Introduction:

In a significant judgment reinforcing the constitutional protection afforded to artistic and creative expression, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated against Bollywood actor Rajkumar Rao, film producers, and other individuals associated with the promotion of the film Behen Hogi Teri. The decision was rendered by Justice H.S. Grewal in a batch of petitions led by Rajkumar Yadav @ Rajkumar Rao v. State of Punjab and Another.

The case arose from an FIR registered on April 19, 2017, at Police Station Division No. 5, Jalandhar, Punjab, under Sections 295-A and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The complaint alleged that a promotional poster of the film had hurt the religious sentiments of members of the Hindu community by portraying Lord Shiva in a manner perceived as disrespectful. According to the complainant, the depiction amounted to an insult to religious beliefs and was capable of outraging the sentiments of devotees.

The controversy centered around a promotional poster circulated on social media in connection with the release of the film. The complainant asserted that the image portrayed Lord Shiva in a “cartoonist manner” and that such depiction was offensive to Hindu religious sensibilities. Based on these allegations, criminal proceedings were initiated not only against the actor featured in the poster but also against the producers and other persons associated with the film’s creation and promotion.

Following investigation, a challan was eventually presented before the competent court in 2022. The prosecution sought to proceed against the accused persons on the premise that the poster amounted to a deliberate and malicious act intended to outrage religious feelings. The petitioners, however, approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, the challan, the non-bailable warrants issued against them, and all consequential proceedings.

The matter raised important constitutional and criminal law questions concerning the scope of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, the interpretation of Section 295-A IPC, the legal significance of certification granted by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), and the limits of criminal prosecution in matters involving films and artistic works.

At the heart of the dispute was the issue of whether a creative depiction contained in a promotional poster, without any demonstrable intention to insult religion, could attract criminal liability merely because certain individuals found it objectionable. The High Court’s answer to this question would ultimately have implications extending beyond the facts of the present case and touching upon the broader relationship between artistic freedom and criminal law.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioners argued that the FIR and subsequent proceedings constituted a gross abuse of the criminal justice process. They contended that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, failed to satisfy the essential ingredients required to constitute offences under Section 295-A IPC or Section 67 of the Information Technology Act.

The petitioners submitted that Section 295-A is not attracted merely because a section of society takes exception to a particular depiction or expression. According to them, the provision requires proof of a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings. Such intention must be evident from the material on record and cannot be presumed merely because a complaint has been lodged.

It was argued that the promotional poster formed part of a cinematographic work and was released in the ordinary course of promoting a film. The depiction in question was not designed to insult or ridicule any religion but was part of a fictional and artistic narrative. Therefore, the fundamental requirement of malicious intent was wholly absent.

The petitioners also emphasized that the film had already undergone statutory scrutiny under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, and had been granted a ‘UA’ certificate by the Central Board of Film Certification. It was submitted that the CBFC is a specialized statutory body entrusted with examining films and determining their suitability for public exhibition. Once such a body had approved the film, criminal prosecution could not be sustained merely on the basis of subjective objections raised by certain individuals.

Another significant argument advanced by the petitioners was that several of the persons accused in the case themselves belonged to the Hindu faith and were devotees of Lord Shiva. This circumstance, according to them, further demonstrated the absence of any intention to insult or outrage religious sentiments.

With respect to Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, the petitioners argued that the provision deals with the publication or transmission of obscene material in electronic form. The allegations in the FIR did not concern obscenity, lascivious content, or material appealing to prurient interests. Instead, the grievance related solely to alleged hurt religious sentiments. Therefore, the statutory ingredients of Section 67 were not remotely attracted.

The petitioners also challenged the invocation of Section 120-B IPC. It was submitted that when the substantive offences themselves were not made out, the allegation of criminal conspiracy necessarily failed. In the absence of evidence showing an agreement to commit an unlawful act, the conspiracy charge was legally unsustainable.

The State and the complainant opposed the petitions. It was contended that the depiction of Lord Shiva in the promotional poster had offended the religious sentiments of devotees and was capable of causing public outrage. According to the prosecution, the issue was not merely artistic expression but the effect that the depiction had on members of a religious community.

The respondents maintained that the allegations disclosed the commission of cognizable offences and that the matter ought to proceed to trial. They argued that the question of intention could only be determined after evidence was recorded and should not be decided at the threshold stage. The prosecution therefore urged the Court to permit the criminal proceedings to continue so that all relevant facts could be examined during trial.

