Introduction:

The Supreme Court has clarified the proper appellate forum available to a victim who seeks to challenge an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate, holding that such an appeal lies before the Court of Session and not before the High Court. The judgment assumes significance under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), particularly because of the interplay between the general provision dealing with appeals against acquittal and the specific statutory right granted to victims to challenge an acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation.

A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran delivered the ruling in Subhas Chandra Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., while upholding an order of the Calcutta High Court which had declined to entertain an appeal filed by the victim against an acquittal recorded by a Judicial Magistrate. The High Court had, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate Sessions Court. The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with that approach. (Lawcurb)

The case arose from the death of the petitioner’s son, who was suffering from depressive disorders and had been admitted to a hospital. According to the petitioner, the death by suicide was attributable to negligence on the part of a doctor and a nurse. An FIR was consequently registered alleging an offence punishable under Section 304A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The offence involved in the case was a bailable offence.

Following investigation and trial, the Judicial Magistrate, 9th Court, Alipore, acquitted the accused persons. Dissatisfied with the acquittal, the petitioner, claiming to be the victim in the criminal proceedings, approached the Calcutta High Court by way of an appeal. Although the matter had earlier been admitted by a Single Judge, another Single Judge, when the matter came up for final hearing, considered the statutory scheme and held that the appeal was not maintainable before the High Court. The petitioner was given liberty to approach the Sessions Court instead. (LawLens)

The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision. The central question before the Supreme Court was therefore not whether the acquittal itself was correct, but which court was legally competent to hear a victim’s appeal against an acquittal passed by a Magistrate under the BNSS.

The question became particularly important because Section 419 of the BNSS separately deals with appeals against acquittal. On a preliminary reading, the provision could appear to suggest that an appeal arising from an acquittal in certain circumstances may lie before the High Court. However, the Supreme Court held that where the appeal is brought by a victim under the proviso to Section 413, the specific mechanism contained in that proviso determines the appropriate forum.

The Court therefore examined Sections 413, 415(3) and 419 of the BNSS together and concluded that the victim’s right of appeal must be traced to the proviso to Section 413. That proviso expressly links the forum of the victim’s appeal to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the conviction passed by the same court. Since an appeal against a conviction recorded by a Magistrate of the First or Second Class ordinarily lies before the Court of Session under Section 415(3), the same Sessions Court is the forum for a victim challenging an acquittal by such Magistrate. (LexStreak)

The ruling thus provides an important clarification concerning appellate jurisdiction under the new criminal procedural framework and makes it clear that the nature of the offence, including whether it is bailable, does not alter the forum where a victim invokes the specific right of appeal provided under Section 413.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner challenged the Calcutta High Court’s decision primarily on the question of maintainability and the interpretation of the statutory appellate scheme. One of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court concerned the fact that the matter had earlier been admitted by a Single Judge of the High Court. The petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajan Chadha and Another v. Sanjay Arora, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 899, in support of the proposition that once a matter has been admitted by a Single Judge, another coordinate Bench should not subsequently take a contrary view and reject the proceedings on the ground of maintainability.

The petitioner sought to contend that the earlier admission of the appeal had created a procedural position which could not simply be displaced at the final hearing by another Single Judge. According to this line of argument, the High Court ought to have proceeded with the matter rather than directing the petitioner to seek an alternative remedy before the Sessions Court.

The Supreme Court, however, found that the reliance on Rajan Chadha was misplaced. The Court explained that the factual and procedural circumstances in that case were materially different. In Rajan Chadha, a Single Judge had already reached a conclusion in a contempt proceeding that contempt had been committed and had granted an opportunity to the alleged contemnor to purge the contempt. When another Single Judge subsequently discharged the show-cause notice on the reasoning that there had been no wilful and deliberate disobedience, the Supreme Court found the subsequent approach impermissible because the earlier order had already conclusively determined the existence of contempt at that stage.

The present case, according to the Supreme Court, involved no comparable situation. Although the appeal had initially been admitted by one Single Judge, another Single Judge subsequently examined the statutory provisions at the stage of final hearing and concluded that the appeal was not maintainable before the High Court. The Supreme Court expressly held that such an exercise was permissible. (LexStreak)

The petitioner also had the benefit of assistance from the amicus curiae appointed in the proceedings. The question of the correct appellate forum was examined by reference to the provisions of both the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the BNSS. The distinction was significant because the statutory language under the new procedural law is not identical to the earlier framework.

