Introduction:
The Calcutta High Court has upheld the authority of the Railways to remove unauthorised occupants from railway property under Section 147(2) of the Railways Act, 1989, without first initiating eviction proceedings under the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De dismissed an appeal filed by Alok Chakraborty and others in Alok Chakraborty and Others v. Union of India and Others, MAT 1294 of 2025, concerning hawkers operating from railway land at Chandanpur Railway Station.
While rejecting the challenge to the eviction, the Court granted the appellants 90 days from September 3, 2026, to vacate the railway premises. The extension was granted as a measure of consideration, taking note of the fact that the appellants had been carrying on vending activities from the premises for a considerable length of time. The Court, however, made it clear that the length of occupation by itself could not create a legal right to possess railway property when no valid permission or authority to occupy the land had been established.
The dispute arose from the occupation of railway land by hawkers associated with the Chandanpur Bazar Railway Premises Shoppers Cooperative Society Limited. The appellants claimed a right to continue their business activities from the railway premises and challenged successive attempts by the Railway authorities to remove them.
The litigation had already travelled through the High Court on earlier occasions. In the first round of proceedings, the appellants challenged an eviction notice issued by the Railways. The Court granted protection by staying the eviction and directed the Railway authorities to consider the representation made by the occupants. In the subsequent proceedings, the Court once again intervened and directed the authorities to provide an opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass a reasoned order.
In compliance with these directions, the Railway authorities passed a speaking order on October 17, 2023. The authorities considered the claim of the appellants and concluded that they had failed to produce authentic documents establishing any legal right to conduct business on railway land at Chandanpur Railway Station. The Railways also recorded that they had never granted permission for registration or functioning of the Chandanpur Bazar Railway Premises Shoppers Cooperative Society Limited on the railway property.
The appellants challenged the said decision, but no stay was granted in their favour. Thereafter, on August 1, 2025, the Railway authorities issued an eviction-cum-show-cause notice requiring the occupants to remove their structures and belongings from the railway premises.
The appellants again approached the High Court. A Single Bench dismissed their writ petition, following which they preferred the present appeal before the Division Bench.
The central legal issue before the Division Bench was whether the Railways could directly exercise the power contained in Section 147(2) of the Railways Act to remove unauthorised occupants from railway property, or whether the authorities were required to first initiate proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
The issue assumed significance because the appellants argued that their occupation could not be treated as that of ordinary trespassers. They relied upon a communication issued by the Railway authorities in 2006 concerning their proposal to form a cooperative society for conducting business from the railway premises. According to them, this communication demonstrated that the Railways had, at least in principle, recognised their proposed commercial arrangement and therefore could not subsequently treat them as rank trespassers.
The Railways disputed this interpretation. Their position was that the 2006 communication did not create any tenancy, licence, lease or other enforceable right in favour of the appellants. It merely required the appellants to submit certain documents relating to the proposed cooperative society so that their request could be considered. No final permission to occupy the railway property had ever been granted.
The Railways therefore relied upon Section 147 of the Railways Act, which deals with trespass and refusal to desist from trespass upon railway property. Section 147(2), in particular, empowers a railway servant or a person called to the railway servant’s aid to remove a person who is committing an act covered by the provision from the railway property.
The Division Bench was consequently required to reconcile the appellants’ claim of long-standing occupation and the earlier correspondence with the statutory authority of the Railways to protect their property from unauthorised occupation.
The Court ultimately accepted the Railways’ interpretation. It held that where railway property is admittedly involved and the occupants have no established legal right to possess it, Section 147(2) provides an independent statutory mechanism enabling the Railways to remove such occupants. There is no statutory requirement under Section 147(2) that proceedings under the Public Premises Act must first be instituted.
The judgment also considered the principles of natural justice. The appellants contended that the August 1, 2025 notice violated the rule of audi alteram partem because it was styled as an “eviction-cum-show cause notice.” The Division Bench rejected this objection, pointing out that the appellants had already received opportunities of hearing during the earlier proceedings and that those opportunities had culminated in a detailed and reasoned order dated October 17, 2023.
The Court held that natural justice cannot be converted into an endless requirement to provide repeated hearings where the affected parties have already been heard and their claims have been duly considered. The question is ultimately one of prejudice. In the absence of demonstrated prejudice, a further hearing cannot be demanded merely as a matter of form.
