Introduction:
The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a reasoned and principled decision, has reiterated a long-settled but often misunderstood principle of criminal jurisprudence: the seriousness of an offence, by itself, cannot justify cancellation of bail or transfer of a criminal trial. The Court underscored that the power to cancel bail or interfere with an ongoing criminal process under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)—corresponding to provisions under the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure—must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances supported by clear and convincing material.
The case arose out of a criminal complaint alleging impersonation of officials of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and extortion of money. The complainant, Vijay Kumar, approached the High Court seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the accused, contending that the accused had misused the liberty of bail by threatening and pressurising him to withdraw the FIR. The accused, who had been granted interim anticipatory bail and later confirmed protection after joining investigation, opposed the plea. The State of Haryana also resisted the petition, asserting that there was no misuse of bail or interference with the investigation or trial.
Justice Sumeet Goel, while dismissing the petition, delivered a detailed exposition on the distinction between grant of bail and cancellation of bail, the evidentiary threshold required for invoking the extraordinary power of cancellation, and the dangers of permitting bail to be revoked merely on the basis of the gravity of allegations. The judgment reinforces constitutional values of personal liberty, procedural fairness, and judicial restraint, while making it clear that bail once granted cannot be cancelled on speculative or unsubstantiated allegations.
Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner (Complainant):
The petitioner, Vijay Kumar, urged the High Court to cancel the anticipatory bail granted to the accused on the ground that the accused had grossly misused the liberty extended by the Court. The petitioner submitted that the allegations in the FIR were extremely serious in nature, involving impersonation of public officials, criminal conspiracy, cheating, forgery, and extortion, which strike at the very root of public trust in law enforcement agencies. It was contended that the accused, along with associates, had posed as officers of the Enforcement Directorate, threatened the petitioner with false implication in tax-related cases, and extracted a sum of ₹2.5 lakh as part of a larger demand of ₹5 lakh.
The petitioner argued that such offences were not ordinary criminal acts but constituted a systematic abuse of authority and fear, warranting strict judicial scrutiny. According to the petitioner, the seriousness and gravity of the offence itself justified cancellation of anticipatory bail, particularly when the accused had allegedly attempted to interfere with the administration of justice after securing protection from arrest.
A central plank of the petitioner’s case was that after obtaining anticipatory bail, the accused had pressurised and threatened him to withdraw the FIR. It was alleged that the accused had visited the petitioner’s workplace along with associates, thereby creating an atmosphere of intimidation. The petitioner submitted that these acts amounted to violation of the conditions of anticipatory bail, particularly those envisaged under Section 438(2) CrPC (now reflected in the BNSS), which require the accused not to influence witnesses or obstruct the investigation.
The petitioner further contended that the Court must adopt a victim-centric approach, especially in cases involving extortion and impersonation of public officials, where victims are often silenced through fear and pressure. It was argued that allowing the accused to remain on bail in such circumstances would send a wrong signal and embolden similar offenders. Emphasis was placed on the Court’s power under Section 439(2) CrPC to cancel bail where the accused has abused the concession granted to him.
In sum, the petitioner urged the Court to look beyond technical compliance with investigation requirements and consider the overall conduct of the accused, the nature of the offence, and the alleged post-bail intimidation as sufficient grounds for cancellation of anticipatory bail.
Arguments on Behalf of the State and the Accused:
Opposing the petition, the State of Haryana submitted that there was no material on record to demonstrate misuse of anticipatory bail by the accused. The State pointed out that the accused had joined the investigation promptly, cooperated with the Special Investigation Team (SIT), and that recoveries had been effected pursuant to disclosures made during investigation. It was emphasised that the investigation had already culminated in the filing of the challan, charges had been framed, and the trial was pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ferozepur Jhirka.
The State categorically stated that it had no complaint regarding interference with the investigation or obstruction of justice by the accused. It was argued that once the investigating agency itself does not allege misuse of bail or intimidation of witnesses, the Court should be slow in accepting unsubstantiated allegations made solely by the complainant.
Counsel for the accused echoed these submissions and contended that the petition was an attempt to re-litigate the issue of bail under the guise of seeking cancellation. It was argued that the law draws a clear distinction between setting aside a bail order on merits and cancellation of bail based on subsequent conduct. Cancellation, it was submitted, requires proof of supervening circumstances, such as violation of bail conditions, intimidation of witnesses, or attempt to flee justice.
The accused denied the allegations of threats and intimidation, submitting that the claims were bald, vague, and unsupported by any independent evidence such as CCTV footage, call records, contemporaneous complaints, or statements of independent witnesses. It was argued that mere assertions by the complainant, without corroboration, could not form the basis for depriving an individual of liberty.
The defence further submitted that seriousness of the offence is a relevant factor at the stage of grant of bail, but once anticipatory bail has been granted after due consideration and the accused has complied with all conditions, seriousness alone cannot justify cancellation. Reliance was placed on settled precedents, including the High Court’s own earlier decision in Dinesh Madan v. State of Haryana, which clearly delineates the narrow scope of bail cancellation.
Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
After hearing the parties at length, the High Court undertook a detailed examination of the legal principles governing cancellation of anticipatory bail. Justice Sumeet Goel began by reiterating that the power to cancel bail is an extraordinary power that must be exercised with great caution. The Court emphasised that cancellation of bail stands on an entirely different footing from rejection of bail at the initial stage. While the latter involves an assessment of the allegations and prima facie material, the former requires proof of subsequent conduct demonstrating misuse of liberty.
The Court noted that in the present case, the accused had been granted interim anticipatory bail on July 20, 2023, which was later confirmed on September 20, 2023, after he joined the investigation. There was no dispute that the accused had complied with the conditions imposed by the Court and had cooperated with the investigating agency.
Addressing the petitioner’s allegations of threats and intimidation, the Court observed that these claims were based solely on the petitioner’s assertions, without any supporting material to prima facie establish interference with the trial or intimidation of witnesses. The Court found it significant that neither the investigating agency nor the prosecution had placed any material before the Court suggesting misuse of bail.
Justice Goel categorically held that seriousness of the offence, by itself, is not a ground for cancellation of bail, once the accused has been found entitled to the concession and has adhered to the conditions imposed. The Court observed that accepting seriousness alone as a ground for cancellation would effectively render the concept of bail illusory and subject liberty to perpetual uncertainty.
Relying on its earlier judgment in Dinesh Madan v. State of Haryana (CRM-M-9029-2023), the Court reaffirmed that bail can be cancelled only upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of supervening circumstances such as misuse of liberty, tampering with evidence, intimidation of witnesses, or violation of bail conditions. Mere apprehensions or allegations, howsoever serious, do not meet this threshold.
The Court further noted that the trial was already pending before the competent court, charges had been framed, and there was no indication that the accused was attempting to derail the proceedings. In such circumstances, exercising the power under Section 439(2) CrPC to cancel anticipatory bail would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail. However, it clarified that its observations were confined to the bail proceedings and should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the pending trial, which would be decided independently on the basis of evidence.