Introduction:

In a landmark judgment, the Delhi High Court struck down the use of Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) Post Graduate (PG) scores as a criterion for public employment, holding that such a recruitment measure is unconstitutional and lacks rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The case titled Shannu Baghel v. Union of India & Anr. arose out of a Public Interest Litigation filed by advocate Shannu Baghel, who challenged a notification issued by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) on August 11 that prescribed CLAT-PG scores as the sole eligibility measure for recruiting legal professionals in the organization. A division bench comprising Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela presided over the matter and delivered a detailed judgment rejecting the NHAI’s reasoning. The Court emphasized that suitability for public employment cannot be equated with eligibility for admission into higher education, as the two involve distinct objectives, skills, and evaluation standards.

Arguments:

The petitioner, Shannu Baghel, argued that the CLAT-PG exam was never designed as an employment-based qualifying test but strictly as an academic entrance examination to postgraduate programs in law. The plea pointed out that CLAT-PG tests a candidate’s academic knowledge of substantive and procedural laws for the purpose of admission into LL.M programs, but recruitment into public employment demands a wider and different assessment, including professional aptitude, communication skills, practical knowledge, and other qualities which the CLAT-PG score does not and cannot measure. The petitioner contended that the NHAI’s recruitment notification amounted to arbitrary action, violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and was discriminatory against candidates who had not appeared in the CLAT-PG exam, particularly those who had obtained admission into postgraduate law courses through other university-specific entrance examinations or through merit-based selection at the undergraduate level. According to the petitioner, this notification effectively excluded a significant section of law graduates who were otherwise qualified and capable of applying for legal positions but had chosen not to take the CLAT-PG exam because it was irrelevant to their career choices. The plea also relied on comparative practices, arguing that no other recognized national authority used an academic entrance exam meant for higher education as the basis for employment in public sector organizations.

The respondents, including the Union of India and the NHAI, sought to justify their recruitment criteria by arguing that CLAT-PG was a nationally recognized, standardized examination which tested advanced legal knowledge across substantive and procedural areas. They submitted that using CLAT-PG scores as a benchmark would streamline the recruitment process, ensure merit-based selection, and bring uniformity to public recruitment processes for legal professionals. The respondents further argued that several other public sector undertakings had previously adopted CLAT-PG scores for recruiting law officers, setting a precedent for NHAI to follow. They claimed that this system would minimize subjectivity in recruitment by eliminating reliance on internal interviews or university-specific academic scores, which might otherwise vary across institutions. The NHAI defended the move on the grounds of administrative convenience, uniformity, and efficiency, while asserting that the adoption of CLAT-PG scores was neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional.

Judgement:

After hearing both sides, the Delhi High Court rejected the reasoning offered by the NHAI and held that the adoption of CLAT-PG scores as the sole criterion for recruitment to public employment positions was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. The bench underscored that the CLAT-PG examination was created solely for the purpose of admission into postgraduate law courses and had no rational or logical nexus with recruitment to public sector jobs. The Court observed that while CLAT-PG may cover substantive and procedural laws, the assessment framework is academic in nature and does not evaluate the qualities necessary for professional employment. Suitability for public employment, the Court said, may demand interpersonal skills, practical orientation, professional ethics, and adaptability, none of which are tested in CLAT-PG.

The Court noted that some universities conduct their own entrance examinations or interviews to admit candidates into postgraduate law courses, while others rely on undergraduate merit. Thus, tying public employment exclusively to CLAT-PG scores would result in discrimination against those who pursued their academic path through non-CLAT routes, despite being equally, if not more, qualified. Such discrimination, the Court ruled, violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which guarantee equality before law and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The bench highlighted that precedent or practice by other public sector undertakings in using CLAT-PG scores does not legitimize an otherwise unconstitutional and irrational recruitment measure. It reiterated that the adoption of a recruitment criterion must always have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved, and in this case, NHAI’s notification failed to satisfy that test.

The Court also examined the broader constitutional and policy framework. It emphasized that public employment is a matter of constitutional right, rooted in Article 16, and any recruitment criteria must meet the twin tests of reasonableness and fairness. An academic entrance exam designed for higher studies cannot be repurposed as an employment eligibility tool without legislative sanction or proper policy justification. The Court further stressed that allowing such arbitrary linkage between education-oriented exams and employment would open the door to unfair practices, reduce inclusivity, and compromise the meritocratic principles underpinning public service recruitment. By tethering eligibility to CLAT-PG scores, NHAI had effectively excluded otherwise eligible candidates, rendering the recruitment process discriminatory and violative of constitutional guarantees.

In its final observations, the Court declared that the impugned recruitment criteria had no rational basis and lacked logical nexus with the object of recruitment. It held that the NHAI notification prescribing CLAT-PG scores for recruitment was unconstitutional and struck it down. The Court concluded that while CLAT-PG remains a respected and nationally recognized exam for academic admissions, it cannot be stretched beyond its intended purpose to govern public employment. The judgment clarified that recruitment to public employment must be based on criteria specifically designed to test the qualities and competencies required for the job in question, and not on academic scores that serve an entirely different purpose.

Thus, the Delhi High Court not only invalidated the NHAI’s notification but also sent a broader message that public sector organizations must adopt fair, rational, and inclusive recruitment measures aligned with constitutional mandates. The ruling strengthens the principle that public employment cannot be compromised by administrative shortcuts or misplaced reliance on academic examinations meant for entirely different objectives. It is a victory for constitutional equality, fairness, and the protection of opportunities for all aspiring candidates in the field of law.