Introduction:

In a crucial ruling reinforcing judicial control over prosecutions arising out of court proceedings, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that when an offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a judicial proceeding, the procedure prescribed under Sections 215 and 379 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) must be strictly followed, and a police officer cannot directly register an FIR without the concerned court first conducting or causing a preliminary inquiry and recording its satisfaction. The judgment was delivered by Justice Vivek Jain while deciding a petition arising from execution proceedings of a money decree where allegations of impersonation and fraudulent furnishing of surety were raised. The proceedings stemmed from a civil dispute in which the petitioners had obtained a money decree, and during the pendency of the first appeal, the judgment debtors deposited a sum of ₹35.25 lakhs before the Executing Court pursuant to an interim order. The Executing Court permitted the decree holders to withdraw the deposited amount on furnishing a solvent surety, and the surety was shown to have been provided by one Jugal Kishore in respect of agricultural land. Subsequently, serious allegations surfaced that the same land had been used as surety multiple times and that Jugal Kishore himself appeared before the court denying that he had ever executed or furnished such surety, alleging that someone had impersonated him. On the basis of these allegations, the judgment debtors filed an application under Section 379 BNSS seeking prosecution of the decree holders and the impersonator for offences allegedly committed in relation to the court proceedings. However, instead of passing a reasoned order on the application or recording its own satisfaction regarding the expediency of prosecution, the Executing Court directed the police to conduct an inquiry and further observed that if the surety was found to be fraudulent, an FIR should be registered and appropriate action taken. This approach raised a significant question of law as to whether the court could delegate its statutory responsibility to the police and permit registration of an FIR without following the mandatory safeguards built into the BNSS, especially when the alleged offence had a direct nexus with judicial proceedings. The High Court was thus called upon to examine the delicate balance between preventing misuse of judicial processes through fraudulent acts and safeguarding individuals from criminal prosecution without judicial scrutiny when the alleged offence is integrally connected with court proceedings.

Arguments:

The petitioners contended that the impugned order of the Executing Court was fundamentally contrary to the statutory framework under the BNSS and violated the mandatory procedure laid down for dealing with offences committed in or in relation to court proceedings. They argued that Section 215 BNSS clearly contemplates offences affecting administration of justice, such as giving or fabricating false evidence, impersonation before court and fraudulent acts relating to judicial processes, and that cognizance of such offences can be taken only in the manner provided under Section 379 BNSS. According to them, Section 379 mandates that the court concerned must first conduct or cause a preliminary inquiry and then form an opinion as to whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to make a complaint in writing. Only after such satisfaction is recorded can a formal complaint be lodged for initiation of criminal proceedings. The petitioners submitted that the Executing Court, instead of discharging this statutory duty, had mechanically shifted the burden to the police by directing that if the surety was found to be fraudulent, the police should register an FIR, thereby completely bypassing judicial application of mind. They emphasized that while a court may seek assistance from the police to ascertain facts, the ultimate decision regarding prosecution cannot be delegated and must remain with the court, as the statute intends to prevent frivolous, vindictive or premature criminal proceedings arising out of judicial processes. The petitioners further argued that such delegation would defeat the very object of Sections 215 and 379, which is to protect parties from harassment and to ensure that prosecutions affecting the sanctity of judicial proceedings are initiated only when the court itself is satisfied that prosecution is necessary in the interest of justice. They also pointed out that the Executing Court did not pass any order on the application filed under Section 379 BNSS, nor did it record any prima facie satisfaction regarding commission of an offence, and therefore its direction to the police was without jurisdiction. On the other hand, the respondents supported the order of the Executing Court and submitted that the allegations involved impersonation and repeated use of the same land as surety, which were serious offences striking at the root of the justice delivery system. They argued that in such circumstances, directing the police to inquire into the matter and register an FIR if wrongdoing was found was necessary to ensure that offenders did not escape criminal liability. According to them, the Executing Court had acted pragmatically in seeking police investigation because impersonation and verification of land records require technical investigation beyond the immediate capacity of a civil court. They contended that insisting on strict procedural compliance at the preliminary stage could delay investigation and allow perpetrators to manipulate evidence or abscond. The respondents further submitted that the order did not finally direct registration of an FIR but only made it conditional upon the outcome of police inquiry, which according to them was sufficient compliance with the spirit of the law. They also argued that the court’s supervisory role would continue since the police were required to submit a report, and therefore no prejudice was caused to the petitioners. Thus, the central conflict before the High Court was between procedural safeguards mandated by statute and the perceived need for swift investigative action in cases involving alleged fraud upon the court.

Judgment:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court carefully examined the statutory scheme of Sections 215 and 379 of the BNSS and held that when an offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court, the law mandates a specific and exclusive procedure for initiating prosecution, which cannot be bypassed by directing the police to register an FIR on their own assessment. Justice Vivek Jain observed that Section 379 BNSS explicitly requires the court concerned to conduct or cause a preliminary inquiry and to form an opinion as to whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to make a complaint in writing. This statutory satisfaction, the Court held, is not a mere formality but a substantive safeguard intended to ensure that criminal prosecution is not lightly initiated in matters arising out of judicial proceedings. The Court clarified that while a court may seek assistance from the police to verify facts or conduct field inquiries as part of the preliminary inquiry, the discretion as to whether a complaint should be made must remain with the court and cannot be left to the police authorities. The High Court categorically held that a police officer cannot directly register a crime for offences under Section 215 BNSS when the alleged offence has been committed in or in relation to a court proceeding, and that only after the court records satisfaction and makes a complaint in writing can criminal law be set in motion. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court found that the Executing Court had not conducted any inquiry of its own, nor had it recorded any prima facie satisfaction that an offence had been committed, nor had it passed any order on the application filed under Section 379 BNSS seeking prosecution. Instead, the Executing Court had simply directed the police to conduct an inquiry and further left it to the police to decide whether an FIR should be registered, which according to the High Court amounted to abdication of judicial responsibility under the statute. The Court observed that although the Executing Court could have directed the police to conduct a preliminary inquiry and submit a report, it was not permissible to allow the police to decide whether criminal proceedings should be initiated, as that decision must be taken by the court after applying its mind to the material on record. The High Court therefore held that the impugned order was legally unsustainable to the extent it permitted registration of an FIR at the discretion of the police. However, instead of quashing the entire order, the Court adopted a balanced approach and modified the order by directing that the police authorities may conduct an inquiry and submit a report to the Executing Court, but that an FIR shall be registered only upon specific orders of the Executing Court after considering the inquiry report and recording its satisfaction as required under Section 379 BNSS. The Court thus preserved the possibility of criminal prosecution if warranted while ensuring strict compliance with statutory safeguards. With this modification, the petition was disposed of, and the High Court reaffirmed that procedural discipline is not a technicality but an essential component of fair administration of justice, especially when criminal law is invoked in matters intrinsically linked with judicial proceedings.