Introduction:
The Madras High Court, while deciding Paulpandiyan v. State, arising out of Crl.O.P. No. 28664 of 2025, has underscored an important aspect of POCSO jurisprudence: protecting a child victim does not end with providing a separate courtroom or restricting direct confrontation with the accused. The judicial process itself must be sensitive to the child’s emotional condition, and the manner in which evidence is elicited must avoid unnecessary trauma and secondary victimisation. Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy emphasised that judges presiding over Special Courts under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 must make the child feel safe and comfortable, develop a rapport with the child and conduct the examination with patience, empathy and care.
The case arose from a POCSO prosecution in which the Special Court had permitted the prosecution to recall the child victim for further examination. The accused challenged that order before the High Court. His principal concern was that the child had already given evidence and that the Presiding Officer had recorded that the child was appearing frightened while deposing. According to the accused, the prosecution had not stopped the examination at that stage on the ground that the child was not in an appropriate frame of mind. Since the child’s deposition had already been recorded, the accused argued that recalling the child would serve little legitimate purpose and could expose the child to further pressure or tutoring.
The matter consequently brought into focus a difficult tension inherent in POCSO trials. On one side is the prosecution’s obligation to place the truth before the Court and establish the ingredients of the alleged offence. On the other is the statutory and constitutional concern for protecting a child victim from repeated exposure to the traumatic circumstances surrounding the offence. The High Court was therefore required to balance the interests of a fair prosecution and the accused’s right to defend himself with the overarching objective of protecting the child.
The Court’s approach was firmly rooted in the philosophy underlying the POCSO Act. The legislation is designed not merely to punish sexual offences against children but also to ensure that children participating in criminal proceedings are treated with dignity and sensitivity. A child victim cannot be viewed simply as another witness whose evidence has to be extracted through conventional adversarial methods. The child’s age, psychological vulnerability and the possibility of trauma must inform the manner in which judicial proceedings are conducted.
Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy therefore used a series of powerful analogies to explain the special responsibility of the Presiding Officer. The Court compared the judge’s role to that of a mother gently helping an infant to focus on the moon, emphasising that truth must be elicited without causing unnecessary fear or pain. It also compared the Presiding Officer to a prism which receives the sharp questions of the prosecution and defence and transforms them into questions that can be put to a child in a comprehensible and non-threatening manner.
The decision thus goes beyond the immediate question of whether the victim should be recalled. It provides significant guidance on how Special Courts should approach child testimony, how judges should build rapport with child witnesses and how the legal system can reconcile the pursuit of truth with the child’s right to heal and move forward.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Paulpandiyan, challenged the order of the POCSO Special Court which had permitted the prosecution to recall the child victim. His principal argument was that the recall was unnecessary because the child had already been examined and the circumstances of the earlier deposition had been duly recorded by the Court.
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R. Muthukumar, pointed out that the Presiding Officer had specifically recorded that the child was deposing with a frightened expression. Despite this observation, the prosecution had not sought to stop the examination on the ground that the child was not in a proper mental condition to depose. The Court had also not recorded that the child’s evidence was unreliable or required to be discarded because of the child’s emotional state.
On this basis, the petitioner contended that once the evidence had been recorded, there was no sufficient justification for bringing the child back to Court. Recalling a vulnerable child, according to the defence, could potentially expose the child to additional psychological pressure and create an opportunity for other witnesses to influence or tutor the child before the subsequent deposition.
The defence therefore invoked the accused’s right to rely upon the testimony already recorded and expressed concern that repeated examination of the child could prejudice the defence. The argument was not merely that recall was procedurally unnecessary, but that repeated exposure of the child to the criminal proceedings could undermine the fairness of the trial itself.
The petitioner also raised the concern that the prosecution’s attempt to recall the victim could effectively allow it to repair deficiencies in its earlier examination. Once the witness had already deposed, permitting repeated examination without a compelling reason could, from the defence perspective, enable the prosecution to fill gaps in its case. The accused was entitled to rely upon the evidence as it stood, subject to the ordinary rules governing its appreciation.
The prosecution, represented by Mr. M. Mohamed Riyaz, Government Advocate (Criminal Side), defended the Special Court’s decision. The prosecution submitted that its fundamental responsibility was to ensure that the truth was brought before the Court. If the child had previously deposed while frightened, the prosecution argued that the earlier deposition might not have represented the child’s complete account of the incident.
