Introduction:

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has reiterated an important principle governing service jurisprudence: an employee cannot ordinarily challenge the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) grading of a colleague merely because the colleague secured a better assessment and consequently gained an advantage in promotion. The Court held that a co-employee who has been superseded does not, by that fact alone, acquire a legally enforceable right to question the ACRs of the employee who was promoted. The ruling was delivered by Justice Sandeep Sharma in Dr. Mukesh Surya v. State of H.P. & Ors., CWP No. 5569 of 2020, decided on August 5, 2026.

The dispute arose in the context of promotion to the post of Assistant Professor in Radiology at Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla. The petitioner, Dr. Mukesh Surya, was one of the eligible doctors considered for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee in 2015. He claimed that he had been adversely affected by the higher grading awarded to respondent No. 7, Dr. Shikha Sood. According to the petitioner, Dr. Sood’s ACRs had effectively been upgraded from “Very Good” to “Outstanding”, which placed her above him in the assessment for promotion despite his claim of seniority.

The petitioner therefore approached the High Court seeking judicial intervention against the ACRs of his colleague as well as the proceedings of the 2015 Departmental Promotion Committee. He sought quashing of the allegedly upgraded ACRs and the DPC proceedings and requested that a review DPC be convened to reconsider the promotion in accordance with what he claimed to be the correct assessment of the eligible candidates.

The controversy consequently raised a significant question concerning the limits of an employee’s right to challenge a colleague’s service record. In service matters, ACRs and their gradings play an important role in determining suitability for promotion, particularly where candidates are assessed comparatively by a DPC. However, the fact that one employee receives a higher grading than another does not automatically mean that the latter has a right to challenge the former’s assessment. A challenge must be supported by a legal basis and appropriate material demonstrating illegality, arbitrariness, mala fides or some other recognised ground for judicial review.

The factual background showed that four eligible doctors had been considered by the DPC for two available posts in 2015. Dr. Mukesh Surya received a “Very Good” assessment, whereas Dr. Shikha Sood was placed in the “Outstanding” category and consequently ranked above the petitioner. Her superior assessment resulted in her promotion to the post of Assistant Professor in Radiology.

The petitioner questioned the manner in which Dr. Sood’s ACR grading had been treated. His case was essentially that the higher assessment had materially affected his own promotional prospects and resulted in his supersession. He also alleged that there had been collusion or mala fides on the part of the authorities in favour of respondent No. 7. On this basis, he sought an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding her assessment and the subsequent promotion.

The State and the concerned authorities, however, opposed the petition. Their position was that the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the ACRs of another employee and that the promotion process had been undertaken by the competent authorities. They also disputed the allegations of mala fides and collusion, pointing out that no substantive material had been produced to support such serious allegations.

An additional obstacle before the Court was the considerable delay in approaching the Court. The DPC proceedings in question related to 2015, whereas the writ petition was filed in 2020. The petitioner sought to explain the delay by asserting that he had only become aware of the relevant facts concerning his supersession in September 2020. The respondents disputed this explanation and contended that the relevant information had been available much earlier.

Against this factual and legal background, the High Court was required to determine not only whether the petitioner could question his colleague’s ACRs, but also whether there was sufficient material to justify an inquiry into the alleged mala fides and whether the petition could be entertained after such a substantial lapse of time.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Dr. Mukesh Surya, challenged the promotion granted to Dr. Shikha Sood primarily on the ground that her higher ACR grading had resulted in his supersession. His case was that while he had been assessed as “Very Good”, Dr. Sood had been treated as “Outstanding”, and this distinction had decisively influenced the DPC’s comparative assessment.

The petitioner questioned the correctness of the “Outstanding” grading awarded to Dr. Sood. According to his case, the assessment required scrutiny because the reporting and reviewing authorities had initially recorded a “Very Good” rating. He sought to draw attention to the subsequent treatment of the ACR and argued that the higher grading had conferred an unfair advantage upon his colleague in the promotion process.

The petitioner also raised allegations of mala fides and collusion. His contention, in substance, was that the authorities had acted in concert with respondent No. 7 to ensure that she received a higher assessment and was consequently promoted over him. Since the alleged irregularity had directly affected his promotional prospects, he argued that the circumstances surrounding the ACR assessment warranted an inquiry.

Another important submission concerned his seniority. The petitioner claimed that he had been superseded despite being senior and that the higher ACR grading of respondent No. 7 was the factor that enabled her to move ahead of him. On this basis, he sought judicial intervention in the DPC process and a direction for convening a review DPC.

