Introduction:
In a significant ruling reinforcing the sanctity of judicial process, the Supreme Court of India has held that an absconding accused cannot invoke the principle of parity to seek anticipatory bail merely because co-accused persons have been acquitted after trial. The Court observed that granting such relief would set a dangerous precedent by rewarding those who evade trial while placing law-abiding accused at a disadvantage.
The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Vijay Bishnoi in the case of Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.. The appeal arose from an order of the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court granting anticipatory bail to an accused who had been declared an absconder for nearly six years.
The complainant challenged the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court, contending that parity cannot be claimed by an accused who deliberately evades the process of law and that the acquittal of co-accused does not constitute a change in circumstances warranting anticipatory bail. The State of Madhya Pradesh also supported the appeal, though the Supreme Court questioned why the State had not independently challenged the High Court’s order earlier.
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the anticipatory bail granted to the absconding accused and directed him to surrender before the concerned court within four weeks from February 13, 2026.
Arguments Advanced by the Appellant (Complainant):
The appellant, represented by Mr. Divyakant Lahoti, Advocate-on-Record, assailed the High Court’s order on multiple legal and factual grounds.
First, it was argued that the principle of parity cannot be invoked by an absconding accused who has deliberately avoided participation in the trial. The appellant submitted that parity in bail jurisprudence applies when similarly placed accused persons seek similar relief under comparable circumstances. However, an accused who absconds and evades the judicial process cannot claim to be similarly situated to co-accused who faced trial, cooperated with the investigation, and abided by court proceedings.
The appellant emphasized that the co-accused were acquitted after a full-fledged trial based on evidence led against them. Their acquittal was a consequence of the prosecution’s failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in their specific cases. Such findings, it was argued, were confined to those accused and could not automatically benefit an absconding accused who never subjected himself to trial.
It was further contended that the respondent-accused had earlier filed anticipatory bail applications which had been rejected. Therefore, the acquittal of co-accused did not amount to a “change in circumstances” justifying reconsideration. The appellant maintained that the High Court erred in treating the acquittal as a fresh ground for granting anticipatory bail.
Another significant submission concerned the conduct of the accused. The appellant pointed out that the respondent had absconded for nearly six years, thereby delaying the trial of the co-accused. This conduct not only obstructed justice but also demonstrated disregard for the authority of the court. Granting anticipatory bail in such circumstances would incentivise abscondence and undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system.
The appellant also brought to the Court’s attention allegations that the accused had threatened the injured victim, Shailendra alias Pintu, who was also an eyewitness in the case. An FIR bearing No. 272/2019 dated May 10, 2019 had reportedly been registered against the accused for such threats. This, according to the appellant, further demonstrated that the accused was not entitled to discretionary relief.
On these grounds, the appellant urged the Supreme Court to set aside the High Court’s order and direct the accused to surrender.
Stand of the State and the Respondent-Accused:
The State of Madhya Pradesh supported the appellant’s challenge before the Supreme Court. However, the Bench expressed concern as to why the State had not independently filed an appeal against the High Court’s decision granting anticipatory bail to an absconding accused.
On behalf of the respondent-accused, it was argued that the High Court had rightly exercised its discretion in granting anticipatory bail. The respondent relied heavily on the acquittal of co-accused by the trial court, contending that the prosecution had failed to produce cogent evidence linking the accused persons to the alleged offence.
It was submitted that since the allegations in the FIR were common to all accused, and since the prosecution evidence was found insufficient in respect of the co-accused, the same reasoning should apply to the respondent. The respondent invoked the principle of parity, arguing that similarly placed accused should not be treated differently.
The respondent also contended that anticipatory bail is a protective remedy intended to safeguard personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was argued that denial of anticipatory bail solely on the ground of abscondence would be unjust if the material on record does not prima facie disclose a strong case against the accused.
The defence attempted to portray the High Court’s reasoning as a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion, particularly in view of the trial court’s findings that the prosecution failed to establish the involvement of the accused persons named in the FIR.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
After hearing the parties and examining the record, the Supreme Court found substantial merit in the appellant’s contentions. The judgment, authored by Justice Vijay Bishnoi, categorically held that the acquittal of co-accused does not ipso facto entitle an absconding accused to anticipatory bail on grounds of parity.
The Court emphasized that parity is a principle rooted in fairness and equality. However, equality operates among equals. An accused who absconds and refuses to cooperate with the investigation or trial cannot be equated with co-accused who diligently attend court proceedings.
The Bench observed that granting anticipatory bail to an absconding accused sends a troubling message: that those who comply with the law and participate in trial were misguided, while those who evade justice stand to benefit. Such an approach would incentivise evasion of legal process and erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The Court further held that findings recorded by the trial court in favour of co-accused are wholly irrelevant for deciding the anticipatory bail application of an absconding accused. Since the respondent did not face trial, the prosecution was under no obligation to produce evidence against him during the co-accused’s trial. Therefore, reliance on those findings was legally untenable.
The Supreme Court described the High Court’s reasoning as erroneous and perverse. It noted that the accused had absconded for approximately six years and had “made a mockery of the judicial process.” In such circumstances, he could not be permitted to “encash” upon the acquittal of co-accused.
At the same time, the Court clarified an important legal nuance. While an absconder is generally not entitled to anticipatory bail, there may be exceptional cases where the FIR, case diary, and other materials reveal that no prima facie case is made out against the accused. In such rare situations, courts may exercise discretion to grant anticipatory bail even to an absconding accused.
However, the present case did not fall within that exceptional category. The Court noted that the accused was named in the FIR as a member of the unlawful mob. Additionally, allegations of threatening the injured eyewitness further militated against the grant of anticipatory bail.
Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and directed the accused to surrender before the concerned court within four weeks from February 13, 2026.