Introduction:

The distinction between being present at a police station for questioning and being formally placed under arrest has once again come under judicial scrutiny, with the Bombay High Court holding that an accused cannot automatically treat the time spent waiting for an Investigating Officer to begin an inquiry as a period of arrest. A Division Bench comprising Justice Sarang Kotwal and Justice Ranjitsinha Bhonsale held that mere presence at a police station, even where a person’s movement is restricted to the extent necessary for an inquiry, does not by itself establish that he has been arrested or illegally detained.

The ruling was delivered in Manohar Sharad Pathare v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 3221 of 2026, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Bom) 403. The petitioner, Manohar Pathare, sought a declaration that the period for which he remained at Dongri Police Station before his formal arrest should itself be treated as a period of arrest. He argued that the police exercised effective control over him during those hours and that his movement was restricted, thereby bringing him within the protection against unlawful detention under Article 22(2) of the Constitution.

The High Court, however, did not accept this contention. It found that the circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s presence at the police station did not support the conclusion that he had been placed under arrest from the moment he entered the station. The Court accepted the prosecution’s explanation that the Investigating Officer was engaged in another investigation involving an accused who had developed health complications and had to be taken to a hospital. The resulting delay in questioning Pathare was therefore found to be reasonably explained.

The case arose from an FIR registered at Dongri Police Station, Mumbai, on June 4, 2026, in which Pathare was named as an accused. He was subsequently called to the police station for an inquiry. Significantly, the police had not gone to his residence, forcibly picked him up, or apprehended him from any other location. He came to the police station in connection with the inquiry.

According to the petitioner’s case, he reached the police station at approximately 11.00 a.m. on June 10, 2026. He remained there for several hours before the police formally recorded his arrest at 8.15 p.m. on the same day. The substantial interval between his arrival and the formal arrest became the central issue in the writ petition.

The petitioner contended that this entire period could not simply be described as “waiting.” Since he was at the police station under the authority and control of the police and could not freely leave, he argued that his liberty had effectively been restrained. On this basis, he sought to treat the period commencing from his arrival at the police station as a period of arrest.

The argument was legally significant because Article 22(2) of the Constitution provides a vital safeguard against prolonged police custody. A person who has been arrested and detained in custody must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours of the arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey. The constitutional guarantee is designed to prevent arbitrary detention and ensure prompt judicial oversight over the deprivation of personal liberty.

The question before the High Court was therefore not merely factual. It concerned the precise legal point at which an inquiry into an accused becomes an arrest. Police officers undoubtedly possess the power to question persons connected with an investigation, but the exercise of that power cannot become a device for keeping a person in unofficial custody without recording an arrest.

At the same time, the Court recognised that police officers must have a reasonable opportunity to conduct an inquiry and satisfy themselves whether arrest is actually necessary. The legal system does not require the police to arrest every person immediately upon his arrival at a police station merely because he is named in an FIR.

The Division Bench thus had to balance two important concerns. On one side stood the individual’s fundamental right to personal liberty and protection against illegal detention. On the other stood the legitimate authority of investigating agencies to question an accused and assess whether the circumstances justify arrest.

The Court ultimately concluded that the facts of the present case fell on the latter side of the line. The period spent by the petitioner at the police station did not, by itself, amount to arrest. Since the formal arrest took place at 8.15 p.m. and the petitioner was produced before the appropriate authority within twenty-four hours from that point, the constitutional requirement was found to have been satisfied.

The judgment is important because it clarifies that the legal concept of arrest depends upon the actual circumstances and nature of police control. Physical presence at a police station, inconvenience caused by waiting, or the inability to immediately leave because an inquiry is pending cannot automatically be equated with formal arrest. However, the decision must also be understood within its factual context. The Court did not give police authorities unrestricted power to keep persons at police stations indefinitely without recording an arrest. Rather, it accepted the prosecution’s case because the delay was reasonably explained and the surrounding circumstances did not indicate illegal detention.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Manohar Pathare, approached the Bombay High Court with the central contention that his formal arrest at 8.15 p.m. did not reflect the true point at which his liberty had been curtailed. He argued that he had effectively been under the control of the police from the time he entered Dongri Police Station at approximately 11.00 a.m. on June 10, 2026.

According to the petitioner, the police had complete control over his presence and movement during the hours that followed. He was not merely a casual visitor to the police station. He had been called there in connection with an FIR in which he was an accused, and the practical restrictions imposed upon him, he contended, amounted to a deprivation of liberty.

