Introduction:
The Jharkhand High Court has dismissed a writ petition challenging the termination of a government pleader’s engagement, holding that where the governing terms permit the Government to discontinue the services of a counsel by giving the stipulated notice, the advocate cannot claim an enforceable right to continue in office. The Court emphasised that a government pleader holds an engagement that remains subject to the applicable terms and conditions, and when the Government exercises its contractual power of termination in accordance with those terms, judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is not ordinarily warranted.
Justice Deepak Roshan made the observations while deciding Shiva Kant Srivastava @ S.K. Srivastava v. Union of India and Others, W.P.(S) No. 5780 of 2026. The petitioner, who had been engaged as counsel in the Additional Panel of Advocates for Animal Husbandry cases since 2003, challenged the order dated July 8, 2026, by which his engagement as a public prosecutor was terminated. He sought quashing of the termination order and a direction restraining the authorities from interfering with his engagement.
The dispute raised questions concerning the nature of a government advocate’s engagement, the applicability of Article 14 to State action in contractual matters, the requirement of hearing before termination, allegations of discrimination and mala fides, and the extent to which a government counsel can claim protection against discontinuance of his engagement.
The petitioner had been associated with the respondents for a considerable period and claimed that he had handled several matters arising out of the animal husbandry scam. His long association with the Government formed an important part of his challenge. He contended that the authorities could not simply discontinue his engagement without following principles of fairness, particularly when other advocates who had been engaged alongside him continued to represent the respondents.
A further plank of the petitioner’s case was a communication dated September 18, 2013, issued by the Directorate of Prosecution. According to the petitioner, the communication contemplated that changes of counsel or transfer of officers in connection with the relevant matters could be undertaken only with the permission of the High Court. He sought to rely upon this communication to contend that the authorities did not possess an unrestricted power to terminate or replace his engagement.
The petitioner also asserted that the termination was preceded by no opportunity of hearing. According to him, discontinuance of an engagement that had continued for many years, particularly one involving sensitive criminal cases, ought not to have been undertaken arbitrarily.
The petitioner further alleged that the action was discriminatory and actuated by mala fide considerations. It was claimed that, while other counsels engaged along with him were permitted to continue, his engagement alone was terminated. The petitioner also connected the alleged mala fides with his conduct as a public prosecutor, asserting that he had required the respondent to appear before the Court for giving evidence in the course of proceedings.
The petitioner invoked the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. to contend that government advocates do not stand outside the protection of Article 14 merely because their appointments arise from an engagement with the State. According to the petitioner, the Government was required to act fairly, reasonably and without arbitrariness even while dealing with the continuation or termination of legal engagements.
The respondents disputed these claims and relied upon the notification dated January 30, 1997 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. They pointed specifically to Clause IV of the notification, which permitted either side to terminate the appointment of counsel by giving one month’s notice in writing.
The respondents therefore maintained that the petitioner’s engagement was not an irrevocable appointment and that the governing terms expressly recognised the right of either side to bring the engagement to an end upon the prescribed notice. Since the termination order itself provided the required notice, the respondents argued that there was no illegality warranting interference under Article 226.
The High Court ultimately accepted the respondents’ position. It found that the termination order complied with the governing notification and that the petitioner had failed to establish any legal basis for compelling the Government to continue his engagement. The Court also rejected the allegations of mala fides for want of supporting evidence and distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision relied upon by the petitioner.
In doing so, the Court concluded with an important observation concerning the dignity expected of members of the legal profession. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, the Court stated that where the Government ends the public office held by a government pleader, the appropriate response is a dignified renunciation of office rather than a pursuit of “lost briefs” through writ proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties:
On behalf of the petitioner, Senior Advocate Rajeeva Sharma, assisted by Advocates Devesh Krishna and Gopal K. Sinha, challenged the legality of the termination order dated July 8, 2026. The petitioner emphasised his long association with the Government, submitting that he had been working as counsel in the Additional Panel of Advocates for Animal Husbandry cases since his engagement in 2003.
The defence sought to demonstrate that the petitioner was not merely an advocate with a temporary or casual association with the Government but had been entrusted with important matters for a substantial period. Particular emphasis was placed on the cases relating to the animal husbandry scam, which the petitioner claimed to have handled for the authorities.
The petitioner relied upon the Directorate of Prosecution’s communication dated September 18, 2013. His interpretation of the communication was that changes in counsel or transfers concerning the relevant cases required permission of the High Court. On that basis, he sought to challenge the authority of the respondents to independently discontinue his engagement.
