Introduction:

The Bombay High Court has delivered an important ruling on the scope of remedies available under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, holding that an Internal Complaints Committee’s decision to reject a complaint at the threshold without conducting an inquiry can still amount to a “recommendation” under the Act and can therefore be challenged in appeal before the appropriate Industrial Court.

In Anup Vikal vs State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition No. 7430 of 2026, Justice Sandeep Marne considered whether a woman who alleges workplace sexual harassment can be denied the statutory remedy of appeal merely because the Internal Complaints Committee, or ICC, failed to conduct the inquiry contemplated under Section 11 of the POSH Act and instead rejected her complaint at the threshold on the ground that it disclosed no “sexual element”.

The Court answered this question in favour of the complainant. It held that the failure of the ICC to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11 may render its decision legally vulnerable, but such procedural failure cannot simultaneously be used to place that decision beyond the scope of appeal. A decision that effectively determines a complaint and brings the statutory process to an end would still possess the character of a “recommendation” for the purposes of Sections 13 and 18 of the POSH Act.

The case arose out of a workplace dispute involving employees of Maple Infra, an infrastructure investment trust. One of the female employees made a complaint against a senior employee. The employer took cognisance of the complaint and referred it to the ICC. Since a conflict was said to exist concerning one of the members of the Internal Committee, the complaint was referred to an ICC headed by an external member.

The ICC considered the complaint and, in October 2025, communicated its decision through an email. It concluded at the threshold that the complaint did not involve any sexual element and therefore did not constitute a case of sexual harassment requiring further action under the POSH Act. Crucially, this conclusion was reached without the detailed inquiry contemplated under Section 11 of the statute.

The female employee challenged the ICC’s decision before the Industrial Court. The maintainability of her appeal itself became a central issue. The other employees challenged the proceedings and contended that a threshold rejection of the complaint could not be treated as a “recommendation” under Section 13 because the ICC had not conducted an inquiry under Section 11.

The Industrial Court, in a decision delivered in May 2026, held that the woman’s appeal was maintainable. While considering the matter, it also made observations concerning the merits and the working environment in which the complainant was employed, and directed the ICC to reconsider the complaint afresh.

The petitioners thereafter approached the Bombay High Court, challenging the Industrial Court’s approach. Their principal argument was that the ICC had merely rejected a complaint that did not disclose the essential sexual element necessary to invoke the POSH Act. Since no statutory inquiry had been conducted, they argued that the ICC had not reached the stage of making a recommendation under Section 13. Consequently, according to them, there could be no appeal under Section 18.

The High Court rejected this narrow construction of the statute. Justice Marne held that the consequences of an ICC’s decision, rather than merely the procedural stage at which it was rendered, must be considered. If the ICC decides that a complaint does not amount to sexual harassment and the employer acts upon that decision by taking no further action, the decision effectively determines the complainant’s statutory rights and brings the proceedings to an end.

Treating such a decision as non-appealable would produce a particularly troubling result. An ICC that conducts a proper inquiry and makes a formal recommendation would be subject to the appellate mechanism under the POSH Act, while an ICC that bypasses the mandatory inquiry altogether and rejects the complaint immediately would allegedly escape appellate scrutiny. The Court held that such an interpretation would reward non-compliance with the statutory procedure and could leave the very woman for whose protection the law was enacted without an effective remedy.

The judgment therefore gives a purposive and protective interpretation to the POSH Act. It recognises that the legislation is a beneficial statute intended to create an accessible and meaningful mechanism for the prevention and redressal of workplace sexual harassment. Its provisions cannot be interpreted in a manner that permits a procedural failure by the ICC to extinguish the complainant’s statutory right to challenge an adverse decision.

The Court, however, also found fault with the manner in which the Industrial Court dealt with the issue. While upholding the maintainability of the appeal, Justice Marne held that the Industrial Court could have avoided entering into the merits while deciding a preliminary objection to maintainability. The High Court therefore directed the Industrial Court to reconsider the woman’s appeal afresh on its merits.

The ruling is significant not merely because it clarifies the meaning of “recommendation” under the POSH Act, but because it reinforces a broader principle of statutory interpretation: a body cannot defeat an aggrieved person’s remedy by failing to perform the very statutory duty whose performance would ordinarily make its decision appealable.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocates Sharan Jagtiani and Ashish Kamat along with other counsel, challenged the Industrial Court’s finding that the woman’s appeal against the ICC’s October 2025 decision was maintainable under Section 18 of the POSH Act.

Their principal submission was that the complaint had been rejected at the threshold because it did not disclose any sexual element. According to the petitioners, the allegations made by the complainant, even if taken at face value, did not constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of the POSH Act. The ICC had therefore correctly concluded that there was no basis to proceed with a full-fledged inquiry.

The petitioners further argued that the statutory scheme distinguishes between an inquiry under Section 11 and a recommendation made after such inquiry under Section 13. Section 11 requires the ICC to inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment in accordance with the applicable procedure. Section 13 then deals with the manner in which the ICC is required to communicate the findings and make recommendations to the employer or District Officer after the completion of the inquiry.

