Introduction:
The Karnataka High Court has granted bail to a man accused of rape under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, observing that where an accused who allegedly promised to marry a woman subsequently approaches her family and expresses his willingness to marry her, it cannot, at the stage of bail, readily be concluded that the promise was made without any intention of being fulfilled. The Court emphasised that the existence of the necessary dishonest intention at the time the promise was allegedly made is a significant aspect of an offence under Section 69 BNS.
The ruling was delivered by Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty in X v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Petition No. 11340 of 2026, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 332. The petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking regular bail after the accused’s bail application had been rejected by the Sessions Court.
The criminal case originated from a complaint lodged by the woman before the Mico Layout Police Station, Bengaluru, on May 30, 2026. The prosecution alleged that the woman had become acquainted with the petitioner in 2023 and that the two remained in regular contact over mobile phones from December 2024 onwards. According to the prosecution case, the petitioner subsequently promised to marry her, following which the two travelled to a tourist destination where they allegedly had sexual intercourse.
The accused was arrested in connection with offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 351(3), 69, 89 and 352 of the BNS. The central allegation relevant to the present bail proceedings was that the sexual relationship had been established on the basis of a promise of marriage which, according to the prosecution, was not genuinely intended to be fulfilled.
Section 69 of the BNS creates a specific offence relating to sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or through a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling that promise. The provision therefore makes the state of mind of the accused at the time of making the promise an important consideration. A mere subsequent failure to marry, by itself, does not necessarily establish that the promise was dishonest from its inception.
The High Court was therefore required, at the bail stage, to consider whether the material placed before it disclosed sufficient circumstances to prima facie indicate that the petitioner had made the promise of marriage without intending to honour it. The Court particularly examined the conduct attributed to the petitioner after the alleged sexual act.
The victim herself, in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, had stated that after the alleged incident, the petitioner approached her mother and expressed his willingness to marry her. According to the material before the Court, the proposed marriage was not accepted by the victim’s mother.
This subsequent conduct became significant in determining whether the petitioner could, at the preliminary stage, be said to have possessed no intention whatsoever of marrying the woman when he allegedly made the promise. The Court found that the fact that the petitioner had approached the woman’s mother and expressed his willingness to marry her could not be ignored while assessing the question of bail.
The High Court nevertheless did not conduct a final adjudication on the merits of the prosecution case. Its observations were confined to the question whether continued incarceration of the petitioner was justified in the circumstances placed before it. The Court also took into account the period already spent by the petitioner in custody and the stage of investigation.
The petitioner had remained in custody since the third week of June 2026, while most of the investigation had already been completed. Considering these circumstances along with the material relating to the alleged promise of marriage, the High Court concluded that the petitioner had made out a case for grant of regular bail.
The decision is significant in the context of the newly introduced Section 69 BNS because it highlights the distinction between a genuine promise to marry that is subsequently not fulfilled and a promise allegedly made from the beginning with no intention of marriage. That distinction can be crucial when determining whether the statutory ingredients of the offence are prima facie established.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner sought regular bail under Section 483 BNSS and challenged his continued detention following the rejection of his bail application by the Sessions Court. His case was that the allegations, even when considered from the prosecution’s perspective, did not establish at this stage that he had entered into a relationship with the woman by making a false promise of marriage with no intention of fulfilling it.
The petitioner particularly relied upon the victim’s own statement concerning what happened after the alleged sexual relationship. According to that statement, the petitioner did not simply disappear or refuse to acknowledge the relationship. Instead, he allegedly approached the woman’s mother and expressed his willingness to marry the victim.
The petitioner argued that this conduct was inconsistent with the prosecution’s allegation that the promise of marriage was dishonest from its inception. If the petitioner had genuinely intended from the beginning to deceive the woman merely by using marriage as a means of obtaining sexual relations, his subsequent conduct in approaching her family and expressing willingness to marry could be considered a circumstance inconsistent with such an allegation.
The petitioner also relied upon the legal ingredients of Section 69 BNS. The provision does not criminalise every consensual sexual relationship in which the parties subsequently fail to marry. According to the petitioner’s case, the prosecution must demonstrate the requisite element of deception or a promise of marriage made without any intention of fulfilling it.
Thus, the petitioner sought to distinguish between two situations. In the first, a man makes a promise of marriage while never intending to marry and uses that promise to obtain sexual intercourse. In the second, a man genuinely intends to marry but the relationship or proposed marriage subsequently fails because of circumstances arising later. The petitioner argued that the material in the present case, particularly his alleged approach to the victim’s mother, placed the case closer to the latter category.
The petitioner further pointed out that he had already spent a substantial period in custody since the third week of June 2026. Most of the investigation had also been completed. Continued detention, therefore, was argued to be unnecessary, particularly when the remaining proceedings could be conducted without requiring the petitioner to remain incarcerated throughout the trial.
