Introduction:
In a significant judgment dealing with the evidentiary standards required to establish the age of a prosecutrix in cases involving allegations of statutory rape, the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh set aside the conviction of an accused under Section 376 of the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC), holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged occurrence. The decision was rendered by Justice Sanjay Dhar in Yawar Ahmad Bhagat v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir through Police Station Yaripora, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 253.
The appeal arose from a judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Kulgam, whereby the appellant had been convicted for the offence of rape under Section 376 RPC and sentenced to undergo eight years of rigorous imprisonment. The trial court had proceeded on the basis that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age at the time of the incident, rendering her consent legally irrelevant. While the accused was acquitted of the charge of kidnapping under Section 363 RPC, he was convicted for rape on the premise that the sexual relationship, even if consensual, constituted statutory rape due to the victim’s minority.
The prosecution case originated from a complaint lodged on December 7, 2018, by the father of the prosecutrix before Police Station Yaripora. It was alleged that his daughter had left home on the previous evening to purchase goods from the market and had thereafter been kidnapped by the appellant. Based on this complaint, an FIR was registered under Sections 363 and 109 RPC. During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix was traced and recovered from the company of the appellant at Shirpora Dal. She was subjected to medical examination, and following the investigation, the offence under Section 376 RPC was added to the case.
The prosecution sought to establish that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age by relying upon a school certificate issued by Government High School, Kujjar, Kulgam. The certificate indicated her date of birth as January 14, 2001. This document became the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case regarding age and was heavily relied upon by the trial court while recording the conviction.
However, the defence consistently maintained that the prosecution had failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix through legally reliable evidence. It was further argued that the prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and had entered into a consensual relationship with him. The appeal therefore raised crucial legal questions concerning proof of age, the evidentiary value of school records, the burden of proof in criminal trials, and the distinction between consensual relationships and statutory rape.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant challenged the judgment of conviction primarily on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish one of the most essential ingredients of the offence, namely, that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. It was argued that the conviction was based upon assumptions rather than legally admissible and reliable evidence.
The defence contended that the school certificate relied upon by the prosecution lacked evidentiary value because no witness was able to explain the source from which the date of birth had been entered into the school records. The teacher who produced the certificate had admittedly not been posted in the school when the prosecutrix was admitted and had no personal knowledge regarding the basis on which her date of birth had been recorded. According to the appellant, such a document could not be treated as conclusive proof of age.
The appellant further argued that the evidence of the prosecutrix herself completely undermined the prosecution’s case. Her statement recorded under Section 164A of the Code of Criminal Procedure revealed that she had voluntarily contacted the appellant and persuaded him to accompany her to Jammu. She had stated that when the appellant initially refused, she threatened to commit suicide, thereby compelling him to accompany her. She also stated that the physical relationship between them was established out of her own free will.
The defence highlighted that during cross-examination before the trial court, the prosecutrix reaffirmed these facts and admitted that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and had engaged in a physical relationship with him without any force or coercion. Therefore, once the prosecution failed to establish minority, the entire foundation of the statutory rape charge collapsed.
The appellant also relied upon the testimony of the prosecutrix’s father and sister. The father admitted during cross-examination that he could not remember the date of birth of the prosecutrix or even the dates of birth of his other children. Similarly, the prosecutrix’s elder sister admitted that she did not know the exact date of birth of the prosecutrix and merely assumed that she was younger. According to the defence, such vague testimony could not satisfy the strict standard of proof required in criminal cases.
On the other hand, the prosecution sought to support the conviction by relying upon the school certificate indicating the date of birth of the prosecutrix. It was argued that the document formed part of official school records and therefore deserved acceptance as evidence of age.
The prosecution maintained that the trial court had correctly appreciated the material on record and had rightly concluded that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age. Once minority was established, it was argued, the question of consent became legally irrelevant because any sexual relationship with a minor amounted to statutory rape under the applicable law.
The State further submitted that the trial court had already considered the evidence relating to the prosecutrix’s conduct and voluntary companionship with the accused but had correctly concluded that such circumstances could not exonerate the appellant if the victim was legally a minor. Therefore, the conviction and sentence deserved to be upheld.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Sanjay Dhar undertook a detailed examination of the evidence on record and ultimately found that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proving the age of the prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt. The Court observed that in a criminal trial, every essential ingredient of the offence must be established through reliable and convincing evidence, and the age of the prosecutrix was a foundational fact in the present case.
