Introduction:
In State of Bihar and Anr. v. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari and Ors., the Patna High Court delivered a significant ruling emphasizing the binding nature of statements made by counsel and recorded in judicial orders. The matter was adjudicated by a Division Bench comprising Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma, while hearing a Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State challenging the order of a learned Single Judge dated 08.04.2024 in CWJC No. 14725 of 2023. The dispute originated from a writ petition filed by teaching and non-teaching staff of non-government recognized aided Sanskrit schools and Madarsas, who had questioned the legality of Clause 6 of Resolution No. 970 dated 31.08.2013 issued by the Education Department, Government of Bihar. The impugned clause placed employees appointed on or after 15.02.2011 on a fixed salary structure, which was challenged as discriminatory and arbitrary. The Single Judge, relying on earlier binding Division Bench judgments, allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned provision with consequential benefits. Crucially, the Single Judge recorded that both parties had agreed that the issue was already settled by precedent. Aggrieved by this outcome, the State preferred an intra-court appeal, attempting to reopen the issue by raising procedural grounds. The Division Bench was thus tasked with determining whether a party could resile from its earlier concession and re-agitate a settled issue in appellate jurisdiction.
Arguments:
The central controversy in the appeal revolved around whether the State could challenge an order that was passed on the basis of its own concession before the Single Judge, and whether the existence of pending proceedings in related matters could justify reopening the issue.
The State, represented by its counsel, advanced a multi-layered argument seeking to justify interference with the order of the Single Judge. It was contended that although earlier Division Bench judgments had addressed similar issues, the matter had not attained finality due to subsequent procedural developments. Specifically, the State pointed out that against one such earlier judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 985 of 2015, a review petition had been filed. Although the review petition was dismissed for non-prosecution, a restoration application had been filed and was pending consideration.
On this basis, the State argued that the issue could not be said to have been conclusively settled, and therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have exercised caution and refrained from deciding the writ petition. Instead, it was submitted that the matter should have been kept in abeyance until the restoration application was decided.
The appellants further contended that the concession recorded by the Single Judge—that the issue stood concluded by binding precedent—should not be treated as absolute or irrevocable. They argued that such a concession, if made under a mistaken understanding of law or facts, should not preclude the State from raising legitimate legal arguments in appeal.
Additionally, the State emphasized the importance of safeguarding public interest and ensuring that financial implications arising from the grant of consequential benefits are carefully examined. It was argued that the quashing of the resolution and the direction to grant benefits could have significant fiscal consequences, and therefore warranted reconsideration.
The appellants thus urged the Division Bench to set aside the order of the Single Judge and remand the matter for fresh consideration, taking into account the pending restoration application and other relevant factors.
The respondents, represented by their counsel, strongly opposed the appeal and defended the order of the Single Judge. They argued that the issue raised in the writ petition had already been conclusively settled by multiple Division Bench judgments, which were binding on the Single Judge as well as on the parties.
The respondents emphasized that during the hearing before the Single Judge, both parties had unequivocally agreed that the controversy was covered by existing precedents. This agreement was duly recorded in the judgment, and the writ petition was decided on that basis. Therefore, the State could not now be permitted to resile from its own concession and seek to reopen the issue.
It was further argued that the principle of finality in litigation is essential for the proper functioning of the judicial system. Allowing parties to re-agitate issues that have already been settled and conceded would lead to uncertainty and undermine the authority of judicial decisions.
The respondents also contended that the pendency of a restoration application in a separate matter does not dilute the binding nature of existing judgments. Until such judgments are set aside or modified by a competent court, they continue to hold the field and must be followed.
Relying on established legal principles, the respondents argued that statements made by counsel and recorded in a judgment are conclusive and binding on the parties. They submitted that there was no material to suggest that the recording of the concession by the Single Judge was erroneous or inaccurate.
The respondents thus urged the Court to dismiss the appeal, contending that it was devoid of merit and amounted to an attempt to delay the implementation of lawful entitlements.
Judgment:
The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, after a detailed examination of the record and submissions, dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal, reaffirming the binding nature of recorded concessions and the finality of settled legal issues.
At the outset, the Court framed the core issue for determination: whether an order passed by a Single Judge, based on the agreement of counsel that the issue was concluded by binding precedent, could be interfered with in intra-court appellate jurisdiction.
Upon perusal of the judgment of the Single Judge, the Division Bench noted that it had been explicitly recorded that both parties had agreed that the controversy was covered by earlier Division Bench decisions. The writ petition was accordingly allowed on that basis, and the impugned clause of the resolution was quashed.
The Court placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982) 2 SCC 463, which laid down the principle that statements recorded in a judgment as having been made by counsel are conclusive and binding on the parties. The Division Bench reiterated that such recorded statements cannot be contradicted or reopened in subsequent proceedings, except in cases where there is clear evidence that the recording is erroneous.
Applying this principle, the Court held that the State could not be permitted to challenge the correctness of its own concession at the appellate stage. The Bench observed that allowing such a course would not only be contrary to established legal principles but would also undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings.
The Court further noted that the appellants had failed to produce any material to show that the recording of the concession by the Single Judge was incorrect or based on a misunderstanding. In the absence of such evidence, the recorded statement had to be treated as binding.
Addressing the argument regarding the pending restoration application, the Court held that the mere pendency of such an application does not affect the binding nature of existing judgments. Until a judgment is set aside or modified, it continues to be binding and must be followed.
The Division Bench also emphasized that intra-court appellate jurisdiction is not intended to provide a forum for re-agitating issues that have already been settled and conceded. The scope of such appeals is limited to examining the legality and correctness of the impugned order, and not to revisit issues that have attained finality.
In a clear and categorical observation, the Court stated:
“Once the parties agreed before the learned Single Judge that the controversy was concluded by binding precedent, and the order was passed on that basis, the appellants cannot now be permitted to re-agitate the same issue in an intra-court appeal.”
The Court thus found no illegality, infirmity, or procedural irregularity in the order of the Single Judge that would warrant interference. It held that the appeal was devoid of merit and dismissed it accordingly.
This judgment reinforces the principles of judicial discipline, finality, and accountability. It underscores that parties must stand by their representations before the court, and cannot later seek to withdraw or contradict them for strategic advantage. It also highlights the importance of adhering to binding precedents and maintaining consistency in judicial decisions.