Introduction:

In Shakeel Pasha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Writ Appeal No.1143/2025, the Andhra Pradesh High Court was confronted with a challenge that arrived nearly two decades too late. The appellant, Shakeel Pasha, had purchased a parcel of land in 1990, only to later discover that in 1996 the Revenue Divisional Officer had cancelled the land assignment, resumed the land to the government, altered its nature and further granted it on lease to M/s Lakshmi Granites. According to the appellant, all this occurred without his knowledge, and he remained oblivious to the cancellation for twenty long years. When he finally approached the High Court in 2016 challenging the 1996 resumption, a Single Judge dismissed his writ petition on the grounds of extraordinary delay, absence of proof of possession and third-party rights having arisen in the meantime. Aggrieved by the dismissal, he filed the present writ appeal. The Division Bench comprising Justice R. Raghunandan Rao and Justice TCD Sekhar examined whether a litigant who has slept over his rights for twenty years can revive a challenge relating to land assignment, especially when the land has long been leased out, utilised and third-party rights have crystallised.

Arguments of the Appellant:

The appellant argued that he had lawfully purchased the land in 1990 and had no knowledge of the cancellation order passed in 1996 by the Revenue Divisional Officer. He contended that the resumption was carried out behind his back, that no notice was ever served upon him and that the authorities had illegally resumed the land and leased it out without following due process. He asserted that he remained under the bona fide impression that the land continued to be in his name and that only in 2016 did he become aware of the cancellation, prompting him to approach the High Court. The appellant attempted to justify the delay by arguing that the cancellation was never communicated to him and that the State had suppressed material facts. He further claimed that since his land was resumed without his knowledge, the long lapse of time should not extinguish his right to question an illegal administrative action. Although he admitted that the land had been leased to M/s Lakshmi Granites for 15 years and later renewed till 2034, he insisted that such lease could not override his original rights arising from his purchase. He maintained that the governmental authorities acted arbitrarily, contrary to principles of natural justice and that the Single Judge erred in rejecting his writ solely on the ground of delay without appreciating the alleged illegality in the initial resumption order. He urged the Division Bench to set aside the Single Judge’s order and restore his rights over the land, contending that a void order can be challenged at any time, regardless of the delay.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The State and the revenue authorities countered the appellant’s claims by arguing that the writ petition itself was hopelessly delayed by twenty years and that the appellant had no valid explanation for this extraordinary lapse of time. They maintained that before passing the 1996 cancellation order, a notice was indeed issued to the appellant, but he chose not to appear or file objections, leading to the lawful resumption of the land. They further highlighted that from 1996 onwards the land was not in the appellant’s possession and had been leased to M/s Lakshmi Granites in 1997, with the lease later renewed, thereby creating third-party rights that could not be easily disturbed. The respondents emphasised that the appellant had not produced a shred of evidence to prove that he ever remained in possession after 1996, nor had he shown any tangible steps taken by him to assert his rights for two decades. They also pointed out the glaring omission of the appellant to implead the leaseholder, despite being fully aware of the lease. This omission, according to them, reflected that the appellant was engaging in “chance litigation” without any substantive basis. They submitted that entertaining such belated claims would destabilise settled rights, undermine administrative certainty and open the floodgates for stale claims. The State argued that the Single Judge correctly dismissed the writ petition and that no interference was warranted.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court delivered a detailed and reasoned judgment, upholding the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition and firmly reiterating that courts cannot entertain stale claims filed after decades, especially where third-party rights have already crystallised. The Bench observed that the appellant had not denied that the land had been leased to M/s Lakshmi Granites, which clearly indicated that he was not in possession of the land from 1996 onwards, when the government resumed it through the order dated 18.11.1996. The Court highlighted that the appellant had failed to file even a minimal piece of evidence showing possession, control or interference with the land for the last two decades. This, the Court held, was fatal to his case because a writ petitioner seeking relief against an administrative action must at least demonstrate his subsisting interest or possession over the property in question. The Court further emphasised that the appellant did not implead the leaseholder Laxmi Granites, despite admitting that the land had been leased, which rendered the writ petition defective. When a person’s rights are likely to be affected by a judicial order, that person must be made a party; the failure to implead is not a trivial procedural lapse but a substantive flaw that strikes at the root of the proceedings. The Court noted that the appellant furnished no plausible explanation for the twenty-year delay and appeared to have woken up only when the land had gained economic value, suggesting speculative and opportunistic litigation. Relying on well-established jurisprudence that writ courts do not entertain belated and stale claims, particularly when third-party rights have intervened, the Bench held that reopening a resumption order passed in 1996 would disproportionately affect the rights of the leaseholder and disturb settled affairs. The Bench also underscored the principle that though writ jurisdiction is discretionary, such discretion cannot be exercised in favour of a litigant who has been negligent, inactive or indifferent for an inordinate period. In the present case, the appellant’s silence for two decades, his inability to justify the delay, his failure to implead necessary parties, and his lack of evidence regarding possession collectively revealed that the writ petition was an afterthought. The Court sternly remarked that litigation cannot be revived after twenty years merely on vague claims of lack of knowledge, especially when the appellant was fully aware of the lease, renewals and ongoing activity on the land. The Court found the reasoning of the Single Judge fully sound and legally correct, concluding that there was no error warranting interference. Ultimately, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal, bringing the prolonged and speculative litigation to an end.