Introduction:

In the case of Ajmer Singh alias Pinka v. The State of NCT of Delhi through SHO Kanjawala, the Delhi High Court addressed a profoundly human and constitutional question—whether a convict can be denied parole to perform the last rites of his deceased father. Justice Ravinder Dudeja, while balancing the gravity of the convict’s offence with his fundamental rights, underscored that the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution extends even to those behind bars. Ajmer Singh, who was convicted in a 2018 rape case and sentenced to 14 years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of ₹1,70,000, sought emergency parole after his father’s demise on September 19 due to a heart attack. He argued that as the eldest son, he bore the moral, religious, and customary duty to perform the last rites. The Court’s ruling reaffirmed that parole is not merely a concession but a constitutional tool to maintain human dignity, family ties, and social obligations, thereby protecting a convict’s essential rights despite the gravity of the offence committed.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

On behalf of the petitioner Ajmer Singh, counsel emphasized that his request for parole was grounded on humanitarian grounds rather than personal convenience. He submitted that his father’s untimely death imposed a religious and moral obligation upon him, being the eldest son of the family, to perform the cremation rites and post-death ceremonies. He stated that in Indian cultural and religious ethos, the eldest son carries a sacred duty to perform these rituals, and denying him parole would not only deprive him of this duty but also violate his constitutional right to dignity. The counsel highlighted that the convict had already undergone incarceration for approximately 1 year, 9 months, and 15 days, excluding remission, and had not previously availed parole or furlough during his sentence. Furthermore, his jail conduct was recorded as “Satisfactory” in the Nominal Roll, which demonstrated that he was not a habitual violator and could be trusted for temporary release. The petitioner clarified that the relief sought was limited to two months of emergency parole, strictly for the purpose of attending the cremation rituals and managing the associated familial responsibilities. His plea revolved around humanitarian justice, arguing that prison does not strip a convict of all rights and that parole serves as a bridge between punishment and preservation of human dignity.

Arguments of the Respondent:

The State, through its counsel, acknowledged the gravity of the offence for which the petitioner had been convicted—rape, a heinous and socially grave crime warranting strict punishment. The respondents argued that parole cannot be claimed as a matter of right but is instead subject to rules, guidelines, and considerations of security, law, and order. The State emphasized that while parole jurisprudence recognizes humanitarian grounds, the authorities are duty-bound to ensure that granting parole does not endanger public safety or undermine the seriousness of punishment. The State also underlined that releasing a convict convicted of such a grave offence, even temporarily, demands utmost caution, as it could create apprehensions of misuse of liberty or possible threats to law and order. However, the respondents did not contest the factual position that the petitioner’s father had passed away or that the convict was indeed the eldest son. Instead, they raised concerns about the potential risks associated with releasing a convict in such cases, and stressed that any order granting parole should be mindful of public interest alongside individual rights.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Ravinder Dudeja, after considering the submissions, examined the matter through the lens of constitutional rights and parole jurisprudence. The Court observed that parole is not merely a discretionary concession but an established facet of criminal jurisprudence designed to allow convicts to maintain family and social ties, discharge essential obligations, and preserve human dignity. The Court held that the right to perform the last rites of a parent is not only a religious duty but also a moral and cultural obligation deeply rooted in Indian traditions. To deny parole in such circumstances would amount to stripping a convict of his dignity, which is an intrinsic part of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court stressed that Article 21 protects the life and personal liberty of every individual, including prisoners, and encompasses their right to dignity even within the confines of incarceration.

Justice Dudeja recognized the seriousness of the crime committed by the petitioner but asserted that the gravity of the offence cannot justify denial of parole on genuine humanitarian grounds. He warned against a mechanical application of rules that would defeat the very object of parole jurisprudence, which balances punitive justice with humane treatment. Observing that the petitioner’s conduct in jail was satisfactory, and that he had never availed parole earlier, the Court held that there was no reasonable ground to believe he would misuse the liberty granted. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Regulation and Rules governing parole cannot override fundamental rights, especially when circumstances involve the death of a close family member.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition and directed the release of Ajmer Singh on parole for a period of four weeks from the date of release. While granting this relief, the Court implicitly emphasized the evolving philosophy of criminal justice—one that recognizes that punishment does not mean dehumanization, and that convicts retain certain essential rights, particularly when life, death, and dignity are at stake.