Introduction:
In Mala Kumari v. State of U.P. and Another [2026 LiveLaw (AB) 466], the Allahabad High Court delivered a significant judgment strengthening the enforcement of maintenance orders under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). Justice Praveen Kumar Giri held that a wife cannot be compelled to institute successive execution applications every month merely because the husband defaults in making maintenance payments. The Court observed that once a maintenance order has attained finality and continues to remain in force, the liability of the husband to pay maintenance is a continuing obligation, and its execution cannot be fragmented into separate proceedings for each default.
The case arose from a criminal revision filed by a woman challenging the orders of the Family Court, Jaunpur. Earlier, the Family Court had awarded her monthly maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. When the husband failed to comply with the order, she initiated execution proceedings under Section 128 CrPC and recovered the arrears. After those proceedings were disposed of, the husband again defaulted in paying maintenance for subsequent months. Consequently, the wife filed another execution application seeking recovery of the unpaid monthly maintenance as well as future maintenance in terms of the subsisting order.
Initially, the Family Court issued a recovery warrant. However, after the husband deposited the arrears for one intervening month, the court recalled the warrant and disposed of the execution proceedings, holding that recovery warrants could not be issued for maintenance that had not yet fallen due. This effectively required the wife to approach the court repeatedly whenever the husband defaulted in future payments.
Aggrieved by this approach, the wife approached the Allahabad High Court. The case raised an important question regarding the execution of maintenance orders and whether a maintenance claimant can be compelled to initiate fresh execution proceedings every time a monthly payment becomes due. The High Court answered this question emphatically in favour of the wife while issuing comprehensive directions to all Family Courts and Gram Nyayalayas across Uttar Pradesh regarding the enforcement of maintenance orders.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner-wife contended that the maintenance order passed in her favour had neither been stayed nor set aside and therefore continued to remain legally enforceable. She argued that the obligation imposed upon the husband was not confined to payment of past arrears but extended to every monthly payment falling due so long as the maintenance order remained operative.
She submitted that the Family Court committed a serious legal error by treating the execution proceedings as fully satisfied after the husband deposited the arrears for one month. According to her, such an approach compelled a maintenance claimant to file fresh execution applications every month in case of default, thereby defeating the very object of Section 125 CrPC, which is intended to provide speedy and effective financial support to neglected wives, children and parents.
The petitioner further argued that the proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC merely regulates the issuance of recovery warrants and does not extinguish the substantive right to claim maintenance or recover arrears. She maintained that the maintenance order continued to create a recurring legal obligation and therefore the execution proceedings ought to have remained alive for enforcement of future defaults.
The respondent-husband relied upon the proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC and contended that recovery warrants could only be issued for maintenance that had already become due. Since he had deposited the arrears for the intervening month, he argued that nothing further remained to be executed and the Family Court rightly consigned the proceedings to the record room.
The State supported the judicial process and left the matter to the discretion of the Court.
Court’s Judgment:
Allowing the criminal revision, the Allahabad High Court held that the Family Court had completely misconstrued the law governing execution of maintenance orders. Justice Praveen Kumar Giri observed that maintenance awarded under Section 125 CrPC is a continuing statutory obligation and cannot be enforced through fragmented proceedings requiring the claimant to repeatedly approach the court.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Shantha alias Ushadevi v. B.G. Shivananjappa (2005), wherein it was held that Section 125 CrPC is a beneficial piece of social welfare legislation intended to prevent destitution and vagrancy. The Supreme Court had clarified that it would be unreasonable and contrary to the legislative intent to compel a wife to file successive execution applications for each monthly default.
Justice Giri observed that the Family Court’s interpretation defeated the very purpose of the maintenance provisions. Once a valid maintenance order exists, the husband’s liability automatically continues every month until the order is modified or set aside by a competent court. The wife should not be required to undertake repetitive litigation merely to secure compliance with an already existing judicial order.
The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Poongodi v. Thangavel (2013), which authoritatively interpreted the proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC. The Supreme Court clarified that the one-year limitation contained in the proviso only regulates the issuance of warrants and does not extinguish the claimant’s entitlement to maintenance arrears beyond one year. Nor does it bar recovery proceedings under Section 128 CrPC, now Section 147 BNSS.
The Court held that the Family Court had incorrectly treated the statutory provision as restricting the claimant’s substantive rights. Such an interpretation, according to the High Court, was directly contrary to the binding law declared by the Supreme Court.
Examining the facts of the present case, the Court noted that the maintenance order dated March 4, 2023 remained valid and enforceable. The earlier execution proceedings had merely resulted in payment of arrears up to February 2025. Thereafter, fresh monthly liabilities continued to accrue automatically under the same maintenance order.
The High Court observed that after the husband deposited ₹5,000 towards the arrears for March 2025, the Family Court wrongly concluded that the execution proceedings had become infructuous. This approach ignored the continuing nature of the maintenance obligation and effectively required the wife to institute fresh execution proceedings for every subsequent default.
During the hearing, the Court specifically questioned the Presiding Officer of the Family Court as to whether a wife should be compelled to repeatedly file execution applications every month despite an existing maintenance order. The explanation furnished by the Presiding Officer, based on the proviso to Section 144(3) BNSS, was found to be legally unsustainable.
Justice Giri emphasised that maintenance laws are intended to secure social justice and must therefore receive a liberal interpretation. Courts dealing with maintenance matters should facilitate enforcement rather than create procedural hurdles that discourage claimants from securing their lawful entitlements.
Recognising that similar errors were being committed by Family Courts across Uttar Pradesh, the High Court issued comprehensive statewide directions. It directed all Family Courts and Gram Nyayalayas to strictly follow the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shantha alias Ushadevi, holding that successive execution applications are unnecessary for recovering monthly maintenance under a subsisting maintenance order.
The Court further directed strict adherence to Poongodi v. Thangavel, clarifying that the limitation contained in Section 125(3) CrPC does not curtail the claimant’s right to recover maintenance arrears.
The High Court also directed that maintenance should ordinarily be deposited directly into the verified bank account of the claimant, following the law declared by the Supreme Court in Aarti Rai. Wherever the maintenance payer is a salaried employee, the concerned employer or department should deduct the maintenance amount directly from the salary or remuneration and transfer it into the claimant’s bank account in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Dimple.
Further, where maintenance remains unpaid despite these measures, the Court directed trial courts to recover the amount by attaching the property of the defaulting husband. If attachment proves insufficient, courts may resort to imprisonment in accordance with Section 125(3) CrPC (now Section 144(3) BNSS) and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (2021).
In one of the strongest observations in the judgment, Justice Giri warned that failure by judicial officers to faithfully implement these binding precedents would expose them to disciplinary as well as contempt proceedings. The Court stressed that subordinate courts are duty-bound to follow the law declared by the Supreme Court and the High Court in both letter and spirit.
The High Court also directed the District Administration and Police Authorities throughout Uttar Pradesh to extend full assistance in executing maintenance orders. Additionally, it ordered that enforcement of maintenance orders should become a regular agenda item in Monitoring Cell meetings conducted by District and Sessions Judges.
For institutional strengthening, the Court directed the Registrar (Compliance) to forward the judgment to the Judicial Training and Research Institute, Lucknow, so that judicial officers receive appropriate training regarding execution of maintenance orders.
Accordingly, the criminal revision was allowed. The High Court directed the husband to clear all outstanding maintenance arrears and continue depositing the monthly maintenance directly into the wife’s verified bank account. The judgment serves as an important reaffirmation that maintenance orders are continuing obligations and that procedural technicalities cannot be permitted to frustrate the object of social welfare legislation.