The State further relied upon the allegations contained in the complaint and argued that the investigation had culminated in the filing of a challan, indicating that sufficient material existed to warrant prosecution. Accordingly, it was submitted that the extraordinary power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and only in cases where no offence was disclosed on the face of the record.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice H.S. Grewal undertook a detailed examination of the statutory provisions, constitutional principles, and factual circumstances of the case before ultimately concluding that the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The Court began by analyzing the scope and requirements of Section 295-A IPC. It observed that the provision does not criminalize every act that may offend or hurt religious sentiments. Rather, the legislature has consciously incorporated the requirement of a “deliberate and malicious intention” to outrage religious feelings. These words, the Court noted, are not incidental but constitute the very essence of the offence.

The Court emphasized that criminal liability under Section 295-A can arise only when there is clear material demonstrating a conscious and deliberate attempt to insult religion or religious beliefs. Mere criticism, artistic expression, satire, or creative depiction cannot automatically attract criminal prosecution unless accompanied by the requisite malicious intent.

Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found a complete absence of any material suggesting that the petitioners intended to insult Hinduism or outrage the religious sentiments of devotees. The promotional poster formed part of a cinematographic work and was used in connection with the legitimate promotion of a film. The Court held that mere objection, disagreement, or protest by certain individuals could not by itself establish the existence of deliberate and malicious intent.

The judgment underscored that criminal courts must distinguish between subjective perceptions of offence and legally recognizable criminal conduct. The fact that some individuals felt offended by a particular depiction was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 295-A IPC.

A significant aspect of the decision was the Court’s reliance on constitutional protections available to artistic and creative expression. Referring to the jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court, the Court observed that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) extends to films, artistic works, literature, and other creative endeavors.

The Court noted that artistic expression occupies a protected constitutional space and that criminal prosecution relating to films or creative works must satisfy a particularly high threshold. Courts must exercise caution before permitting criminal proceedings that could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. If prosecutions were allowed to continue merely because some individuals found a creative work objectionable, it would seriously undermine constitutional values and artistic freedom.

Justice Grewal observed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that restrictions upon creative expression must be interpreted narrowly and applied only where the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence are clearly established. In the present case, those ingredients were conspicuously absent.

The Court also attached considerable importance to the fact that the film had been granted certification by the Central Board of Film Certification. The CBFC functions as an expert statutory body entrusted with examining films under the Cinematograph Act. Its certification process involves scrutiny of content from various perspectives, including public order, morality, and social sensitivities.

According to the Court, certification granted by the CBFC carries legal sanctity and cannot be casually disregarded. While certification does not provide absolute immunity from legal scrutiny, it constitutes an important factor when assessing allegations relating to creative works. Once a film has undergone statutory examination and has been approved for public exhibition, criminal prosecution cannot be initiated merely because some persons subjectively disagree with or dislike certain aspects of the content.

The Court then turned to the allegation under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act. It held that the provision criminalizes the electronic publication or transmission of obscene material. For the offence to be attracted, the content must be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, or tend to deprave and corrupt persons likely to view it.

Examining the promotional poster, the Court found no element of obscenity whatsoever. The complaint itself was based entirely on alleged injury to religious sentiments rather than obscenity. Consequently, the foundational requirements of Section 67 were wholly absent, rendering the charge legally untenable.

With respect to Section 120-B IPC, the Court observed that a conspiracy charge cannot exist independently in the absence of an underlying unlawful objective. Since the substantive offences under Section 295-A IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act were not made out, the allegation of criminal conspiracy necessarily collapsed. The prosecution had failed to place any material demonstrating an agreement among the accused persons to commit an illegal act.

The Court further observed that some of the petitioners themselves belonged to the Hindu faith and were devotees of Lord Shiva. While this fact was not determinative, it served as an additional circumstance negating the allegation that the petitioners deliberately intended to insult the deity or outrage the sentiments of Hindu worshippers.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings would be wholly unjustified. The essential ingredients of the offences alleged in the FIR were absent. The prosecution was founded upon subjective dissatisfaction rather than legally sustainable evidence of criminal intent.

Invoking its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice, the Court quashed the FIR, the challan, the non-bailable warrants, and all consequential proceedings against the petitioners.

The judgment serves as an important reaffirmation of the principle that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to suppress artistic expression merely because certain sections of society find a creative work objectionable. By insisting upon strict compliance with the statutory requirements of Section 295-A IPC and emphasizing the constitutional importance of freedom of expression, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has reinforced the balance between protection of religious sentiments and preservation of artistic liberty. The ruling stands as a reminder that criminal prosecution must be grounded in clear evidence of deliberate wrongdoing and cannot be sustained on the basis of subjective perceptions alone.