Another important submission was that the petitioner had not been given an opportunity of hearing before his engagement was terminated. The petitioner contended that the absence of a prior hearing rendered the decision arbitrary, especially considering the length of his engagement and the nature of the work entrusted to him.
The petitioner also raised a claim of discrimination. He asserted that other advocates who had been engaged along with him continued to represent the respondents, while his services alone were brought to an end. According to the petitioner, differential treatment without a rational basis was contrary to Article 14 and demonstrated arbitrariness in the decision-making process.
The allegation of mala fides was advanced on a similar basis. The petitioner claimed that his conduct in the discharge of his functions as a public prosecutor had displeased the authorities. He referred to instances in which he had called upon a respondent to appear before the Court and give evidence. The petitioner suggested that the termination was connected with this conduct and therefore was not a bona fide administrative decision.
The petitioner placed considerable reliance on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., where the Supreme Court had examined the termination of government advocates and emphasised that State action, even in contractual matters, cannot be wholly insulated from the discipline of Article 14. The petitioner sought to extend that principle to his own case and argued that the State could not terminate his engagement arbitrarily or for extraneous reasons.
The respondents, represented by Additional Solicitor General of India Prashant Pallav and Shivani Jaluka, opposed the writ petition. Their primary submission was that the petitioner’s engagement was regulated by the notification dated January 30, 1997.
The respondents specifically relied upon Clause IV of the notification, which expressly contemplated termination of a counsel’s appointment by either party upon one month’s written notice. According to the respondents, this provision conclusively answered the petitioner’s principal objection because the Government was exercising a power expressly reserved under the terms governing the engagement.
The respondents further argued that the petitioner could not claim an absolute or vested right to remain engaged merely because he had served for many years. The length of an engagement, by itself, could not override the contractual conditions governing it. Where the Government exercised a power expressly conferred by the governing notification and complied with the prescribed notice requirement, there was no basis for treating the discontinuance as unlawful.
The respondents also disputed the relevance of the 2013 communication concerning the animal husbandry cases. They pointed out that the trials relating to those matters had already concluded. Therefore, according to the respondents, the communication could not confer a continuing right upon the petitioner to remain engaged indefinitely or prevent the Government from bringing the broader engagement to an end.
The respondents also challenged the allegation of mala fide. They submitted that the petitioner had not produced any document or concrete material establishing that the termination was motivated by an improper purpose. Mere allegations, without supporting evidence, could not justify a finding of mala fide against public authorities.
The respondents consequently urged the High Court to exercise restraint in its writ jurisdiction. They argued that Article 226 does not provide a mechanism for compelling the Government to retain a particular advocate where the governing terms expressly permit termination. In their submission, unless the petitioner could establish statutory illegality, constitutional arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of the governing conditions, the Court ought not to substitute its own view for that of the Government.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Deepak Roshan dismissed the petition after examining the governing conditions of the petitioner’s engagement and the grounds raised against the termination order.
The Court’s reasoning began with the notification dated January 30, 1997 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. The Bench found Clause IV of the notification to be particularly significant because it expressly permitted either party to terminate the appointment of counsel by giving one month’s written notice.
The Court then examined the actual termination order dated July 8, 2026. Far from terminating the engagement with immediate effect, the order provided the prescribed one-month notice, with the disengagement to become effective from August 9, 2026.
This aspect substantially weakened the petitioner’s challenge. Once the governing terms permitted termination upon one month’s written notice and the respondents had complied with that requirement, the petitioner could not successfully contend that the authorities lacked power to terminate the engagement.
The Court therefore rejected the contention that the respondents had acted without authority. The power to discontinue the engagement was expressly contemplated by the notification, and the manner in which that power had been exercised was consistent with the stipulated requirement of notice.
The judgment consequently draws an important distinction between an engagement that is governed by defined terms and a statutory tenure carrying an independent guarantee of continuance. The petitioner’s long association with the Government could not, by itself, transform an engagement terminable in accordance with its governing conditions into an appointment immune from termination.
The Court next addressed the petitioner’s reliance on the September 18, 2013 communication issued by the Directorate of Prosecution. The petitioner had sought to use this communication to contend that changes of counsel in animal husbandry matters required permission of the High Court.
The Bench, however, found the argument misplaced in the circumstances of the case. The Court noted that the trials relating to the animal husbandry cases had already concluded. Therefore, the communication could not provide a continuing basis for the petitioner’s claim to remain engaged.
The Court’s treatment of this issue is significant because it prevented an earlier administrative communication, issued in the context of particular proceedings, from being transformed into a perpetual right of engagement. The existence of an earlier arrangement concerning conduct of particular cases could not override the express terms governing the continuation of the counsel’s engagement once those cases had themselves concluded.