The State therefore maintained that recalling the child was necessary to enable the prosecution to properly elicit the truth. The fact that the child had been frightened during the first deposition, rather than being a reason to permanently close the evidentiary process, could justify a further examination conducted in a more appropriate and child-sensitive environment.
The prosecution’s position also reflected the seriousness of the allegations involved. POCSO offences concern the sexual abuse of children and are viewed with particular gravity by the criminal justice system. The State argued that the objective of a criminal trial is to arrive at the truth and that procedural restrictions should not prevent the prosecution from presenting material evidence necessary to establish the alleged offence.
The prosecution thus placed emphasis on its duty to establish the alleged offence through legally admissible evidence. From its perspective, recalling the child was not intended to subject the victim to unnecessary hardship but to ensure that the child’s evidence was properly brought before the Court, particularly when the initial deposition had taken place in an atmosphere of fear.
The High Court consequently found itself confronted with two competing considerations. The prosecution sought to fulfil its duty to establish the alleged offence and present the child’s evidence fully, while the defence sought to prevent unnecessary recall of a vulnerable witness and preserve its right to rely upon the testimony already recorded. The Court’s task was to determine which course was consistent with the statutory objective of POCSO and the interests of justice.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy of the Madras High Court set aside the order permitting the recall of the child victim. The Court held that, in the circumstances of the case, recalling the child would not be in the child’s best interests and could result in unnecessary secondary victimisation.
The Court began by recognising the fundamental dilemma presented by cases involving child victims of sexual offences. Criminal proceedings require the Court to determine whether an offence has been committed and whether the accused is guilty in accordance with law. At the same time, however, the justice system cannot lose sight of the fact that the principal witness may herself or himself be a child who has already undergone a traumatic experience.
The Court observed that the situation could not be approached simply as a conflict between prosecution and defence. There was a third and particularly important consideration: the welfare and psychological well-being of the child. The Court noted that the matter involved a difficult balance between prosecuting what may be described as a grave or “monstrous” offence and protecting the child from the continuing trauma associated with recounting the experience.
The Court made it clear that the purpose of the POCSO framework would be defeated if a child victim were repeatedly required to return to Court and relive the circumstances of the alleged offence. Protection of the child is not an ornamental principle. It must operate in the actual conduct of the trial.
A particularly significant aspect of the judgment concerned the role of the Presiding Officer while recording the evidence of a child. The Court stressed that judicial officers must make conscious efforts to create an atmosphere in which the child feels secure. The ordinary preliminary questions asked by a judge, such as asking the child’s name or other basic details, should not be treated as mere procedural formalities.
According to the Court, these apparently simple questions serve an important purpose: they provide an opportunity for the Presiding Officer to establish a relationship of trust with the child. By the time the formal examination begins, the child should feel sufficiently comfortable to communicate with the judge.
This approach recognises that a child may not respond to questioning in the same manner as an adult witness. A child who is frightened, confused or intimidated may struggle to communicate facts even when those facts are known to the child. Consequently, the responsibility of the Court is not simply to ask questions but to ensure that the questions are framed in a manner that enables the child to understand and answer them.
The Court explained this responsibility through an evocative analogy. It compared the judicial officer’s role to that of a mother feeding an infant while gently directing the child’s attention towards the moon. The metaphor conveys the idea that truth must be elicited gradually and sensitively, without making the child feel that he or she is being subjected to pressure.
The Court observed that there remains considerable scope for improving the legal system’s understanding of child victims, their emotions and their “inner voice”. Judicial officers must therefore approach child testimony with empathy rather than treating the examination as an ordinary adversarial exercise.
Another important observation concerned the respective roles of the prosecution, defence and Presiding Officer. The prosecution naturally seeks to place every relevant ingredient of the alleged offence on record and establish the guilt of the accused. The defence, equally legitimately, seeks to challenge the prosecution’s version and establish the accused’s innocence.
The Presiding Officer, however, occupies a different position. The judge must remain above the competing objectives of the parties while ensuring that the child’s best interests are protected. The Court described this role by comparing the judge to a prism. The prism receives sharp rays of light and disperses them into a softer and more comprehensible spectrum. Similarly, the judge must receive questions from the prosecution and defence and reformulate them into language that is suitable for the child.
