Sections 467 (forgery), 420 (cheating), and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code were clearly made out. The petitioner relied heavily on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, arguing that registration of an FIR is mandatory once information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and that no preliminary inquiry into the veracity of the complaint is permissible. He submitted that despite repeated representations to the police, including under Section 154(3) CrPC, the authorities failed to act in accordance with binding Supreme Court precedent. The petitioner further argued that the Magistrate acted illegally in declining to exercise powers under Section 156(3) CrPC and in treating the application as a complaint under Section 200 CrPC, which, according to him, amounted to defiance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In the course of his submissions, the petitioner went further to state that the general public perception was that while the Supreme Court shows proactiveness in matters of public safety, other constitutional courts disregard the law, ensuring that even FIRs are not registered. He even sought directions for “training” of the Magistrate, alleging ignorance of settled law. The petitioner maintained that he was merely stating facts emerging from the record and exercising his right to critique institutional failures.

Arguments on Behalf of the State:

The State of Gujarat opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner was repeatedly attempting to reopen issues that had already been adjudicated at multiple levels, including before the Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the petitioner had earlier approached the High Court seeking directions for registration of an FIR, and the High Court had relegated him to the alternative remedy before the Magistrate, which order had also been unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court. The State argued that the Magistrate had acted strictly in accordance with law in examining the material placed before him and concluding that no cognizable offence was made out so as to warrant investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. It was submitted that the affidavit filed by the Airports Authority of India in the pending public interest litigation did not contain any allegation of forged documents having been submitted by the builders, and that at best, it indicated discrepancies in coordinates and deviations in construction, which did not automatically translate into criminal offences of forgery or cheating. The State further argued that under Section 190(1)(c) CrPC, the Magistrate was fully empowered to take cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer and that treating an application under Section 156(3) as a complaint under Section 200 CrPC was a well-recognised and lawful course. With regard to the petitioner’s remarks against the judiciary, the State supported the Court’s view that such statements went beyond permissible criticism and amounted to an attempt to scandalise and undermine the authority of constitutional courts.

Court’s Judgment:

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the petition in emphatic terms, holding that it was frivolous, misconceived, and a clear abuse of the process of law. Justice M. R. Mengdey undertook a detailed examination of the record and found that the petitioner had miserably failed to point out which documents were allegedly forged or how such forged documents were used before the Airports Authority of India to obtain No Objection Certificates. The Court noted that the affidavit filed by the AAI in the pending PIL merely stated that wrong coordinates and site elevation had been provided at the relevant time and that the construction had deviated from the data supplied, but nowhere did it allege submission of forged documents. On this basis, the Court held that the Magistrate was fully justified in concluding that no cognizable offence was made out and in declining to exercise powers under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court further clarified the legal position that even if a Magistrate chooses not to direct investigation under Section 156(3), he is always empowered under Section 190(1)(c) CrPC to take cognizance and proceed by treating the application as a complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Such an approach, the Court held, cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed contempt of the Supreme Court or defiance of Lalita Kumari. Addressing the petitioner’s extraordinary prayer seeking “training” for the Magistrate, the Court observed that the petitioner appeared to have assumed an advisory jurisdiction over the judiciary itself, and remarked that from the tenor of the petition and the manner of arguments advanced, it was the petitioner who was more in need of training in law. The most serious aspect of the judgment concerned the petitioner’s remarks against constitutional courts. The Court recorded that when asked whether he was making allegations against the judiciary, the petitioner reaffirmed his statements, claiming them to be factual. The Court held that such remarks were made with a clear intention to lower the dignity of the institution and to defame constitutional courts, including the Supreme Court. Observing that a disgruntled litigant cannot be permitted to malign the judiciary after failing to obtain favourable orders, the Court held that the conduct amounted to contempt not only of the High Court but also of the Supreme Court and the trial court. Accordingly, the Court issued notice to the petitioner to explain why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be initiated against him, directed the Registry to revisit the competency certificate permitting him to appear as party-in-person, and imposed costs of ₹25,000 for abuse of process. The judgment stands as a firm reminder that while courts are open to scrutiny and reasoned criticism, scandalising the judiciary under the guise of legal argument cannot be tolerated.