The decision therefore represents a significant reaffirmation of the statutory powers of the Railways over their property while simultaneously illustrating the limits of claims based upon prolonged occupation, cooperative society formation and administrative correspondence.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellants, Alok Chakraborty and others, representing hawkers operating through the Chandanpur Bazar Railway Premises Shoppers Cooperative Society Limited, challenged the eviction proceedings primarily on the ground that the Railways had adopted an incorrect legal procedure. Their principal contention was that the Railways could not simply invoke Section 147(2) of the Railways Act and remove them from the property without first following the procedure prescribed under the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
According to the appellants, Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act provided the appropriate statutory mechanism for eviction of persons alleged to be unauthorised occupants of public premises. Since railway property constituted public premises, the appellants argued that the Railways were required to issue the prescribed notice and follow the adjudicatory procedure under the special eviction legislation before seeking to dispossess them.
The appellants also sought to distinguish themselves from ordinary trespassers. Their case was that they had not entered the railway property secretly or without any interaction with the authorities. They had been operating their businesses from the premises for a considerable period and had formed a cooperative society in connection with the vending activities.
To support this contention, reliance was placed upon a communication issued by the Railway authorities in 2006. The appellants argued that the communication showed that the Railways were aware of their proposal to form a cooperative society and had considered the possibility of allowing them to conduct business from the railway premises. In their view, this correspondence demonstrated that their occupation had at least some foundation in the conduct and representations of the authorities.
The appellants therefore argued that the Railways could not subsequently characterise their possession as purely unauthorised and proceed against them summarily. Their long-standing occupation, coupled with the 2006 communication and the formation of the cooperative society, according to them, created circumstances requiring a more formal eviction process.
The appellants further challenged the eviction-cum-show-cause notice dated August 1, 2025 on the ground that it violated natural justice. They contended that they had not been given a fresh and effective opportunity to explain why they should not be evicted pursuant to the latest notice. Since the notice contemplated eviction from premises where they had been conducting business for years, they argued that the principles of audi alteram partem required the authorities to provide an opportunity of hearing before taking coercive action.
The appellants therefore sought protection from eviction and questioned the legality of the Railway authorities’ reliance upon Section 147(2) of the Railways Act.
The Union of India and the Railway authorities defended the eviction proceedings by relying primarily upon the statutory language of Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989. Their contention was that railway property enjoys a specific statutory protection and that Section 147 provides the Railways with an independent power to remove persons who unlawfully trespass upon or remain upon railway premises.
The Railways argued that there was no conflict requiring Section 147 to be subordinated to the Public Premises Act. Section 147(2), according to the respondents, expressly authorises removal from railway property in the circumstances contemplated by the provision. Nothing in the statutory scheme requires the Railways to first institute proceedings under the 1971 Act before exercising that specific power.
The respondents also disputed the appellants’ interpretation of the 2006 communication. The Railways maintained that the letter did not constitute a grant of permission or a promise that the proposed cooperative society would receive the right to occupy railway land.
According to the respondents, the communication merely required the appellants to submit documents concerning the formation of the cooperative society for consideration of their request. It did not create any vested right, lease, licence or other legally enforceable interest in railway property.
The Railways further relied upon a communication dated January 9, 2007, issued by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Hooghly. That communication indicated that a no-objection certificate from the Railways was necessary for the cooperative society to use the railway land.
The respondents argued that there was no material demonstrating that such a no-objection certificate or any other final permission had ever been granted by the Railways. Consequently, the formation or registration of the cooperative society could not, by itself, confer any right to occupy railway property.
On the issue of natural justice, the Railways contended that the appellants had already received ample opportunity to present their case. The earlier High Court proceedings had specifically resulted in directions requiring the authorities to hear the appellants and pass a reasoned order. In compliance with those directions, the Railways had passed the detailed order dated October 17, 2023.
The respondents therefore submitted that the appellants could not repeatedly demand hearings after their claims had already been examined and rejected by a reasoned decision. The subsequent notice dated August 1, 2025 was merely a step towards implementing the decision already taken and did not create a fresh requirement for an entirely new adjudicatory process.
The Railways accordingly urged the Division Bench to uphold the Single Bench decision and permit the authorities to remove the unauthorised occupants from railway property in accordance with Section 147(2) of the Railways Act.
Court’s Judgment:
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the authority of the Railways to remove the appellants from the railway premises under Section 147(2) of the Railways Act, 1989. At the same time, recognising the fact that the hawkers had been carrying on their activities from the premises for a considerable period, the Court granted them 90 days from September 3, 2026, to vacate the property.
The principal issue examined by the Court was whether the Railways were legally required to initiate proceedings under the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 before exercising their power under Section 147(2) of the Railways Act.
The Court answered this question in favour of the Railways. It examined the language of Section 147 and observed that sub-section (2) specifically permits a person falling within the circumstances described in sub-section (1) to be removed from railway property by a railway servant or another person called upon to assist such servant.