The petitioner therefore urged the Court to look beyond the formal arrest memo and examine the substance of what had actually occurred. His case was that constitutional safeguards cannot be defeated merely because the police choose to formally record an arrest several hours after a person has already been brought within their effective control.

This argument was closely linked to Article 22(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner sought to treat the earlier point of time as the actual commencement of custody so that the constitutional requirement regarding production before a Magistrate could be calculated from the time he first entered the police station.

The petitioner’s broader submission was that the police cannot keep an accused waiting under their control and later characterise the entire period as a voluntary presence for inquiry. If a person is not free to leave and his movements are effectively determined by the police, the petitioner argued, the deprivation of liberty is real regardless of whether the word “arrest” has formally been used.

The State of Maharashtra opposed the petition and maintained that Pathare had not been under arrest when he initially came to the police station. The prosecution emphasised that the petitioner had been called for an inquiry and that the police had not apprehended him from his home or forcibly taken him into custody.

According to the State, the Investigating Officer was entitled to question the petitioner and assess his involvement before deciding whether an arrest was necessary. The fact that the petitioner was an accused named in the FIR did not mean that his arrest became automatic the moment he entered the police station.

The State also provided an explanation for the delay in beginning or completing the inquiry. The Investigating Officer was occupied with another investigation in which an accused had developed health complications and had to be taken to the hospital. This unexpected situation required the officer’s attention and prevented the immediate inquiry of Pathare.

The prosecution submitted that this was a genuine and reasonable explanation. The delay was not the result of an attempt to keep the petitioner in secret or unrecorded custody. Rather, it arose from the practical circumstances of police work and the officer’s simultaneous responsibility in another investigation.

The State further relied upon the circumstances indicating that Pathare had not been completely cut off from the outside world. The High Court was shown material, including phone records, indicating that the petitioner remained in contact with others until approximately 7.00 p.m.

The prosecution argued that there was nothing to demonstrate that the petitioner had been prevented from speaking to or contacting his relatives. This aspect, according to the State, was inconsistent with the petitioner’s attempt to portray the entire waiting period as one of complete police custody.

The State also stressed that the police had acted cautiously by not immediately arresting the petitioner. An Investigating Officer is expected to satisfy himself about the involvement of an accused and the necessity of arrest. Immediate arrest without inquiry is not always legally required and, in many situations, may itself be contrary to the principles governing personal liberty.

The State therefore submitted that the actual arrest took place only at 8.15 p.m. on June 10, 2026. From that point onwards, the petitioner was produced within the constitutionally prescribed period of twenty-four hours. There was consequently no breach of Article 22(2) and no basis for declaring the earlier period to be illegal detention.

The victim was also represented before the Court, while the petitioner’s counsel sought to establish that the factual reality of police control, rather than the formal timing of the arrest, should govern the determination of custody. The case thus required the Court to examine the factual circumstances carefully rather than applying a rigid formula.

The competing arguments brought into focus an essential distinction in criminal procedure. A police inquiry may involve questioning, waiting and a degree of temporary restriction associated with the investigative process. Arrest, however, is a legally significant act involving the formal restraint of a person’s liberty and triggering specific constitutional and procedural safeguards.

The Court was required to determine whether the circumstances of this case crossed the line from permissible inquiry into actual custody before the formal arrest was recorded.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition and held that the petitioner could not establish that he had been under arrest from the moment he entered the police station at approximately 11.00 a.m. on June 10, 2026.

The Court first considered the circumstances in which the petitioner came to the police station. It noted that he had been called for an inquiry. The police had not gone to his residence, picked him up from another place or forcibly brought him to the police station.

This distinction was relevant to the Court’s assessment of whether the petitioner had immediately been placed under arrest. His presence at the police station was initially connected with an inquiry, and the police were entitled to undertake that inquiry before reaching a conclusion regarding the necessity of arrest.

The Bench observed that once the petitioner came to the police station, it was within the authority of the police to question him and conduct an inquiry. Only after the Investigating Officer was satisfied that arrest was necessary could the formal arrest be effected.

This observation reflects an important principle of criminal procedure. The fact that a person is named as an accused does not mean that police officers must immediately place him under arrest. Investigators are expected to assess the facts, examine the person’s role and determine whether arrest is justified.

The Court then considered the explanation offered by the Investigating Officer for the delay. The officer had been occupied with another case in which an accused had suffered health-related complications and had to be taken to a hospital. The Bench accepted this explanation as reasonable.