On this basis, the petitioners contended that where the ICC had not conducted an inquiry at all, its communication could not be elevated to the status of a “recommendation” under Section 13. If there was no inquiry, they argued, there could be no finding or recommendation emerging from the statutory process contemplated by the Act.

The petitioners therefore maintained that the appellate provision under Section 18 was not attracted. In their submission, the right of appeal under Section 18 is linked to recommendations or other decisions specifically recognised under the statutory scheme. A threshold rejection of a complaint, particularly one made before the commencement of an inquiry, was argued to fall outside this framework.

They also questioned the Industrial Court’s approach in going beyond the issue of maintainability. The Industrial Court had made observations suggesting that the complainant was working in an uncomfortable environment and had directed the ICC to reconsider the matter. The petitioners submitted that while deciding whether an appeal was maintainable, the Industrial Court should not have entered into substantive questions concerning the merits of the complaint.

The complainant, represented by Advocates Karl Tamboly, Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, Aseem Naphade, Vilasini Balasubramanian and Victoria Gonsalves, opposed the petition and supported the Industrial Court’s conclusion on maintainability.

The complainant’s essential case was that the ICC had taken cognisance of her complaint and had actually decided it. The employer had referred the matter to the ICC, and the ICC, headed by an external member because of the conflict involving one of its members, had considered the allegations and concluded that they did not involve sexual harassment.

The complainant therefore argued that the ICC’s decision was not a mere administrative communication. It was a substantive determination that effectively terminated the proceedings under the POSH Act. Once the ICC decided that the complaint did not disclose sexual harassment, the employer acted upon that determination and no further statutory action was taken.

According to the complainant, it would be contrary to both the language and object of the POSH Act to hold that such a decision was immune from challenge merely because the ICC had failed to conduct the inquiry required under Section 11. The complainant emphasised that the ICC’s own procedural failure could not be allowed to deprive her of the appellate remedy created by the statute.

The complainant’s position was strengthened by the practical consequences of the interpretation advanced by the petitioners. If an ICC conducts an inquiry and rejects a complaint after considering evidence, its decision would ordinarily be capable of challenge. However, if the ICC rejects the same complaint immediately without conducting the mandatory inquiry, the petitioners’ interpretation would make that decision non-appealable.

Such a result, the complainant contended, would be fundamentally inconsistent with the remedial nature of the legislation. It would mean that an ICC could avoid appellate scrutiny by simply declining to perform its statutory duty of inquiry.

The complainant therefore urged the Court to adopt a purposive interpretation of Sections 13 and 18. Since the ICC’s ruling had the practical and legal effect of deciding the complaint, it should be treated as a recommendation for the purpose of preserving the statutory remedy of appeal.

The State, represented through Assistant Government Pleaders V.R. Raje and A.A. Nadkarni, participated in the proceedings concerning the statutory framework and the proper interpretation of the POSH Act.

The competing arguments ultimately placed before the High Court a question that went beyond the individual workplace dispute. The issue was whether statutory remedies under a welfare legislation can disappear because the authority responsible for deciding a complaint fails to follow the procedure mandated by that very legislation.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Sandeep Marne dismissed the challenge to the maintainability of the woman’s appeal and held that the ICC’s threshold decision rejecting her complaint was capable of being treated as a “recommendation” under the POSH Act.

The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the need to interpret the statute in a manner that preserves, rather than defeats, the remedies available to persons protected by it. Justice Marne made it clear that the absence of an inquiry under Section 11 does not automatically take an ICC’s decision outside the expression “recommendation” under Section 13.

The Court acknowledged that Section 11 imposes a statutory obligation upon the ICC to inquire into complaints of sexual harassment in the prescribed manner. Therefore, if an ICC decides a complaint without conducting such an inquiry, that failure may affect the validity and legality of its decision.

However, the Court drew a crucial distinction between the legality of the decision-making process and the character of the decision that emerges from it. A decision may be procedurally defective because the ICC failed to conduct the required inquiry, but that does not mean the decision ceases to be a decision under the statutory scheme.

Justice Marne observed that the ICC’s non-compliance with Section 11 could “vitiate” its decision or recommendation. But the procedural vice of not conducting an inquiry could not be used as a reason to remove the decision from the scope of Sections 13 and 18.

The Court illustrated this principle by considering a hypothetical situation in which an ICC, upon receiving a complaint, recommends that the employer terminate the services of the respondent-employee without conducting an inquiry. Such an action would undoubtedly be procedurally flawed because the ICC would have failed to comply with Section 11. Nevertheless, its direction to terminate employment would still possess the essential character of a recommendation under Section 13(3).

The mere fact that the ICC acted improperly by skipping the inquiry would not transform its recommendation into something legally invisible or non-appealable.

The Court applied the same reasoning to the present case. If the ICC receives a complaint and decides that it does not constitute sexual harassment, that decision effectively resolves the complaint. The employer acts upon the ICC’s conclusion by not taking further action under the statute.

