Introduction:

The Rajasthan High Court in Rukmani Birla Modern High School v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 21, examined whether the statutory obligation of private unaided schools to reserve 25% seats for children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups under Section 12(1)(c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 extends only to admissions in Class I or also applies to pre-primary or pre-school levels wherever such education is offered by the school, and the Court categorically held that the obligation applies to pre-primary education as well, since denying entry at that foundational stage would defeat the very object of educational equality embedded in Article 21A of the Constitution. The matter arose from multiple Public Interest Litigations challenging State guidelines issued for the academic session 2020–21 which restricted the applicability of Section 12(1)(c) to admissions at the Class I level alone, as well as special appeals filed against a Single Judge decision which had held that the State was justified in directing private unaided schools to reserve 25% seats both at pre-school level and at Class I level to ensure continuity of social inclusion. The petitioners contended that restricting the quota only to Class I would perpetuate educational inequality because students from privileged backgrounds typically receive structured pre-school education in the same private institutions and then seamlessly transition to Class I, whereas children from marginalized backgrounds, if denied access at pre-primary stage, would enter formal schooling at a severe academic disadvantage. The Court was therefore called upon to interpret the scope of Section 12(1)(c) along with its proviso and Section 11 of the Act, and to determine whether the legislative intent of universal and equal access to education could be meaningfully realized if reservation obligations were confined only to the first year of elementary education, ignoring the crucial formative stage of early childhood education.

Arguments:

The petitioners argued that Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, when read along with its proviso, clearly mandated that where a school provides pre-school education, the obligation to reserve 25% seats for children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups must also extend to such pre-primary levels, and therefore the State’s restrictive guidelines limiting admissions under RTE quota only to Class I were ultra vires the statute and contrary to the legislative scheme. It was emphasized that the proviso uses the word “further”, indicating an additional obligation rather than an exception, and thus requires inclusion of marginalized children at the earliest stage of institutional education. It was submitted that Section 11 of the Act expressly recognizes the duty of the appropriate government to provide free pre-school education, and therefore any interpretation that excludes pre-primary stages from the protective umbrella of the Act would render Section 11 redundant. The petitioners highlighted that modern private schools routinely admit students from nursery or Montessori level and thereafter grant automatic promotion to Class I, meaning that excluding disadvantaged children from pre-primary admissions effectively blocks their entry into quality schooling systems. On the other hand, the appellants contended that Section 12 does not envisage dual admission points for reservation and that once 25% reservation is applied at one stage, it cannot be repeated at another, as that would impose an excessive burden on private unaided schools. It was argued that if admissions are made at pre-primary level under the quota, schools should not be compelled to again reserve 25% seats at Class I, and conversely, if admissions are made at Class I level, then pre-primary reservation is unnecessary. The appellants further claimed that extending RTE obligations to pre-school would interfere with autonomy of private institutions and was not clearly mandated by the main provision of Section 12. They submitted that the Act primarily governs elementary education and that pre-schooling is not compulsory under Article 21A, and therefore reservation at pre-primary stage was beyond the core scope of the Act. The debate thus centered on statutory interpretation of provisos, legislative intent of early childhood inclusion, and balancing institutional autonomy with constitutional commitment to social justice.

Judgment:

The Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Justice Baljinder Singh Sandhu dismissed the special appeals and upheld the broader interpretation of Section 12(1)(c), holding that the RTE obligation of reserving 25% seats for weaker sections applies to pre-primary levels wherever such education is offered by private unaided schools, as excluding children at that stage would structurally disadvantage them and undermine substantive equality in education. The Court held that the proviso to Section 12(1)(c) does not carve out an exception but rather operates in furtherance of the main provision, and the word “further” must be read as expanding the scope of the obligation to include pre-school education. The Court also relied on Section 11 of the Act which recognizes the government’s responsibility to provide free pre-school education, and held that a combined reading of Sections 11 and 12 establishes that the Act contemplates educational inclusion of children between the ages of 3 to 6 years, not merely those above 6 years. The Bench observed that in private unaided schools, admission does not practically begin at Class I but at Montessori or nursery levels, and children admitted at those stages usually continue in the same school, creating a pipeline of privilege that systematically excludes marginalized children if pre-primary access is denied. The Court clarified that once 25% reservation is satisfied at any earlier level, schools are not required to again admit a fresh 25% at Class I if the proportion of disadvantaged students already meets statutory requirement, but if the percentage falls short at Class I, schools must admit additional students to maintain the 25% benchmark. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Act is to advance Article 21A and that statutory provisions must be interpreted to achieve real equality rather than formal compliance. It held that elementary education must be understood in an inclusive sense that accommodates the realities of early childhood learning, and that exclusion at pre-primary stage would irreversibly impair educational outcomes for children from marginalized communities. Concluding that the State guidelines were inconsistent with statutory mandate and constitutional vision, the Court upheld the Single Bench view, dismissed the appeals, disposed of the PILs, and reaffirmed that inclusive education must begin at the earliest institutional stage to meaningfully level the social playing field.