Introduction:
In Abdul Rashid Sheikh versus National Investigation Agency, the Delhi High Court examined the maintainability of an appeal filed against an order framing charges in a case registered under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Indian Penal Code, where the appellant, a sitting Member of Parliament from Jammu and Kashmir, challenged the trial court’s decision framing serious charges including criminal conspiracy, waging war against the Government of India, terrorist acts, raising funds for terrorist activities, and conspiracy to commit terrorist offences. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Prathiba M Singh and Justice Madhu Jain, which was called upon to decide whether an order framing charges under the UAPA can be assailed in appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act. The appellant had been arrested by the NIA in 2019 in an alleged terror funding case and remained lodged in Tihar Jail, even after being elected to the Lok Sabha from the Baramulla constituency in the 2024 general elections. The challenge before the High Court arose from a trial court order dated 16 March 2022 framing charges and a subsequent formal charge order dated 10 May 2022, with the appellant seeking not only to set aside the charge order but also discharge from all offences. The matter required the High Court to revisit settled principles on the nature of charge framing orders, the scope of appellate jurisdiction under the NIA Act, and the distinction between final, intermediate, and interlocutory orders within criminal procedure.
Arguments:
On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that the order framing charges was not a mere interlocutory order but one having grave civil and constitutional consequences, particularly in a case involving stringent provisions of the UAPA where the liberty of the accused is severely curtailed and the presumption of innocence is heavily burdened by statutory restrictions on bail. It was submitted that once charges are framed, the accused is forced to undergo a full-fledged trial, which may take several years, and therefore such an order substantially affects the rights of the accused and cannot be equated with routine procedural directions. The appellant contended that Section 21 of the NIA Act provides a statutory right of appeal against any order of the Special Court, and the expression order should be interpreted broadly to include a charge framing order, especially in cases involving serious offences under special statutes. It was further argued that denying a right of appeal at the stage of charge would leave the accused remediless against patently erroneous or mechanically passed charge orders, thereby violating principles of fair trial and access to justice. The appellant also sought to distinguish earlier precedents by contending that UAPA cases stand on a different footing due to their exceptional nature and the prolonged incarceration that follows once charges are framed. It was urged that the High Court should examine the merits of the charge order and consider whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case warranting trial, and whether the stringent provisions of the UAPA had been correctly invoked.
On the other hand, the National Investigation Agency strongly opposed the maintainability of the appeal and submitted that the legal position on this issue was no longer res integra. The NIA relied upon a coordinate bench decision of the Delhi High Court rendered in December 2025 in Shahid Yusuf versus National Investigation Agency, where it was categorically held that an order framing charges is interlocutory in nature and cannot be challenged in appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act. It was argued that Section 21 contemplates appeals only against final orders and certain intermediate orders which conclusively determine rights, and not against interlocutory orders passed during the course of trial. The prosecution submitted that framing of charges is only a tentative assessment of the material on record and does not determine guilt or innocence, and therefore cannot be treated as a final adjudication. It was also contended that permitting appeals against charge orders would derail the expeditious conduct of trials under special statutes like the UAPA and defeat the legislative intent behind creating Special Courts and streamlined procedures. The NIA further argued that the accused is not left remediless, as he has the opportunity to challenge the charge order in revision where permissible, or to seek discharge before the trial court itself, and ultimately to raise all legal and factual issues during trial and at the stage of final appeal. Emphasis was placed on the settled principle that criminal proceedings should not be stifled at an interlocutory stage unless there is a glaring abuse of process, which was not the case here.
Court’s Judgment:
The Delhi High Court, after considering the rival submissions, dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, holding that an order framing charges is interlocutory in nature and cannot be challenged in appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act. The Division Bench placed strong reliance on the coordinate bench decision in Shahid Yusuf versus National Investigation Agency, where it had been clearly held that the term order appearing in Section 21(1) of the NIA Act refers to a final order and does not encompass interlocutory or intermediate orders. The Court observed that judicial discipline required it to follow the view already taken by a coordinate bench, particularly when the legal reasoning was sound and directly applicable to the facts at hand. The Bench noted that in the present case, the appellant was seeking to challenge both the order framing charges dated 16 March 2022 and the formal charge dated 10 May 2022, along with a prayer for discharge, all of which flowed from the same interlocutory stage of criminal proceedings.
The Court reiterated that framing of charges is a step in aid of trial and represents only a prima facie satisfaction of the court that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. It does not decide the guilt of the accused nor does it finally determine any right, and therefore falls squarely within the category of interlocutory orders. The Bench rejected the argument that the seriousness of the offences or the harsh consequences flowing from a UAPA prosecution could alter the settled character of a charge framing order. It held that the nature of the order does not change based on the statute under which the charges are framed, and that procedural classifications cannot be redefined on the basis of the gravity of allegations alone.
The High Court further observed that accepting the appellant’s contention would open floodgates of litigation, enabling accused persons in every NIA case to challenge charge orders in appeal, thereby causing inordinate delays and frustrating the object of speedy trial under special enactments. The Bench emphasised that the legislative intent behind Section 21 of the NIA Act was to restrict appellate interference to final determinations and not to permit piecemeal challenges at every stage of the proceedings. In view of its conclusion on maintainability, the Court expressly stated that it had not examined the merits of the charge order or the grounds urged for discharge, nor did it consider the issue of delay in filing the appeal, as the appeal itself was held to be incompetent. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The Court also took note of the fact that the appellant had filed a separate appeal challenging the rejection of his bail application by the trial court in March 2025, which was listed for hearing on 19 February, clarifying that the dismissal of the present appeal would not affect the adjudication of the bail matter on its own merits.