The petitioner also urged the Court to consider the settled principles governing bail. At the stage of considering regular bail, the Court is not required to conduct a detailed examination of evidence or record definitive findings concerning guilt. The Court ordinarily examines the nature of the accusations, the material collected during investigation, the possibility of the accused fleeing justice, the likelihood of influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence, the period of custody and the stage of the proceedings.
The State opposed the petition and sought to sustain the criminal proceedings against the accused. The prosecution’s case was that the petitioner had sexual intercourse with the woman after allegedly promising to marry her and that the promise was subsequently not fulfilled. The allegations were serious and involved Section 69 BNS along with several other offences under the new criminal code.
From the State’s perspective, the allegations could not be discarded merely because the accused later claimed willingness to marry. The prosecution could contend that the circumstances surrounding the relationship, the alleged promise, the sexual act and the subsequent conduct were matters that required investigation and eventual adjudication at trial.
The State could further contend that a subsequent expression of willingness to marry does not necessarily conclusively establish the accused’s state of mind at the precise time when the promise was made. The question whether a promise was genuine or deceitful ordinarily depends upon the totality of circumstances and cannot necessarily be determined solely on the basis of one subsequent event.
The seriousness of the allegations was also relevant to the State’s opposition to bail. The prosecution could therefore argue that the Court ought to exercise caution before releasing an accused facing allegations of sexual exploitation based on an alleged false promise of marriage.
Nevertheless, the High Court was required to assess these competing submissions in the limited context of bail and without making findings that would prejudice the eventual trial. The question before the Court was not whether the petitioner was ultimately guilty or innocent, but whether the material justified his continued detention pending trial.
Court’s Judgment:
The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and granted regular bail to the accused. Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty’s reasoning principally turned upon the ingredients of Section 69 BNS and the material relating to the petitioner’s alleged intention to marry the woman.
Section 69 BNS addresses sexual intercourse with a woman by deceitful means or by making a promise to marry her without any intention of fulfilling that promise. The provision therefore contains an important mental element. The allegation is not simply that a promise of marriage was made and that the marriage subsequently did not take place. There must, prima facie, be circumstances indicating that the promise was made without the intention of fulfilling it.
The High Court specifically considered this requirement and observed that, for the purpose of Section 69 BNS, the accused must have sexual intercourse by deceitful means or by making a promise of marriage without any intention of fulfilling the same.
The Court then examined the victim’s own statement recorded under Section 183 BNSS. The statement indicated that after the alleged sexual act, the petitioner had approached the victim’s mother and expressed his willingness to marry the victim. However, the proposed alliance was allegedly rejected by the mother.
This fact assumed considerable importance because it provided material suggesting that the petitioner had, at least subsequently, expressed a genuine willingness to formalise the relationship through marriage. The Court held that this circumstance could not be ignored while assessing whether there was prima facie material to conclude that the petitioner had never intended to marry the victim.
The Court accordingly observed that, having regard to the petitioner’s conduct in approaching the victim’s mother, it could not, at that stage, be said that he had no intention of marrying the first informant.
The expression “at this stage” is important in understanding the scope of the ruling. The High Court did not hold that the petitioner had conclusively proved his innocence or that the prosecution allegations were false. Nor did it determine the precise state of mind of the petitioner at the time of the alleged promise after a full appreciation of evidence. Such questions would ultimately fall for determination during the trial.
Instead, the Court found that the available material was insufficient to justify the inference, for the purpose of bail, that the petitioner had made the promise with no intention whatsoever of fulfilling it. The subsequent conduct attributed to him created a circumstance that weighed in favour of granting bail.
The Court’s reasoning reflects the importance of distinguishing between a false promise of marriage and a subsequently unfulfilled promise. The two situations are legally distinct. If a person promises marriage while secretly having no intention of marrying and the promise is used as a deceptive means to obtain sexual intercourse, the statutory provision may be attracted. But where the person genuinely intended to marry and the proposed marriage subsequently fails because of opposition from the family or other circumstances, the mere fact that the marriage did not ultimately take place cannot automatically establish the offence contemplated by Section 69.
In the present case, the High Court found that the petitioner’s alleged attempt to approach the victim’s mother was a circumstance that weakened the assertion that he had never intended to marry her. The fact that the proposal was allegedly refused by the mother further provided context to the subsequent failure of the relationship to culminate in marriage.
The Court did not treat the mother’s refusal as determinative of the criminal case. Rather, it considered it alongside the petitioner’s conduct and the other circumstances while deciding whether continued custody was necessary.
