Introduction:

In a significant pronouncement on the contours of arbitral supervision and the limits of writ jurisdiction, the Allahabad High Court has categorically held that it lacks jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an arbitrator under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as it does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction and therefore does not fall within the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act. The ruling was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Kunal Ravi Singh while deciding a batch of writ petitions led by Suryadev Pathak versus Union of India and others, wherein the petitioner sought a time-bound and expeditious disposal of arbitral proceedings arising under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1956. The petitioner, a landowner whose property had been partially acquired for road widening by the National Highways Authority of India, challenged the prolonged delay of over two years in deciding his compensation claim by the Arbitrator-cum-District Magistrate, Gorakhpur. The core legal issue before the Court was whether a writ petition seeking expeditious disposal or extension of the arbitrator’s mandate was maintainable before the High Court, and whether Section 29A of the 1996 Act empowered the Allahabad High Court to intervene in such arbitral proceedings. The judgment decisively answers these questions by reinforcing legislative intent, statutory remedies, and jurisdictional discipline in arbitration law.

Arguments of Both Sides:

On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that the prolonged inaction of the arbitrator in deciding the compensation claim under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act had resulted in grave prejudice, financial hardship, and denial of timely justice. The petitioner contended that his land had been acquired for national highway development, yet the compensation awarded was arbitrary, inadequate, and unsupported by disclosed reasoning, compelling him to invoke statutory arbitration. Despite the passage of more than two years, the arbitral authority failed to adjudicate the claim, rendering the remedy illusory. The petitioner urged that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, was empowered to issue a writ of mandamus directing expeditious disposal of the arbitration proceedings, particularly when the delay was unreasonable and defeated the purpose of the statute. It was further submitted that arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the NHAI Act is distinct from consensual commercial arbitration and involves compulsory statutory arbitration, warranting closer judicial supervision. The petitioner relied on earlier precedents, including Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vs. State of U.P., where the Allahabad High Court had exercised writ jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an arbitrator, arguing that the High Court’s constitutional powers cannot be curtailed by statutory limitations when fundamental fairness and access to justice are at stake. It was also contended that Section 29A should be interpreted purposively to include the High Court within the expression “Court,” especially when the arbitrator is a District Magistrate and the dispute arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

The respondents, representing the Union of India and the National Highways Authority of India, strongly opposed the maintainability of the writ petitions. They argued that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides a complete and self-contained mechanism governing arbitral timelines, remedies, and extensions. It was submitted that Section 29A(4) expressly stipulates that extension of an arbitrator’s mandate can be granted only by the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e)(i), namely the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district or a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Since the Allahabad High Court admittedly does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it was contended that it lacks statutory competence to entertain applications under Section 29A or to issue directions indirectly achieving the same result through writ jurisdiction. The respondents emphasized that the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy before the competent civil court bars the invocation of writ jurisdiction, particularly in arbitration matters where legislative intent is to minimize judicial interference. It was further argued that once the statutory period of 12 months had expired without consent of parties, the arbitrator’s mandate had automatically terminated, rendering him functus officio, and no writ could be issued against an arbitrator whose mandate no longer subsists. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents, including Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/s BSC & C&C JV, to underscore that courts must strictly adhere to the statutory scheme of Section 29A and respect the designated forum for extension of mandate.

Court’s Judgement:

After a detailed examination of the statutory framework, legislative intent, and judicial precedents, the Allahabad High Court dismissed all the writ petitions as not maintainable. The Bench held that Section 3G(6) of the NHAI Act clearly provides that arbitration proceedings under Section 3G(5) are governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, subject to the provisions of the NHAI Act. Consequently, Section 29A of the 1996 Act squarely applies to such proceedings. Interpreting Section 29A alongside the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)(i), the Court held that Parliament has consciously and unambiguously designated the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction as the competent authority to extend the mandate of an arbitrator. The High Court emphasized that the definition of “Court” is exhaustive and deliberately excludes High Courts that do not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Since the Allahabad High Court does not possess such jurisdiction, it cannot assume powers under Section 29A, either directly or indirectly. The Court observed that allowing writ petitions for expeditious disposal or extension of mandate would amount to bypassing the statutory forum and defeating legislative intent. It further held that once the statutory period of 12 months has expired without consent, the arbitrator’s mandate automatically comes to an end, and the arbitrator becomes functus officio. In such circumstances, issuing a writ of mandamus against the arbitrator would be legally impermissible unless his mandate is first restored by the competent civil court under Section 29A(4). The Bench expressly disapproved the earlier approach in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., clarifying that though writ jurisdiction had been exercised in that case, it ought not to be exercised ordinarily when a specific statutory remedy exists. The Court concluded that the existence of a designated statutory forum bars writ jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the period of 18 months has expired, and judicial discipline requires strict adherence to the arbitral framework enacted by Parliament. Accordingly, all writ petitions were dismissed.