This observation is particularly significant in the context of cross-examination. A child-friendly trial does not mean that the accused loses the right to challenge the prosecution case. Nor does it mean that the prosecution is prevented from proving the alleged offence. Instead, it requires the judicial officer to ensure that the legitimate questions arising from both sides are put to the child in a manner that does not unnecessarily frighten, confuse or traumatise the witness.
The Court thereby recognised that child-sensitive procedures and a fair trial are not necessarily competing concepts. Proper judicial intervention can protect the child while preserving the essential rights of the accused.
The Court also turned its attention to the training of judicial officers. It noted that the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Academy was already conducting programmes intended to ensure that child witnesses are not unnecessarily summoned to Court repeatedly. However, the Court suggested that judicial training should go further.
According to the judgment, judicial officers should receive practical training on dealing with child witnesses. Such training should not remain confined to theoretical discussions concerning statutory provisions. Officers with practical experience of POCSO trials should be encouraged to share their experiences, while practical exercises and discussions on interviewing and examining child victims should form part of judicial education.
The Court further suggested that field experts could be involved in such training. This reflects a broader understanding that child psychology and trauma-informed methods have an important place within the administration of criminal justice. Judges handling POCSO matters may benefit from understanding how fear, trauma, age and unfamiliar surroundings affect a child’s ability to communicate.
The judgment also contained strong observations regarding the conduct of the Bar. The Court expressed concern that child victims are sometimes treated without sufficient sensitivity during criminal proceedings. It particularly criticised the practice of cross-examinations being deferred and recall applications subsequently being filed on routine grounds.
The Court noted that the repeated recall of children can have consequences far beyond procedural inconvenience. Every return to the courtroom can force the child to confront an experience that he or she may be trying to leave behind. In that sense, repeated proceedings can become a form of secondary victimisation.
The Court stressed that the legal profession must acknowledge the child’s right to heal and resume a normal childhood after giving evidence. While the accused has valuable procedural and constitutional rights, those rights must be balanced against the statutory mandate to protect children from unnecessary trauma.
At the same time, the Court did not suggest that every request to recall a child witness must automatically be rejected. Its reasoning was grounded in the particular circumstances before it and the requirement that any such step must be justified by the interests of justice and, importantly, the child’s best interests.
The Court also observed that the prosecution case was not wholly dependent upon the child’s testimony. Other evidence could be considered and relied upon in accordance with law. Therefore, permitting the prosecution to proceed with the trial through other legally permissible evidence would not necessarily prevent it from establishing the alleged offence.
This was an important qualification because the Court did not intend to dilute the prosecution’s responsibility to prove a POCSO offence. Rather, it made clear that the prosecution must do so through lawful evidence without unnecessarily subjecting the child to repeated testimony.
The Court ultimately concluded that recalling the child in the circumstances would not serve the child’s best interests. The order of the Special Court permitting the recall was therefore set aside. The prosecution was nevertheless left free to continue the trial and establish its case through other evidence in accordance with law.
The judgment carries a broader message for the functioning of POCSO Special Courts. A child-friendly justice system cannot be created merely by statutory provisions. It requires a change in courtroom culture, judicial technique and professional practice. The judge must be sensitive to the child’s age and emotional condition; the prosecutor must avoid unnecessary repetition; the defence must exercise its legitimate rights responsibly; and the entire process must be structured so that the child is not made to suffer repeatedly for having approached the justice system.
The decision also reinforces the idea that the “best interests of the child” should remain a central consideration throughout POCSO proceedings. It does not displace the presumption of innocence or the accused’s right to a fair trial. Instead, it requires the judicial process to harmonise those rights with the special vulnerability of child victims.
Ultimately, the Madras High Court’s decision in Paulpandiyan v. State presents a humane vision of criminal adjudication. The Court’s message is that seeking truth and protecting a child are not mutually exclusive objectives. A sensitive judge can ensure that questions necessary for a fair trial are asked without turning the courtroom into another source of trauma. The decision therefore places empathy, dignity and judicial responsibility at the heart of child-sensitive adjudication under the POCSO Act