Introduction:

In Union of India v. Pranab Kumar Nath (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1250), the Supreme Court of India examined the legality of dismissal from service of a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. The case raised significant questions concerning the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, proportionality of punishment in disciplinary proceedings, and the nature of service conditions applicable to uniformed and disciplined forces.

The respondent, Pranab Kumar Nath, joined the CISF as a constable in 2006. Nearly a decade into his service, a written complaint was lodged in March 2016 by his legally wedded wife. The complaint alleged that Nath had solemnised a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting and had further neglected his wife and minor daughter. Acting upon the complaint, CISF authorities initiated disciplinary proceedings against him for grave misconduct under the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001.

After a full-fledged departmental inquiry, the charges were found to be proved. Consequently, on 1 July 2017, the Senior Commandant dismissed Nath from service. His statutory appeal and revision within the CISF hierarchy were rejected, affirming the punishment of dismissal.

Aggrieved, Nath approached the High Court under Article 226. The High Court, while not disputing the finding of misconduct, interfered with the punishment, holding that dismissal was disproportionately harsh. The matter was remanded to the authorities to impose a lesser penalty. Challenging this interference, the Union of India approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review in disciplinary matters.

The Supreme Court, in allowing the appeal, restored the dismissal and delivered an important judgment reiterating the limited role of constitutional courts in matters of disciplinary punishment, especially in the context of disciplined forces.

Arguments on Behalf of the Union of India:

The Union of India assailed the High Court’s judgment primarily on the ground that it amounted to an impermissible appellate reassessment of punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. It was argued that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, could not substitute its own views on proportionality of punishment unless the penalty imposed was so outrageously disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the court.

The Union emphasised that the respondent had been charged under Rule 18(b) of the CISF Rules, 2001, which categorically prohibits a member of the force from entering into a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage without prior permission of the competent authority. This rule, it was contended, is clear, unambiguous, and forms a core service condition for maintaining discipline and integrity in the force.

It was further argued that the departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with law. The respondent was afforded due opportunity to defend himself, principles of natural justice were complied with, and the findings of guilt were based on evidence on record. There was no procedural infirmity, perversity, or violation of statutory rules that could justify judicial interference.

The Union of India also stressed the unique nature of uniformed services such as CISF. Discipline, moral conduct, and adherence to service rules are essential for maintaining public confidence and operational efficiency. Bigamy, particularly when expressly prohibited by service rules, constitutes grave misconduct warranting stringent punishment.

Reliance was placed on a long line of precedents including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995), Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015), and Union of India v. K.G. Soni (2006), to argue that courts cannot reappreciate evidence or reassess punishment merely because they consider it harsh. The High Court, it was submitted, erred in factoring in personal hardship and financial consequences, which are irrelevant considerations in disciplinary jurisprudence.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent Employee:

On behalf of the respondent employee, it was contended that while contracting a second marriage may amount to misconduct under the CISF Rules, the punishment of dismissal from service was excessively harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

The respondent relied on the doctrine of proportionality, arguing that punishment must be commensurate with the nature of misconduct. It was submitted that dismissal not only deprived the employee of his livelihood but also adversely affected his dependent family members, including children, thereby imposing undue hardship.

The respondent also sought to draw a distinction between misconduct affecting official duties and acts pertaining to personal life. It was argued that the alleged second marriage did not have a direct nexus with discharge of official duties and, therefore, did not warrant the severest penalty available under service rules.

It was further submitted that the High Court, as a constitutional court, is empowered to intervene where punishment appears arbitrary or excessive. According to the respondent, the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction judiciously by recognising the misconduct but directing reconsideration of punishment in the interest of fairness and equity.

The respondent thus urged that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the High Court’s discretion, particularly when the High Court had not exonerated him but only directed imposition of a lesser penalty.

Issues for Consideration:

• From the rival submissions, the Supreme Court was essentially called upon to decide
• Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by interfering with the punishment imposed in a disciplinary proceeding.
• Whether dismissal from service for contracting a second marriage during subsistence of the first marriage, in violation of CISF Rules, was disproportionate or arbitrary.
• Whether considerations of personal hardship and financial consequences can justify judicial interference with disciplinary punishment in a disciplined force.

Supreme Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:

The Supreme Court, speaking through a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi, allowed the appeal and restored the dismissal order. The judgment is a reaffirmation of well-settled principles governing judicial review in service jurisprudence.

• Limited Scope of Judicial Review under Article 226:

The Court began by reiterating that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 does not function as an appellate authority over disciplinary proceedings. Judicial review is confined to examining the decision-making process, not the decision itself.

The Bench emphasised that interference is warranted only in limited circumstances, such as:

• Violation of principles of natural justice
• Non-compliance with statutory rules
• Absence of evidence to support findings
• Punishment being so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the court

Relying on B.C. Chaturvedi and P. Gunasekaran, the Court cautioned that reappreciation of evidence or substitution of punishment is impermissible merely because the court considers a different penalty more appropriate.

• Nature and Purpose of Rule 18 of CISF Rules:

The Court undertook a detailed examination of Rule 18 of the CISF Rules, 2001. It observed that the prohibition on bigamy is not a moral censure but a service condition designed to preserve discipline, integrity, and public confidence in uniformed services.

The Bench highlighted that members of disciplined forces are expected to maintain the highest standards of conduct, both in personal and professional life. Acts leading to domestic discord, divided responsibilities, or financial vulnerability can adversely impact mental and psychological stability, which is crucial for operational efficiency.

The Court clarified that such service rules are well within the employer’s domain and cannot be diluted merely because their enforcement leads to unpleasant consequences. The rule, the Court noted, is clear and unambiguous, leaving no scope for lenient interpretation.

• No Ambiguity, No Procedural Lapse:

The Supreme Court found no procedural infirmity in the disciplinary proceedings. There was no allegation of denial of opportunity, violation of natural justice, or non-compliance with prescribed procedure. The respondent did not dispute the factum of second marriage, and the charge stood proved.

Invoking the principle that penal provisions must be strictly construed, the Court observed that in the present case, there was no ambiguity that could operate in favour of the delinquent employee. The conditions triggering the penal consequence flowed directly from the language of the rule.

• Doctrine of Proportionality and ‘Shock the Conscience’ Test:

On the issue of proportionality, the Court held that dismissal for bigamy in a disciplined force cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate. The High Court erred in substituting its own notion of fairness for that of the competent authority.

The Bench categorically held that considerations such as financial hardship or impact on family members, though sympathetic, are legally irrelevant while examining the validity of disciplinary punishment imposed in accordance with service rules.

• Application of the Maxim “Dura Lex Sed Lex”:

The Court invoked the maxim dura lex sed lex — the law is hard, but it is the law — to underline that hardship or inconvenience resulting from enforcement of a legal provision cannot be a ground to dilute or ignore its mandate.

The Court observed that once a rule clearly prescribes consequences for violation, courts cannot soften its application based on equitable considerations alone.

• Error of the High Court:

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court committed a clear jurisdictional error by interfering with the punishment without finding any illegality, procedural violation, or perversity. By directing reconsideration of punishment, the High Court effectively assumed the role of an appellate authority, which is impermissible.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Single Judge and the Division Bench and restored the dismissal order passed by the CISF authorities.