The Bench found significance in the fact that Section 147(2) does not prescribe a prior statutory requirement to issue notice before carrying out such removal. The Court expressly observed that “Section 147(2) does not contain any statutory prerequisite even to issue a notice before doing so.”
This finding was central to the dismissal of the appeal. The Court held that the existence of the Public Premises Act did not eliminate or suspend the independent statutory power specifically conferred upon the Railways by Section 147 of the Railways Act.
The Court also examined whether Section 147 was applicable to the property in question. Since it was admitted that the disputed property belonged to the Railways, there was little difficulty in bringing the case within the statutory provision.
The Bench referred to Section 2(31) of the Railways Act, 1989, which defines “railway” broadly and includes lands appurtenant to a railway. Therefore, railway land forming part of the property at Chandanpur Railway Station fell within the statutory framework governing railway property.
The Court’s reasoning demonstrates the importance of identifying the precise source of statutory authority being exercised. The appellants attempted to place the entire matter within the framework of public-premises eviction proceedings. The Court, however, found that Section 147 of the Railways Act specifically addressed unauthorised occupation or trespass upon railway property and provided the Railways with a statutory power of removal.
The Bench also rejected the argument that the appellants’ long-standing occupation transformed their possession into a lawful right. Mere duration of occupation cannot create a legal entitlement against the owner of property where the occupant cannot demonstrate the source of the right to remain.
The appellants’ reliance upon the 2006 Railway communication was therefore examined carefully. The Court found that the communication did not amount to an assurance that the proposed cooperative society would be granted possession of the railway land.
The letter merely required the appellants to produce documents relating to the formation of the cooperative society so that their request could be considered. The Court specifically rejected the suggestion that this correspondence amounted to an assurance of future possession.
The Bench emphasised that there was no promise that registration of the society or submission of the relevant documents would automatically result in a right to occupy railway property. In other words, administrative correspondence contemplating consideration of a request cannot be equated with a completed grant of legal rights.
The Court found further support for this conclusion in the January 9, 2007 communication issued by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Hooghly. That communication indicated that a no-objection certificate from the Railways was required before the cooperative society could use the railway land.
The absence of any material establishing that such a no-objection certificate had actually been issued was therefore decisive. Without permission from the owner, the cooperative society’s formation could not confer a proprietary or possessory right over railway property.
The Court made the position clear by observing that mere formation of a cooperative society does not automatically confer a right upon the society to possess railway property. The legal personality or registration of a cooperative body is distinct from the authority to occupy land belonging to another entity.
This distinction is particularly important in cases involving public property. An association, society or cooperative body may be validly formed under the applicable legislation, but its registration does not, by itself, give it ownership or possession of property belonging to the State or a public authority.
The Division Bench also addressed the appellants’ natural justice argument. The appellants contended that the eviction-cum-show-cause notice dated August 1, 2025 was defective because they had not been given a fresh opportunity of hearing.
The Court rejected this contention by considering the entire procedural history rather than examining the August 1 notice in isolation. The appellants had previously approached the High Court, and on those occasions the Court had directed the Railway authorities to consider their representation and subsequently provide an opportunity of hearing before passing a reasoned order.
Those directions had been complied with. The Railway authorities passed a speaking order on October 17, 2023 after considering the appellants’ case and concluding that they had failed to establish any authentic document conferring a right to carry on business from the railway property.
The Court therefore held that the requirement of audi alteram partem had already been substantially satisfied. Natural justice does not necessarily require that a person be heard repeatedly every time the authority takes a subsequent step to implement a decision that has already been reached after a proper hearing.
The Bench applied the test of prejudice while considering the natural justice argument. The principle of hearing is intended to ensure fairness and prevent prejudice. It cannot be transformed into an indefinite procedural cycle where an occupant, after receiving an opportunity of hearing and a reasoned decision, repeatedly seeks fresh hearings without demonstrating any new circumstance or actual prejudice.
The Court’s observation that it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to demand an “infinite number of opportunities of hearing” reflects this principle. Once the essential requirements of natural justice have been fulfilled, procedural fairness cannot be invoked merely to delay implementation of a lawful decision.
The Bench also considered the terminology used in the August 1, 2025 notice. The appellants apparently sought to challenge the notice because it was described as an “eviction-cum-show cause notice.” The Court did not find this terminology sufficient to invalidate the notice.
According to the Court, the expression “show cause notice” was essentially surplusage in the circumstances. The substance of the notice was to inform the occupants that they were required to vacate the railway property and that removal would follow under Section 147(2).
The Court therefore declined to allow the terminology empoyed by the authorities to override the substantive statutor