The amicus curiae pointed to Section 378(2) of the CrPC, which contained a mechanism under which an appeal from an acquittal recorded by a Magistrate could lie to the Court of Session in relation to a cognizable and non-bailable offence, while other acquittals could attract the jurisdiction of the High Court subject to the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the corresponding provision under the BNSS operates differently and that Section 419 must be read in the context of the specific victim’s right under Section 413. (LexStreak)

The respondents, on the other hand, supported the position that the High Court had correctly declined to entertain the appeal. The statutory scheme, when read as a whole, supported the Sessions Court as the appropriate forum for a victim’s challenge to an acquittal by a Magistrate. The respondent side’s position was consistent with the distinction between an appeal against acquittal pursued through the general statutory mechanism and an appeal independently available to a victim under the proviso to Section 413.

This distinction was particularly important in the present case because the acquittal arose from proceedings concerning Section 304A read with Section 34 IPC, which the Supreme Court noted was a bailable offence. A possible argument based solely upon Section 419 could therefore lead to the conclusion that an appeal against such an acquittal would lie before the High Court. However, the Court made clear that such an approach overlooks the separate and specific right conferred upon the victim.

The dispute before the Supreme Court was therefore essentially one of statutory interpretation. The question was whether the general provision dealing with appeals against acquittal should determine the forum in every case, or whether the special right given to a victim by the proviso to Section 413 should govern a victim’s appeal. The Court ultimately accepted the latter interpretation.

Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court began its analysis by identifying the precise question arising from the Special Leave Petition. The issue was whether the Calcutta High Court was justified in rejecting the appeal filed against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate while granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court confined its examination to this question and did not enter into the merits of the acquittal itself. (LexStreak)

The first aspect considered by the Bench was the petitioner’s reliance upon Rajan Chadha v. Sanjay Arora. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the earlier admission of the matter by a Single Judge prevented another coordinate Bench from examining its maintainability.

The Court distinguished Rajan Chadha on the basis of the nature of the order involved there. In that case, the earlier Single Judge had already reached a substantive conclusion that contempt had been committed and had granted the alleged contemnor an opportunity to purge the contempt. The subsequent Single Judge’s attempt to proceed on the premise that no contempt had been committed was therefore inconsistent with an earlier judicial determination.

In the present case, however, the initial admission of the appeal did not amount to a final determination that the High Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the appeal. When the matter later came up for final hearing, the subsequent Single Judge was entitled to examine the statutory provisions governing maintainability. The Supreme Court therefore observed that the High Court’s approach was perfectly in order. (LexStreak)

The Court then turned to the more significant issue concerning the proper forum for a victim’s appeal against acquittal.

The Supreme Court noted that the amicus curiae had referred to Section 378(2) of the CrPC. Under the previous procedural framework, the forum for certain appeals against acquittal depended upon factors such as the nature of the offence. The Court observed that the BNSS has introduced a somewhat different arrangement in this respect.

Section 419 of the BNSS deals generally with appeals in cases of acquittal. The provision contemplates an appeal to the Court of Session, with the sanction of the District Magistrate, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence. In other cases, the appeal against acquittal from an Original Court or an Appellate Court is enabled before the High Court with the sanction of the State Government.

At first glance, this provision could appear relevant to the case because the offence alleged against the respondents was bailable. If Section 419 were considered in isolation, there could be an argument that the appropriate forum for challenging the acquittal was the High Court.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the present case could not be decided merely by applying Section 419. The petitioner was not before the Court as the State seeking to challenge an acquittal. He was claiming the statutory right of a victim to appeal. Consequently, the Court held that the specific provision applicable to such an appeal was the proviso to Section 413 of the BNSS. (Lawcurb)

Section 413 lays down the general rule that no appeal shall lie from a judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided by the BNSS or any other law. Its proviso creates an express statutory right for a victim to challenge three categories of orders: an order acquitting the accused, an order convicting the accused for a lesser offence, and an order imposing inadequate compensation.

The crucial part of the proviso is not merely that it grants a victim the right to appeal. It also expressly identifies the forum in which that appeal must be filed. The proviso states that such an appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court.

The Supreme Court treated this language as decisive.

According to the Bench, once the victim’s right of appeal is traced to the proviso to Section 413, the next question is to identify the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against a conviction recorded by the court which passed the impugned acquittal.

That question is answered by Section 415 of the BNSS.

Section 415(3) provides that, subject to the exceptions contained in the provision, a person convicted in a trial held by a Magistrate of the First Class or Second Class may appeal to the Court of Session. The statutory scheme therefore establishes a direct relationship between the trial court and the appellate court. Where a Magistrate records a conviction, the ordinary appellate forum is the Sessions Court.

Applying that mechanism to the victim’s appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that the forum does not change merely because the Magistrate ultimately acquitted rather than convicted the accused.

