Introduction:
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (SLP (Crl.) No. 2260/2026) marks an important development in the jurisprudence surrounding allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage. The case arose from criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, wherein the complainant alleged that she had been induced into a prolonged sexual relationship by the appellant’s assurance of marriage.
The factual background presents a complex interplay of personal relationships, autonomy, and legal accountability. The complainant had been married since 1998 but began living separately from her husband in 2012. While her divorce proceedings were still pending, she created a matrimonial profile in 2017 seeking remarriage. It was through this platform that she came into contact with the appellant. The two developed a relationship, which, according to the complainant, was based on the appellant’s repeated assurances that he would marry her.
The relationship soon progressed into a physical one. The complainant alleged that on October 17, 2017, the appellant visited her residence and engaged in sexual intercourse against her will, including acts she described as unnatural. Despite this allegation, the parties continued to maintain close contact over several years. They travelled together, stayed in hotels, and engaged in a sustained intimate relationship until 2020.
The turning point came in February 2021, when the complainant sought to formalize the relationship through marriage. Upon the appellant’s refusal, she lodged a criminal complaint, alleging that the sexual relationship had been induced by a false promise of marriage. The appellant sought to quash the proceedings, but the Bombay High Court dismissed his petition, primarily on procedural grounds, stating that a prior quashing petition had already been withdrawn and that the matter required trial.
Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, challenging both the maintainability reasoning and the substantive refusal to quash the case. The case thus presented the Court with two key questions: whether a second quashing petition is maintainable after withdrawal of an earlier one, and more importantly, whether the facts disclosed an offence of rape based on a false promise of marriage.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant’s primary contention rested on the consensual nature of the relationship. It was argued that the complainant was a fully aware and autonomous adult who had knowingly entered into a relationship while both parties were still legally married to other individuals. The appellant emphasized that the complainant herself had created a matrimonial profile even before her divorce was finalized, indicating her intention to seek a new relationship independently.
The appellant further argued that the relationship between the parties was not only consensual but also prolonged and mutually sustained. Over a span of nearly four years, the parties cohabited, travelled together, and maintained a continuous physical relationship. The absence of any complaint during this period, particularly in relation to the alleged incident of October 2017, was highlighted as a crucial factor undermining the credibility of the accusations.
Another key submission was that the alleged promise of marriage did not constitute a “false promise” within the meaning of criminal law. The appellant relied on the distinction between a promise that is false from the inception and a promise that is later not fulfilled due to changing circumstances. It was argued that at no point was there evidence to suggest that the appellant never intended to marry the complainant. Instead, the breakdown of the relationship was attributed to subsequent developments, which cannot retrospectively criminalize a consensual relationship.
On the procedural aspect, the appellant challenged the High Court’s refusal to entertain the quashing petition. It was contended that the earlier petition had been withdrawn without any adjudication on merits, and therefore, the present petition could not be dismissed as non-maintainable. The appellant urged the Court to prioritize substantive justice over procedural technicalities, particularly when the allegations did not disclose any offence.
On the other hand, the respondent-complainant argued that her consent to the physical relationship was vitiated by the appellant’s repeated assurances of marriage. It was contended that she had entered into the relationship with a legitimate expectation of marriage, and that the appellant had exploited this expectation to establish and continue a sexual relationship.
The complainant emphasized the alleged incident of October 17, 2017, asserting that the initial act of intercourse was against her will. She further argued that the continuation of the relationship did not negate the coercive nature of the initial encounter, particularly when it was accompanied by emotional manipulation and promises of future commitment.
The State supported the complainant’s position, contending that the allegations disclosed a prima facie case that warranted trial. It was argued that issues such as consent, intention, and the nature of the promise could not be conclusively determined at the stage of quashing. The State maintained that the High Court was correct in refusing to interfere and that the matter should proceed to trial where evidence could be properly evaluated.
Court’s Judgment:
The Supreme Court, speaking through a bench comprising Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Manmohan, undertook a detailed examination of both the procedural and substantive aspects of the case. At the outset, the Court addressed the issue of maintainability. It held that the High Court had erred in dismissing the quashing petition solely on the ground that an earlier petition had been withdrawn.
The Court clarified that the withdrawal of a petition without any adjudication on merits does not operate as a bar to a subsequent petition. It emphasized that procedural rules should not be applied in a manner that defeats substantive justice, particularly in criminal cases where the consequences are severe. The Court observed that once it is established that no offence is made out, it would be unjust to dismiss a petition on technical grounds of maintainability.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court carefully analyzed the nature of the relationship between the parties. It noted that both the appellant and the complainant were aware of each other’s marital status at the inception of the relationship. The complainant had actively sought remarriage through a matrimonial platform even before her divorce was finalized, indicating a conscious and voluntary decision to engage in a new relationship.
The Court placed significant emphasis on the prolonged duration and nature of the relationship. The parties had cohabited and maintained a physical relationship from 2017 to 2020, engaging in activities such as travelling and staying together in hotels. This pattern of conduct, in the Court’s view, was inconsistent with the claim that the relationship was induced solely by a false promise of marriage.
A crucial factor in the Court’s reasoning was the delay in lodging the complaint. The alleged incident of October 2017 was not reported until February 2021, despite continuous interaction between the parties during this period. The Court found it difficult to reconcile this delay with the claim of coercion or lack of consent, particularly in the absence of any contemporaneous complaint.
The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, wherein it had drawn a clear distinction between a false promise made with no intention of fulfillment and a mere breach of promise arising from subsequent circumstances. The Court reiterated that for criminal liability to arise, the promise must be false from the very beginning, and the consent must be directly attributable to such falsehood.
Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the present case did not involve a false promise of marriage. There was no material to suggest that the appellant had no intention of marrying the complainant at the outset. Instead, the relationship appeared to be a consensual arrangement that later deteriorated due to personal differences.
The Court also addressed the allegation of forcible intercourse on October 17, 2017. It observed that the complainant’s conduct in continuing the relationship for several years without raising any complaint significantly weakened this allegation. While the Court did not dismiss the possibility of coercion in abstract terms, it held that the facts of the case did not support such a conclusion.
In light of these findings, the Court held that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 376 IPC were not made out. It emphasized that criminal law should not be used as a tool to penalize failed relationships or to settle personal disputes arising from emotional or relational breakdowns.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Bombay High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant. The judgment underscores the importance of distinguishing between genuine cases of deception and consensual relationships that later turn sour.
The ruling also reinforces the principle that consent, when given freely and with full knowledge of circumstances, cannot be retrospectively invalidated solely on the basis of a broken promise. At the same time, the Court’s reasoning carefully preserves the distinction between such cases and those where consent is obtained through deliberate and fraudulent misrepresentation.