The Court also considered the period of incarceration. The petitioner had been in custody since the third week of June 2026. By the time the bail application was considered, most of the investigation had already been completed. This factor weighed against continued detention, particularly in the absence of circumstances demonstrating that the petitioner’s release would obstruct the investigation or the administration of justice.
The stage of investigation is an important consideration in bail jurisprudence. Pre-trial detention is not intended to operate as punishment before conviction. Once the investigation has substantially progressed and custodial interrogation is no longer necessary, the Court may consider whether the accused can be released subject to appropriate safeguards.
The High Court consequently imposed conditions designed to secure the petitioner’s presence and protect the integrity of the proceedings. Bail was granted upon the petitioner furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 1 lakh along with two sureties for the like sum, besides the other conditions imposed by the Court.
The decision also demonstrates the manner in which courts may approach allegations under the newly enacted BNS. Section 69 is a new statutory provision and its interpretation will necessarily develop through judicial decisions. One of the important questions likely to arise repeatedly is the distinction between a promise that was fraudulent from its inception and a relationship in which the promise was made genuinely but was later not fulfilled.
The High Court’s decision places the accused’s intention at the time of making the promise at the centre of the analysis. That approach follows from the statutory language itself, which requires the promise to have been made without any intention of fulfilling it. The subsequent conduct of the accused can, therefore, potentially provide relevant circumstantial evidence about his earlier intention.
At the same time, the ruling should not be understood as laying down a proposition that approaching the family after a sexual relationship will automatically defeat an allegation under Section 69 BNS. Every case must turn on its own facts. A subsequent marriage proposal may be one relevant circumstance, but it cannot by itself conclusively determine whether the original promise was genuine or deceitful.
The distinction is particularly important because intention is ordinarily a matter that must be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances. A court may examine what the accused did before, during and after the alleged promise to determine whether the promise was genuine or merely a deceptive device.
In the present case, the High Court found the post-incident conduct significant because the alleged approach to the victim’s mother was consistent, at least prima facie, with an intention to marry. That circumstance, coupled with the mother’s alleged refusal of the proposal, made it difficult at the bail stage to conclude that the petitioner had never intended to marry the victim.
The decision also reiterates that bail proceedings should not become a mini-trial. Where the evidence requires detailed assessment of competing versions, such assessment is ordinarily reserved for trial. At the stage of bail, the Court considers whether the accused’s detention is justified in light of the nature of the accusation, the available material and the circumstances of the case.
The High Court’s approach therefore reflects a balance between the seriousness of allegations involving sexual offences and the fundamental principle that an accused remains entitled to liberty unless continued custody is justified according to law.
Another significant feature of the decision is that the Court relied upon the victim’s own statement in assessing the circumstances. The Court did not ignore the prosecution version; rather, it examined the statement recorded during the investigation and found that one aspect of that statement supported the petitioner’s claim that he had subsequently approached the family with a genuine proposal of marriage.
The Court’s decision also illustrates why the phrase “without any intention of fulfilling” in Section 69 BNS is legally significant. If every failure to marry after consensual sexual relations were automatically treated as evidence of a false promise, the distinction deliberately incorporated into the statutory provision would become meaningless. The law requires attention to the accused’s intention when the promise was made.
At the same time, the ruling does not create a general defence for accused persons in cases involving allegations of false promises of marriage. Whether the accused actually possessed a genuine intention to marry remains a question that may depend on evidence such as communications between the parties, conduct of the accused, circumstances surrounding the promise and subsequent events. The High Court’s observation was made within the limited framework of deciding bail.
Ultimately, the Karnataka High Court concluded that the material before it did not justify a finding, at the present stage, that the petitioner had made the promise of marriage without intending to fulfil it. The fact that he had allegedly approached the victim’s mother and expressed his willingness to marry her, followed by the mother’s refusal of the proposal, constituted a significant circumstance in his favour.
Taking this circumstance together with the petitioner’s period of custody and the fact that most of the investigation had already been completed, the Court found it appropriate to grant regular bail.
The ruling is significant because it underscores that the criminalisation of sexual intercourse obtained through a false promise of marriage under Section 69 BNS depends upon more than the eventual failure of the relationship. The prosecution must ultimately establish the statutory ingredients, including the requisite dishonest intention. For the purpose of bail, where the available material itself indicates conduct consistent with a genuine intention to marry, the Court may consider that circumstance while determining whether continued incarceration is warranted.
The decision thus reinforces two interconnected principles: first, that intention at the time of making the promise is central to the offence under Section 69 BNS; and second, that bail courts must carefully distinguish between a promise that was fraudulent from its inception and a genuine relationship in which marriage subsequently became impossible or was opposed by circumstances.
By granting bail while leaving the ultimate determination to the tral court, the Karnataka High Court maintained the appro