Introduction:

In proceedings arising out of the Elgar Parishad–Bhima Koregaon case, the Bombay High Court on Tuesday expressed a clear inclination to relax a stringent bail condition imposed on rights activist Gautam Navlakha, which presently restrains him from leaving Mumbai without prior permission of the court. The matter was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Bharati Dangre and Justice Shyam Chandak, while considering Navlakha’s plea seeking permission to relocate to Delhi, his permanent place of residence.

Navlakha, aged 73 years, is presently on bail and contends that continuing to reside in Mumbai has become financially and emotionally unsustainable. He emphasized that he is away from his family, is not originally from Mumbai, and that the trial has not even commenced, with his discharge application pending for nearly three years. The High Court’s observations during the hearing reflected a strong concern for the human, personal, and constitutional dimensions of liberty, particularly when weighed against prolonged delays in criminal proceedings. The case thus raises important questions about the reasonableness of bail conditions, the balance between individual liberty and prosecutorial apprehensions, and the need for sensitivity when courts deal with elderly undertrial accused in long-pending cases.

Arguments:

On behalf of Gautam Navlakha, Senior Advocate Yug Chaudhary urged the Court to adopt a humane and pragmatic approach while assessing the bail condition restricting his movement. It was argued that Navlakha is 73 years old, facing severe financial distress, and is effectively being forced to live away from his family and social support system in Delhi. The senior counsel submitted that his client has “become bankrupt” and cannot afford to maintain himself in Mumbai, where he has no permanent home or family base. Emphasizing that Delhi is Navlakha’s permanent residence, Chaudhary pleaded that allowing him to return there would restore a sense of dignity and normalcy to his life without in any manner prejudicing the prosecution.

Chaudhary further highlighted that the trial has not commenced till date, and even more significantly, Navlakha’s discharge application has remained pending for the last three years without any response or progress from the prosecution. According to the defence, such prolonged inaction cannot be permitted to operate as a continuing punishment through restrictive bail conditions. The senior counsel argued that “the prosecution cannot be allowed to turn into persecution,” particularly when liberty is curtailed for years without adjudication on charges.

The defence also traced the background of Navlakha’s custody, pointing out that he was initially placed under house arrest at his Delhi residence before he surrendered and was later incarcerated. This, according to the defence, demonstrates that even at earlier stages, the authorities did not consider Delhi residence to be a risk factor. It was further submitted that Navlakha has scrupulously complied with all bail conditions, initially attending trial court proceedings twice a month and later once a month, despite the fact that charges have not been framed. An assurance was given to the High Court that Navlakha would continue to attend every hearing, and if permitted to stay in Delhi, he could attend proceedings from the NIA office in Delhi, and travel to Mumbai whenever specifically directed by the Court.

Opposing the plea, Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh, appearing for the prosecution, argued that permitting Navlakha to relocate outside Mumbai could set a wrong precedent. The ASG contended that several other accused persons in the Bhima Koregaon case belong to different States such as Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, and if Navlakha is granted this relief, other accused may also seek similar relaxations, thereby diluting the discipline of bail conditions imposed by courts. According to the prosecution, such an order could open the floodgates for similar applications, complicating the monitoring of accused persons in sensitive cases.

The ASG further pointed out that the special court had earlier granted Navlakha permission to visit Delhi on two occasions, each time for a period of two months, thereby demonstrating that adequate flexibility already exists within the system. He submitted that whenever Navlakha wishes to travel or stay outside Mumbai, he could approach the special court, which would consider such requests on a case-to-case basis. Therefore, according to the prosecution, there was no compelling need to permanently relax the bail condition.

In response, the Bench repeatedly questioned the prosecution’s stance, particularly in light of Navlakha’s advanced age, financial hardship, and prolonged delay in the proceedings. Justice Dangre observed that none of the prosecution’s submissions demonstrated that Navlakha posed a flight risk. The Court emphasized that opposition based solely on the fear of precedent cannot override the individual facts and circumstances of a case. Justice Dangre poignantly remarked that a person of Navlakha’s age, living away from his family and social environment, could feel “uprooted” and “lost,” underscoring the psychological and emotional cost of such restrictions. The Bench ultimately asked the prosecution to specify what additional conditions, if any, it wished to impose, indicating that the Court was inclined to allow relocation subject to safeguards.

Judgment:

While the matter has been adjourned for further hearing, the oral observations and directions of the Bombay High Court unmistakably signal its inclination to relax the bail condition restraining Gautam Navlakha from leaving Mumbai. The Court placed significant emphasis on Navlakha’s age of 73 years, his separation from family, the financial burden of living in Mumbai, and the extraordinary delay in commencement of trial and disposal of the discharge application. The Bench made it clear that bail conditions cannot operate as a substitute for punishment, particularly when the judicial process itself has moved at a glacial pace.

Justice Bharati Dangre’s remarks reflect a strong constitutional perspective that personal liberty under Article 21 must be balanced with procedural safeguards, and that restrictions imposed at the stage of bail must remain reasonable, proportionate, and non-oppressive. The Court expressly noted the absence of any material placed on record by the prosecution to suggest that Navlakha is a flight risk or that his relocation to Delhi would prejudice the conduct of the trial. Instead of accepting abstract concerns about precedent, the Bench focused on tailoring conditions specific to the individual accused.

By asking the prosecution to suggest additional conditions rather than opposing the relief outright, the Court reinforced the principle that bail jurisprudence is rooted in individualized justice, not blanket rules. The matter was adjourned to the following day to enable the ASG to seek instructions on possible safeguards, but the tenor of the hearing clearly suggests that the High Court is prepared to permit Navlakha to relocate to Delhi, subject to conditions ensuring his availability for trial. The outcome, once formally pronounced, is likely to reaffirm that human dignity, age, and prolonged delay are relevant and compelling factors in deciding the scope of bail conditions.