The Court also considered the petitioner’s reliance on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. The Supreme Court’s judgment is important in the context of government advocates because it recognises that State action in contractual matters is not completely beyond constitutional scrutiny.
However, the High Court found the factual circumstances of the present case materially different. It observed that Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi dealt with the en bloc termination of government advocates and pleaders in Uttar Pradesh. The present matter, in contrast, involved termination of the petitioner’s engagement in accordance with a notification expressly permitting such discontinuance upon one month’s notice.
The Court therefore did not accept the proposition that the constitutional protection of Article 14 automatically prevented the respondents from exercising their contractual power of termination.
At the same time, the Court did not suggest that the State is free from constitutional obligations whenever it acts in a contractual field. The judgment recognised the broader principle that State action remains subject to Article 14. What mattered in the present case was whether the particular termination was arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or otherwise contrary to the governing legal framework.
On the facts before it, the Court found no such illegality.
The allegation of discrimination was also not accepted. The petitioner had contended that other advocates engaged with him continued to represent the respondents and that his selective termination therefore demonstrated unequal treatment.
The Court, however, did not find sufficient material to establish that the differential treatment was based upon an impermissible or arbitrary consideration. The mere fact that other counsel continued in their respective engagements could not, by itself, confer a legal right upon the petitioner to continue as well.
A more serious allegation was that the termination was actuated by mala fides. The petitioner attempted to connect the termination with his conduct in proceedings, including his insistence that a respondent appear before the Court to give evidence.
The Court rejected this allegation because it was unsupported by documentary or other substantive evidence. The Bench made the important observation that “mere pleading without proof cannot be treated as evidence.” A plea of mala fide carries serious consequences and cannot rest merely upon suspicion, inference or assertion.
The Court’s approach reflects the established principle that allegations of mala fide are required to be supported by cogent material. A person challenging administrative action cannot establish improper motive simply by alleging that the authority acted for an ulterior purpose. There must be some factual foundation from which such an inference can reasonably be drawn.
In the absence of such material, the Court found no basis to invalidate the termination order on the ground of mala fides.
The Court also did not find sufficient reason to interfere merely because the petitioner had not been afforded a prior hearing. The central consideration was that the engagement itself was subject to a condition permitting termination by either side upon one month’s written notice. Since the respondents had exercised that contractual power in the prescribed manner, the Court did not treat the absence of a separate hearing as sufficient to invalidate the action.
The judgment ultimately turns upon the character of the petitioner’s engagement and the terms under which it existed. The Government was not seeking to terminate a statutory tenure contrary to an express legal prohibition. Instead, it was bringing an engagement to an end under a provision that expressly permitted such termination.
After resolving the legal issues, the Court made an important observation concerning professional dignity. Before parting with the matter, Justice Deepak Roshan referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 1979 INSC 192.
The Court invoked the Supreme Court’s observation that when the Government ends the public office occupied by a government pleader, the appropriate response is a “dignified renunciation of office” rather than a “chase for lost briefs” through the writ jurisdiction.
This observation added a broader professional dimension to the judgment. The Court emphasised that advocacy is not merely an occupation concerned with retaining briefs or securing continued engagements. It is a noble profession carrying responsibilities towards the Court and the administration of justice.
Advocates, the Court noted, are foremost officers of the Court and are therefore expected to conduct themselves with dignity. The conclusion serves as a reminder that professional standing is not determined solely by the number or duration of briefs held by an advocate but also by the manner in which the advocate responds when an engagement comes to an end.
The Court’s remarks do not mean that an advocate is barred from approaching a constitutional court whenever a government engagement is unlawfully terminated. Where there is genuine illegality, arbitrariness, discrimination, mala fide or violation of statutory or contractual conditions, judicial review remains available. What the judgment cautions against is the use of writ jurisdiction merely as a means of compelling continuation of an engagement where the Government has lawfully exercised a power expressly reserved under the governing terms.
The decision therefore attempts to maintain a balance between two important principles. On one side is the constitutional requirement that the State must act fairly and reasonably, including when it operates in contractual spheres. On the other is the recognition that a government counsel does not acquire an indefeasible right to remain engaged simply because the engagement has continued for a long period.
In the present case, the High Court found that the respondents had acted within the authority conferred by the 1997 notification, had furnished the required one month’s notice, and had not been shown to have acted with mala fide intent. The earlier communication relied upon by the petitioner did not create a continuing right, particularly when the relevant animal husbandry trials had already concluded.
The Court consequently found no ground to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to quash the termination order or restrain the respondents from giving effect to it.
The dismissal of the petition thus rests on a combination of contactual authority, constitutional scrutiny and professional