The petitioner also sought to overcome the objection of delay. Since the promotion and DPC proceedings dated back to 2015, the respondents questioned why the petitioner had waited for several years before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioner sought to explain this delay by stating that he became aware of his supersession and the relevant circumstances only in September 2020. His position was that the cause for approaching the Court crystallised only upon acquiring knowledge of the alleged irregularities.

The respondents, on the other hand, strongly contested the petitioner’s entitlement to maintain the challenge. Their principal objection was that the petitioner could not claim a right to question the ACRs of another employee merely because that employee had obtained a better assessment and had consequently secured promotion.

The respondents emphasised that the ACR of an employee is part of that employee’s service record and that a rival employee cannot seek its annulment simply because the assessment has an adverse comparative effect upon his own promotional prospects. Unless the petitioner could demonstrate some legally recognisable ground for interference, such as statutory violation, arbitrariness, mala fides or procedural illegality supported by material, there was no basis for the Court to interfere.

The authorities also disputed the allegations of collusion and mala fides. They maintained that the petitioner had not produced any substantive evidence demonstrating that the competent authorities had acted with an improper motive or had deliberately manipulated the assessment in favour of respondent No. 7. According to the respondents, serious allegations of mala fides could not be founded upon mere suspicion or the fact that one employee had received a higher grading than another.

The respondents further relied upon the principle of delay and laches. The relevant DPC proceedings were conducted in 2015, yet the petitioner approached the High Court only in 2020. They argued that service disputes concerning promotions cannot ordinarily be kept open indefinitely, particularly where the promotion of another employee has already taken effect. The respondents therefore contended that the petition was liable to be rejected on the ground of unexplained delay alone.

The respondents also disputed the petitioner’s assertion that he had become aware of the relevant facts only in September 2020. They pointed out that information concerning the matter had been available to another similarly situated doctor as early as 2017. This circumstance, according to them, weakened the petitioner’s explanation that he could not have known about his supersession or the relevant assessment earlier.

The State and the other respondents therefore urged the Court to uphold the promotion and refuse to reopen the ACR assessment merely at the instance of an unsuccessful or superseded candidate.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Sandeep Sharma of the Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding that the petitioner lacked locus standi to challenge the ACRs of his colleague and that the petition was also hit by delay and laches.

The Court’s reasoning proceeded from a basic principle of service law: a co-employee does not acquire an independent legal right to challenge another employee’s ACR merely because the latter’s superior grading has affected the former’s chances of promotion. A comparative disadvantage in a promotional exercise, by itself, is not sufficient to confer locus standi to seek judicial review of another employee’s confidential assessment.

The Court specifically examined the grading awarded to respondent No. 7. It noted that Dr. Shikha Sood had ultimately been graded “Outstanding” after taking into account the assessments recorded by the Reporting Authority and the Reviewing Authority. The relevant authorities had initially assessed her as “Very Good”, but the final assessment resulted in the “Outstanding” grading.

The Court found no sufficient basis for interfering with that assessment at the instance of the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner had himself received a “Very Good” assessment while his colleague was ultimately placed in the “Outstanding” category did not create a right in the petitioner to have the colleague’s ACR reconsidered or annulled.

The Court observed in clear terms that, “Once respondent No.7 has been graded as ‘Outstanding’, keeping in view the ‘Very Good’ given in the rating by the reporting authority as well as by the reviewing authority, no interference is called for by this Court at the instance of the petitioner who has no locus to challenge the ACRs of his colleagues.”

This observation is significant because it reinforces the distinction between an employee’s right to challenge an adverse assessment in his or her own service record and an attempt to challenge the favourable assessment of a rival employee. While an employee may have a legally protected interest in ensuring that his own service record is considered lawfully and fairly, that does not automatically translate into a right to attack the service record of another employee.

The Court’s approach also reflects the limited nature of judicial review in matters involving expert administrative assessments. Promotion decisions made through DPCs ordinarily involve evaluation of service records and comparative suitability. Courts do not function as appellate authorities over every administrative assessment. Interference becomes warranted where the decision-making process suffers from recognised legal defects, such as violation of statutory rules, procedural unfairness, arbitrariness, mala fides or consideration of irrelevant material.

In the present case, the petitioner attempted to establish that the higher grading of respondent No. 7 was improper and had caused his supersession. However, the Court did not find material sufficient to establish any such illegality. The record, as considered by the Court, showed that the “Outstanding” grading had not been conjured out of nothing; rather, it followed consideration of the assessments recorded by the competent authorities.