The proviso to Section 413 requires the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the conviction of that court to be identified. Since an appeal from a conviction by a Magistrate lies to the Sessions Court under Section 415(3), an appeal by the victim against an acquittal by that Magistrate must likewise be filed before the Sessions Court.

The Court therefore held that Section 419 does not govern the victim’s appeal in the circumstances covered by the proviso to Section 413. Rather, Section 419 provides the general statutory mechanism for appeals against acquittal, whereas the victim’s independent right of appeal is specifically governed by the proviso to Section 413. (LexStreak)

This distinction is central to the judgment. The Court did not simply determine the forum by examining whether the offence was bailable or non-bailable. Instead, it focused on the legal capacity in which the appeal was being filed. A State appeal against acquittal and a victim’s appeal against acquittal arise under different statutory routes, and the forum has to be determined accordingly.

The Supreme Court consequently concluded that the acquittal recorded by the Judicial Magistrate had to be challenged before the Sessions Court. The fact that the underlying offence was bailable did not transfer the victim’s appeal to the High Court because the victim’s right flowed specifically from Section 413.

The Court summed up the statutory position by holding that when there is a conviction in a trial held by a Magistrate of the First or Second Class, an appeal lies to the Sessions Court. Therefore, by virtue of the proviso to Section 413, a victim’s appeal against an acquittal passed by that Magistrate must also be filed before the Sessions Court.

The Bench consequently upheld the order of the Calcutta High Court. It found that the High Court had correctly declined to entertain the appeal and had appropriately granted the petitioner liberty to approach the jurisdictional Sessions Court.

Importantly, the Supreme Court took care to ensure that the petitioner would not be prejudiced merely because he had initially pursued the remedy before the wrong forum. The Court directed that if the petitioner filed an appeal before the jurisdictional Sessions Court within one month from the date of the Supreme Court’s order, the appeal would be admitted and heard on merits without taking into consideration the delay caused by the bona fide proceedings pursued by the petitioner. (LawLens)

The direction is significant because the Supreme Court recognised that the petitioner had pursued the remedy in good faith before the High Court and thereafter before the Supreme Court. Rather than allowing the procedural mistake concerning the forum to extinguish the substantive appellate remedy altogether, the Court protected the petitioner’s opportunity to have the challenge examined on merits by the competent court.

At the same time, the Bench expressly clarified that it had made no observation regarding the merits of the acquittal recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. The Sessions Court was therefore required to consider the proposed appeal independently and in accordance with law.

The Special Leave Petition was accordingly rejected with the above directions, and any pending applications were also disposed of. (LexStreak)

The judgment provides an important clarification for the operation of the BNSS. It establishes that the forum for a victim’s appeal cannot be determined solely by referring to the general provision dealing with appeals against acquittal. The specific statutory right granted to the victim under the proviso to Section 413 must first be identified, after which the appellate forum is determined by reference to the court competent to hear an appeal against conviction by the same trial court.

In practical terms, where a Magistrate of the First or Second Class acquits an accused, a victim invoking the proviso to Section 413 must approach the jurisdictional Sessions Court. The decision thus creates a clear statutory pathway: the victim’s right of appeal arises under Section 413, the forum is identified by reference to the ordinary appellate route against conviction, and Section 415(3) places an appeal from a Magistrate’s conviction before the Sessions Court.

The decision also highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing different categories of appeals under the BNSS. An appeal against acquittal by the State and an appeal against acquittal by a victim are not necessarily governed by identical statutory provisions. The forum must therefore be determined by examining the precise provision under which the particular appellant derives the right to appeal.

By resolving the apparent tension between Sections 413, 415(3) and 419, the Supreme Court has provided procedural clarity under the new criminal law regime. The ruling will be particularly relevant to victims and practitioners dealing with acquittals recorded by Magistrates, as filing the appeal before the wrong forum can otherwise result in avoidable delay and procedural complications.

At the same time, the judgment preserves the distinction between procedural jurisdiction and the merits of the criminal case. The Supreme Court has not expressed any opinion on whether the accused persons were correctly acquitted. Its determination is confined to identifying the competent appellate forum. The substantive challenge to the acquittal remains open before the Sessions Court, subject to the requirements of law.

The ruling in Subhas Chandra Sarkar v. State of West Bengal & Ors. therefore serves as a significant clarification of the victim’s appellate remedy under the BNSS. It reinforces the statutory language of the proviso to Section 413 and confirms that where the acquittal is passed by a Magistrate, the victim’s appeal lies before the Sessions Court—the same appellate forum ordinarily available against a conviction recorded by that Magistrate.