The Court held that if the petitioner was required to wait at the police station because the Investigating Officer was temporarily occupied with another urgent investigation, that waiting period could not automatically be converted into a period of arrest.

The Division Bench also attached importance to the absence of evidence showing that the petitioner had been completely isolated or prevented from communicating with others. There was nothing on record to establish that he had been prohibited from contacting or speaking with his relatives.

On the contrary, the material before the Court indicated that he remained in contact with others through his phone until around 7.00 p.m. The Court treated this as a relevant circumstance while assessing whether the petitioner’s presence at the police station amounted to actual detention.

The Bench emphasised that it was reasonable to expect police officers to satisfy themselves about an accused person’s involvement before effecting an arrest. Such caution is consistent with the broader constitutional emphasis on personal liberty and the principle that arrest should not be treated as an automatic consequence of registration of an FIR.

In the Court’s view, the police had taken sufficient precautions in the present case. The circumstances did not reveal an arbitrary decision to detain the petitioner unofficially. Instead, the inquiry was delayed because the Investigating Officer had to attend to another urgent matter.

The Court therefore accepted the prosecution’s position that the petitioner was formally placed under arrest at 8.15 p.m. on June 10, 2026. This was the point from which the constitutional requirement under Article 22(2) had to be considered.

The petitioner was produced within twenty-four hours of that formal arrest. Consequently, the High Court found that there had been no violation of the constitutional safeguard.

The Division Bench specifically referred to the language of Article 22(2), which uses the expression “arrested and detained in custody.” The Court’s reliance on this wording underscored the distinction between a person being present for an inquiry and a person being formally subjected to arrest and custodial detention.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that he must be treated as having been arrested immediately upon stepping into the police station. The passage of several hours before the formal arrest, without more, was insufficient to establish illegal detention.

However, the reasoning of the judgment should not be understood as laying down that any period spent at a police station can never amount to custody. The Court’s conclusion was based on the specific circumstances before it.

The Investigating Officer had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay. The petitioner had come to the police station for an inquiry rather than being forcibly apprehended. There was no material demonstrating that he had been prevented from communicating with relatives. Phone records showed that he remained in contact with others for a substantial part of the day. The actual arrest was subsequently recorded, and the petitioner was produced within twenty-four hours from that point.

These factors collectively persuaded the Court that the earlier waiting period could not be treated as a period of arrest.

The judgment therefore draws an important factual and legal distinction. Police control sufficient to constitute an arrest cannot simply be presumed from the fact that an accused spends several hours inside a police station. Courts must examine what actually happened during that period, including the purpose of the person’s presence, the degree of restraint, his ability to communicate, whether he was formally told that he was under arrest and whether the police had a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The ruling also acknowledges the practical realities of criminal investigation. Investigating Officers may be required to handle multiple cases and unexpected emergencies. A temporary delay in questioning one person because an officer is attending to another urgent matter does not necessarily transform that person’s presence at the police station into unlawful custody.

At the same time, the judgment leaves intact the fundamental constitutional protection against disguised or informal detention. Article 22(2) cannot be avoided through manipulation of paperwork. If the facts show that a person was actually arrested and deprived of liberty earlier than the time formally recorded by the police, a court may examine the substance of the situation rather than merely accepting the arrest memo.

In the present case, however, the High Court found no such evidence. The petitioner’s claim that the police exercised total control over him was not sufficient, on its own, to establish that an arrest had taken place from 11.00 a.m.

The Division Bench accordingly concluded that there was no illegal detention and no basis for granting relief in the writ petition. The prosecution’s case that the petitioner was arrested at 8.15 p.m. on June 10, 2026, was accepted.

The petition was therefore disposed of without granting the declaration sought by the petitioner.

No specific judicial precedent was referred to in the provided case summary. The decision primarily turned on the factual circumstances, the scope of police powers during an inquiry and the constitutional language of Article 22(2).

The ruling in Manohar Sharad Pathare v. State of Maharashtra offers a useful clarification on the delicate boundary between inquiry and arrest. It recognises that police officers may require a reasonable period to question an accused and decide whether arrest is necessary. At the same time, the legal validity of such a waiting period will depend upon the facts of each case.

Ultimately, the Court held that waiting inside a police station because an Investigating Officer is engaged in another case does not automatically amount to arrest. In the absence of evidence of illegal restraint or circumstances showing that the person had already been formally or effectively taken into custody, the constitutional clock under Article 22(2) does not necessarily begin merely because the accused has entered the police station.