The Court first examined the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164A Cr.P.C. The statement revealed that it was the prosecutrix who had initiated contact with the appellant and requested him to accompany her to Jammu. She further stated that when the appellant initially declined, she threatened to commit suicide, following which he agreed. Significantly, she categorically stated that she developed physical relations with the appellant out of her own free will.
The Court noted that the same position emerged during her testimony before the trial court. In cross-examination, she admitted that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and had entered into a consensual physical relationship with him. Thus, the evidence clearly demonstrated that there was no allegation of force, coercion, or inducement. The prosecution case could therefore succeed only if it established that the prosecutrix was a minor and incapable of giving legally valid consent.
Turning to the issue of age, the Court carefully scrutinized the evidence relating to the school certificate produced by the prosecution. The certificate had been proved through PW-7, a teacher from Government High School, Kujjar. However, during cross-examination, the witness admitted that he did not know on what basis the date of birth of the prosecutrix had been entered in the school records. He further admitted that the prosecutrix had joined the school only in the ninth standard and that he was not posted there at the time of her admission.
The witness also acknowledged that no municipal or birth registration records were available in the school and that he had no knowledge regarding the source of the information recorded in the admission register. The Court observed that these admissions completely undermined the evidentiary value of the certificate.
The Court then examined the testimony of the father of the prosecutrix. His evidence, instead of supporting the prosecution, created further doubt. He admitted that he could not remember the date of his marriage, the dates of birth of his elder children, or even the date of birth of the prosecutrix herself. The Court found it impossible to derive any reliable conclusion regarding the prosecutrix’s age from such testimony.
Similarly, the testimony of the elder sister of the prosecutrix was found to be inadequate. Although she knew her own date of birth, she admitted that she had no knowledge regarding the exact date of birth of the prosecutrix. Her assumption that the prosecutrix was a minor merely because she was younger could not substitute legal proof.
While evaluating the evidentiary value of school records, the Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988 Supp SCC 604). In that case, the Supreme Court held that entries relating to date of birth contained in school registers do not automatically become conclusive proof of age unless the source of such entries is established through reliable evidence.
The Court also referred to the decision in Raju Mitra v. State of West Bengal, wherein it was observed that school records may possess evidentiary value but cannot be treated as conclusive proof unless the person who supplied the information at the time of admission is identified and examined or the source of the information is otherwise established.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to explain how the date of birth mentioned in the school certificate came to be recorded. No witness was produced from the institution where the prosecutrix had initially studied. No birth certificate, municipal record, hospital record, or any contemporaneous document was placed on record. Consequently, the school certificate lacked the necessary foundation required to inspire confidence.
Justice Dhar emphasized that the burden of proving minority rests squarely upon the prosecution and must be discharged beyond reasonable doubt like every other ingredient of a criminal offence. The Court observed that mere assumptions, conjectures, or weak documentary evidence cannot substitute the strict standard of proof required in criminal law.
Having found that the prosecution failed to prove minority, the Court proceeded to examine the consequences of that finding. It observed that once the prosecutrix was treated as a major, the evidence clearly established that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant and had entered into a consensual physical relationship with him. The case therefore ceased to be one of statutory rape and instead appeared to be a consensual relationship between two young individuals.
The Court further remarked that even if it were hypothetically assumed that the prosecutrix was slightly below eighteen years of age, the surrounding circumstances could not be ignored. The evidence indicated a relationship based on mutual affection, and there was no allegation of force, coercion, exploitation, or abuse. In such circumstances, incarcerating the appellant would amount to a miscarriage of justice.
The High Court ultimately concluded that the findings recorded by the trial court were unsustainable both on facts and in law. The prosecution had failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix through reliable evidence, and the conviction under Section 376 RPC could not therefore be sustained.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant, who was in custody, was directed to be released forthwith. The judgment serves as an important reminder that in criminal prosecutions involving allegations of statutory rape, proof of minority is not a mere procedural requirement but a fundamental ingredient of the offence that must be established through credible and legally admissible evidence. It also reiterates the settled principle that convictions cannot rest upon doubtful or unsupported assumptions when the liberty of an individual is at stake.