Therefore, the High Court held that a ruling by the ICC that a complaint does not disclose sexual harassment assumes the character of a recommendation under Section 13(2), even where the ICC reached that conclusion without holding an inquiry.

This interpretation was essential to prevent an anomalous and unjust result. Justice Marne observed that the legislative object could not be to reward an ICC for violating the mandatory requirement of Section 11 by making its decision immune from challenge.

The Court emphasised that if the petitioners’ argument were accepted, an ICC that faithfully conducts an inquiry could have its decision challenged in appeal, while an ICC that fails to conduct an inquiry and summarily rejects the complaint could escape the appellate process altogether. Such an interpretation would effectively place an aggrieved woman in a worse position because the statutory authority failed to follow the law.

The High Court therefore rejected a literal and restrictive reading of Sections 13 and 18. It held that a strict construction that results in an aggrieved woman being left remediless cannot be reconciled with the purpose of the POSH Act.

The Court stressed that the POSH Act is a beneficial and protective legislation. Its provisions are intended to safeguard women against sexual harassment in the workplace and to provide an institutional mechanism for the redressal of complaints.

For this reason, the Court held that the provisions must be interpreted liberally, particularly where a narrow interpretation would frustrate the rights of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.

Justice Marne observed that where interpretative difficulty arises, the Court must prefer an interpretation that advances the remedial purpose of the statute. In the present case, treating the ICC’s decision as a recommendation ensured that the complainant retained access to the appellate mechanism.

The Court also considered the specific circumstances in which the ICC had acted. The employer had taken cognisance of the woman’s complaint and formally referred it to the ICC. Because of a conflict concerning one of the Internal Committee’s members, the matter was referred to an ICC headed by an external member.

The High Court noted that the ICC had thus assumed jurisdiction over the complaint and rendered a conclusion on it. Its determination was not merely preliminary correspondence or an informal opinion. It was the decision that brought the complainant’s POSH proceedings to an end.

Justice Marne accordingly held that the ICC’s October 2025 communication through email constituted a recommendation for the purposes of the statutory scheme and was appealable under Section 18.

The Court clarified that the Industrial Court, while hearing the appeal, would be entitled to examine whether the ICC was correct in concluding that the complaint did not involve an element of sexual harassment. This was a substantive issue that could properly be considered in the appeal.

At the same time, the High Court found that the Industrial Court had gone too far while deciding the preliminary issue of maintainability. The Industrial Court had entered into observations concerning the merits, including its view about the complainant working in an uncomfortable environment, and had directed reconsideration of the complaint.

Justice Marne held that once the question before the Industrial Court was whether the appeal was maintainable, it could have avoided making findings that effectively touched upon the merits of the appeal itself.

The High Court therefore preserved the complainant’s right of appeal while correcting the procedural approach adopted by the Industrial Court. It directed the Industrial Court to reconsider the complainant’s appeal afresh.

This aspect of the judgment reflects another important principle of adjudication. Courts and tribunals should ordinarily distinguish between deciding whether a proceeding is maintainable and deciding the substantive merits of that proceeding. Where the matter is before a forum on a preliminary jurisdictional objection, detailed findings on disputed facts should generally await a proper consideration of the appeal unless those findings are unavoidable.

The Bombay High Court thus struck a careful balance. It did not decide whether the allegations in the complainant’s case ultimately amounted to sexual harassment. Nor did it endorse the Industrial Court’s observations on the factual merits at the stage of determining maintainability.

Instead, the High Court answered the legal question that was properly before it: whether the complainant could challenge the ICC’s threshold rejection through the appellate mechanism under the POSH Act.

Its answer was unequivocal. The ICC cannot render an aggrieved woman remediless by deciding, without inquiry, that her complaint contains no sexual element and then claiming that its own failure to conduct the inquiry makes the decision non-appealable.

The judgment has important implications for the functioning of Internal Complaints Committees across workplaces. It reinforces that an ICC is not merely an internal advisory body. It performs a statutory function under a legislation designed to protect fundamental interests relating to dignity, equality and a safe working environment.

The requirement of inquiry under Section 11 is therefore not an empty formality. Where the ICC bypasses that requirement, its decision may be challenged on that ground. But the ICC cannot obtain an additional advantage from its own procedural breach by arguing that the absence of an inquiry has eliminated the complainant’s appellate remedy.

The decision also protects the integrity of the statutory redressal framework. Section 18 must be understood in a manner that ensures meaningful access to review against decisions that conclusively affect the rights of the parties.

By holding that a threshold rejection can itself be treated as a recommendation, the Court has prevented a significant gap in the remedial structure of the POSH Act. An aggrieved woman now cannot be denied access to the appellate forum merely because the ICC chose not to conduct the inquiry required by law before rejecting her complaint.

The writ petitions were accordingly disposed of. The High Court upheld the finding that the ICC’s decision was appealable but set aside the need for the Industrial Court’s earlier merits-based approach to be treated as final. The Industrial Court was directed to reconsider the compainant’s appeal afresh and decide whether the ICC was correct