The Court was equally unpersuaded by the allegations of mala fides and collusion. Allegations of mala fides occupy a serious position in administrative law because they suggest that statutory power has been exercised for an improper purpose. Courts therefore require a petitioner who makes such allegations to place some credible material on record. Mere assertion, suspicion or dissatisfaction with an administrative result cannot be treated as proof of mala fides.

In the present case, the petitioner failed to produce material substantiating his allegation that the authorities had acted in collusion with respondent No. 7. The Court consequently declined to direct an inquiry merely on the basis of the allegations made in the petition.

The Court’s approach demonstrates that judicial proceedings cannot be converted into a mechanism for conducting speculative inquiries. Where a party alleges mala fides, the allegation must have a factual foundation. Without supporting material connecting the alleged improper motive with the impugned administrative action, the Court cannot presume mala fides simply because the outcome has favoured another employee.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s explanation for approaching it only in 2020. The challenged DPC proceedings dated back to 2015, creating a significant time gap between the original decision and the institution of the writ petition. The doctrine of delay and laches is particularly relevant in service matters because stale claims can unsettle promotions and administrative arrangements long after decisions have been implemented.

The petitioner asserted that he became aware of his supersession only in September 2020. The Court, however, was not persuaded by this explanation. It noted that the relevant information was available to another similarly situated doctor as early as 2017. This circumstance made it difficult to accept that the petitioner could reasonably claim complete ignorance of the relevant facts until 2020.

The principle behind delay and laches is not merely procedural. It is founded on fairness and administrative certainty. A person who believes that his service rights have been violated must ordinarily approach the Court within a reasonable period. If a litigant waits for years without adequate explanation, reopening the matter may prejudice the administration as well as the employee who has already obtained the benefit of the original decision.

This consideration becomes even more important where the challenge is directed against the promotion of another employee. An employee who has been promoted on the basis of a DPC decision acquires a legitimate expectation that the decision will not be reopened indefinitely without a substantial legal basis.

The Court therefore found that the petition suffered from delay and laches in addition to the fundamental defect concerning locus standi.

The judgment also underscores an important distinction between seniority and promotional suitability. Seniority can be a relevant factor in promotion depending upon the applicable service rules, but seniority does not invariably entitle an employee to promotion where the governing rules require assessment of comparative merit or suitability. If a DPC is required to consider ACR gradings and other service records, an employee may legitimately be superseded by a colleague who is found more suitable under the applicable criteria.

In the present case, the petitioner’s grievance essentially arose because respondent No. 7’s “Outstanding” grading placed her above him in the DPC assessment. But that comparative outcome did not, by itself, establish that the DPC had acted illegally. The petitioner needed to demonstrate a legal defect in the process, not simply a more favourable assessment of his own case.

The ruling consequently reinforces judicial restraint in matters concerning service evaluations. Courts may certainly intervene where an ACR or promotion process is tainted by illegality, arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of statutory rules. However, judicial review cannot become a substitute for the administrative assessment entrusted to competent authorities.

Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s refusal to order an inquiry merely because allegations were made. An inquiry is not an automatic consequence of every accusation against public authorities. There must first be some material warranting such an exercise. Otherwise, every unsuccessful employee could reopen a colleague’s promotion by alleging collusion or manipulation without any supporting evidence.

The judgment thus protects both sides of the administrative process. On one hand, it preserves the right of employees to challenge genuine illegality in service matters. On the other, it prevents rival employees from using litigation to unsettle another employee’s promotion without demonstrating a legally sustainable grievance.

Ultimately, the High Court held that Dr. Mukesh Surya had no locus standi to challenge the ACRs of Dr. Shikha Sood merely because her higher grading contributed to his supersession. The Court found no material establishing mala fides or collusion and rejected the request for an inquiry. It further held that the petition was barred by delay and laches, particularly in view of the long interval between the 2015 DPC proceedings and the filing of the writ petition.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed. The Court did not find any ground to interfere with respondent No. 7’s “Outstanding” grading, the consequential promotion or the DPC proceedings. There was no order as to costs.

The decision in Dr. Mukesh Surya v. State of H.P. & Ors. therefore serves as a useful reminder that service litigation must be founded upon an enforceable legal right and not merely upon the comparative disappointment arising from another employee’s promotion. A co-worker may be affected by a colleague’s superior assessment, but such impact alone does not create a cause of action to challenge the colleague’s ACR. Where the assessment has been made by competent authorities and there is no convincing evidence of illegality or mala fides, courts will ordinarily refrain from substituting their judgment for that of the administrative authorities. The additional requirement of approaching the Court within a reasonable time further ensures that settled service arrangements are not disturbed after years without compelling justification.